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 Adam Smith made significant changes to the 6th and final edition of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (TMS) that altered both the argument and tone of the work. These changes appear to 
be a response to the flaws inherent in conventional morality and the corruptive influence 
commercial society has on our pursuit of happiness. The concept of praiseworthiness is essential 
to understanding the changes Smith made to the 6th edition of TMS and how these fit together to 
redefine his argument. The existing literature on Smith has neglected the concept of 
praiseworthiness and has thus offered incomplete understandings of TMS. By focusing on 
praiseworthiness I attempt to provide a more complete analysis of Smith’s argument and its 
significance. I argue that the key to understanding praiseworthiness is the teleological framework 
outlined by Smith within TMS. This teleology tells us how we can perfect ourselves by 
following the golden rule and thus how to live a life of virtue and happiness. Prior to the 6th 
edition of TMS Smith focused on a descriptive analysis of sympathy and how this made social 
cohesion possible. The changes made to the 6th edition supplement this descriptive analysis by 
offering a normative argument that prioritizes self-perfection over social cohesion. 
Praiseworthiness facilitates the development of an authoritative and independent conscience 
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In the 6th edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) Smith develops the concept 
of praiseworthiness as an alternative to the potentially corruptive influence of conventional 
morality. The existing literature on TMS has neglected this concept and as a consequence created 
a gap in our understanding of Smith’s moral philosophy. TMS cannot be fully and properly 
understood without a complete analysis of praiseworthiness. By focusing on praiseworthiness, 
and how it relates to other changes made to the final edition of TMS, I intend to fill in any gaps 
in our understanding of the work and offer a more complete picture of Smith’s moral philosophy. 
Praiseworthiness facilitates the pursuit of self-perfection we ought to follow if we want to avoid 
moral corruption and live virtuous, tranquil lives. However, despite offering a path of self-
perfection, Smith is vague as to how we can reliably determine what praiseworthiness is and thus 
how to develop virtue and attain tranquility. Consequently, the theory of self-perfection offered 
in TMS’ final edition is incomplete. A potential source for determining what praiseworthiness 
entails—and thus how to self-perfect—is Smith’s teleology. Smith regularly invokes and Author 
of Nature to reveal a telos immanent within human nature. We become praiseworthy, and attain 
our telos, when we conform to this Author of Nature’s providential plan. 
The concept of praiseworthiness is a part of the significant changes made to the final 
edition of TMS. These changes to the 6th and final edition of TMS suggest that Smith had grown 
dissatisfied with the development and direction of conventional morality (i.e. propriety).1 The 
source of this dissatisfaction is commercial society and our propensity to mistake the mere 
appearance of happiness for the real thing. Prior to its 6th edition, TMS focused on an empirical 
moral theory that explained how moral rules and standards of judgment are created and refined 
over time and how social cohesion was possible. Additionally, within the first five editions of 
                                                 
1 Hiroshi Mizuta argues that Smith acknowledged the existence and role of public opinion and individual conscience 
in Moral Philosophy and Civil Society. Andrew Skinner and Thomas Wilson, eds. (Oxford, UK, Clarendon Press, 
1975) p.127-128. According to Mizuta by the 6th edition Smith had prioritized the supremacy of conscience over 
social conventions. He speculates that what led to this was the publication of The Wealth of Nations, the execution 
of Jean Calas, and the French Revolution. Vivienne Brown (1994) in Adam Smith’s Discourse claims that the Stoic 
structure of TMS is deeply critical of commercial society (p.3). However, this critique only becomes significant in 
the final edition. Accordingly, Hanley (2009) argues that the additions to TMS’ 6th edition are a response to—and 
remedy for—the moral failings of commercial society (p.5). Forman-Barzilai (2010) echoes this, claiming that 
authority of conscience was developed by Smith as a means to escape corruption. Likewise, Griswold (1999) claims 
Smith no longer trusted the “harmonious order” of the universe to protect morals (p.329). 
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TMS there is a general assumption that commercial society would produce the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number of people. However, by 1790 it appears as though Smith had come to 
believe that commercial society corrupted morality, making people vain and miserable.2 
Consequently, he supplemented the empirical account of morality with a normative argument 
about what morality should look like and what type of people we ought to become.3 To 
accomplish this, the theory of self-perfection is superimposed on to the preexisting theory that 
prioritized social cohesion over individual excellence. This path of self-perfection provides a 
means for individuals to depart from conventional morality which may be necessary to the 
pursuit of happiness. The path of self-perfection is a product of three significant changes made to 
the 6th edition of TMS.4 The development of an authoritative conscience allows individuals to 
diverge from conventional morality, especially in instances where these conventions appear to be 
corrupted. This authoritative conscience (i.e. the impartial spectator) speaks to us with the voice 
of Nature and allows us to pursue true happiness rather than its mere appearance. The theory of 
moral corruption developed in the final edition of TMS explains how commercial society 
distorts morality and how this distortion leads us away from happiness and towards misery. 
Subsequently, Smith’s theory of moral corruption helps to explain why an authoritative 
conscience might be necessary. Finally, the virtue ethics developed by Smith in TMS’ 6th edition 
provides the necessary target and content for our pursuit of self-perfection. The cardinal virtues 
of prudence, benevolence, and self-command define what self-perfection is and how it can be 
attained. The concept of praiseworthiness explains how these three significant changes fit 
together into a coherent whole. Ultimately it is the pursuit of praiseworthiness that allows our 
                                                 
2 According to Rasmussen (2008) Smith’s criticism of commercial society borrows heavily from Rousseau (p.6). 
However, as Rasmussen later points out, Smith retains his support for commercial society (p.159). One of 
commercial society’s deepest flaws is the perpetuated belief that the rich and powerful are happy, largely due to the 
attention they receive. See Griswold (1999) p.128. Fleischacker (2004) adds to this by arguing that wealth is more 
obvious than virtue and that material goods seem easier to attain (p.115). However, despite his criticism of it, Smith 
believes that only commercial society can generate the wealth needed for happiness (Alvey, 2003, p.93).  
3 For interpretations of Smith as a strict social scientist see T.D. Campbell, Adam Smith’s Science of Morals 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), Andrew Skinner, A System of Social Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), and Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics ((Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Such interpretations 
typically advocate historical readings of TMS and all must explain away the roles of Providence and a benevolent 
deity.  
4 The editors of the Glasgow Edition of TMS have tracked and contextualized these changes. My focus is on how 
these changes fit together and map on to the preexisting arguments of the first five editions. One of the important 
themes that comes out of these changes is Smith’s increasing concern with the excellence of character (see 
Griswold, 1999, p.179-180).  Accordingly, Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that in the 6th edition Smith provides a 
path to Stoic self-perfection.  
3 
 
authoritative consciences to escape the corrupt conventions of society and attain a life of virtue 
and happiness.  
 My focus in this work is on the significant changes Smith made to the final edition of 
TMS and how they fit together to create a theory of self-perfection facilitated by the concept of 
praiseworthiness. Thus, I argue that the 6th edition of TMS introduces a second morality that is 
distinct from, and superior to, the morality present in the first five editions. Unlike the editors of 
the Glasgow edition of TMS and Charles Griswold in Adam Smith and the Virtue of 
Enlightenment I believe these changes supplement the empirical analysis of human nature and 
the operation of sympathy with a normative argument on how one ought to live.5 This approach 
necessarily puts my own approach at odds with the significant body of literature that frames 
Smith as an empirical social scientist.6 This empirical (i.e. Humean) interpretation of TMS is 
more applicable to the first five editions of the book. Prior to the 6th edition, Smith focused on 
constructing a moral psychology that could sufficiently explain existing moral rules and 
standards of judgment. Smith’s analysis of morality and judgment in the first five editions is 
largely descriptive. Smith opts to discuss what society does approve and disapprove of.7 A strong 
example of this approach is Smith’s discussion of virtue within TMS first five editions. In these 
editions Smith discusses virtue from the perspective of what society has routinely and 
consistently agreed is virtuous.8 Consequently, becoming virtuous simply required an individual 
to conform to the preexisting standards of virtue. These predetermined, and conventional, virtues 
are a product of the routine operation of our moral psychology. The empirical interpretations of 
Smith cast him as distinctly modern. TMS is thus understood as a mechanistic explanation of 
                                                 
5 Alvey (2003) claims that Smith does have a theory of eudaimonia that we should all strive for. According to him 
this is attained when we perfect our benevolence (p.40). Macfie (1967) claioms Smith’s theory of human perfection 
(i.e. how we ought to live) reflects Cicero’s synthesis of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (p.44). Forman-Barzilai 
(2010) argues that Smith’s virtue ethics provide an “imaginary perfection […] against which people might compare 
their own mortal and imperfect characters” (p.108).  
6 Smith’s empirical account of human nature remains essential to understanding his more normative claims in TMS’ 
6th edition. Fleischacker (2004) argues that Smith’s account of human nature also includes what we “aspire for” and 
is “never reduced to the desires [we] merely happen to have” (p.63).  
7 The rules of approbation and disapprobation (and by extension the standards of propriety) are based on experience. 
Thus, Otteson (2002) claims that propriety is “backwards looking” (p.82-82). See also Haakonssen (1987) p.43.  
8 Griswold (1999) discusses two different definitions of virtue in TMS. The first, provided by Smith, links virtue to 
propriety by defining it as “uncommonly great and beautiful” (TMS, 32). Later, in Part VI of TMS’6th edition, virtue 
is define as a natural object of our admiration and approval, linking it more directly to the Author of Nature’s 
providential plan and detaching it from mere propriety. See Griswold p.179.  
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human nature. However, I believe these interpretations neglect how the changes Smith made to 
the 6th edition affect the moral psychology and theory articulated in the previous five.  
The changes Smith made to the final edition of TMS provide a more normative 
understanding and perspective on morality. I believe in the 6th edition Smith is more interested in 
intervening in order to improve the reader’s morality and direct us towards a life of virtue that 
superior to conventional morality. Similarly, the references made in TMS to a deity become less 
mechanistic in the 6th edition, suggesting Smith believes humanity has strayed away from 
Nature’s plan by opting to pursue riches and greatness. I argue that in TMS’ final edition Smith 
has returned to a more ancient moral perspective that preferences what moral rules and standards 
of judgment should be over what they actually are. This approach is facilitated through a 
teleology based upon conformity with Nature and a subsequent path of self-perfection capable of 
breaking away from the potentially flawed moral conventions.9 In constructing this path of self-
perfection Smith does not abandon the empirical accomplishments of TMS’ earlier editions. The 
teleology contained in the 6th edition is superimposed upon the existing moral psychology, 
subsequently offering two diverging, and perhaps potentially conflicting, moral theories. The 
preexisting conventional morality can still be relied upon to produce a peaceful and opulent 
society. However, the 6th edition casts significant doubt on whether conventional morality can 
reliably produce individual happiness (understood by Smith as tranquility).10 Though it relies on 
the moral psychology constructed in the previous editions, the theory of self-perfection offered in 
the 6th edition promises to deliver us to happiness by promoting what we ought to pursue in lieu 
of conforming to existing conventional morality. However, though Smith believes the pursuit of 
self-perfection to be superior he does acknowledge its limitations as well as the merits of 
                                                 
9 Both the introduction and conclusion of Part VI confirm that the cardinal virtues of prudence, benevolence, and 
self-command are recommended to us by Nature (TMS, 250, 308). In his initial comments on benevolence Smith 
highlights the Stoic origins of virtue (TMS, 258). These virtues depend on a “rule of emotions by conscience”. See 
Griswold (1999) p.12.Alvey (2003) argues that living in accordance with Nature promotes the perfection of our 
nature and the peace and order of society (p.33). However, Alvey later claims that these two ends—the peace and 
order of society and human perfection—are at odds with each other (p.256).  
10 Hanley (2009) argues that this is because, for Smith, commerce necessarily corrupts our natural self-love (p.6). 
The conflict between commercial society and perfection is one of the main themes in Alvey’s Adam Smith: Optimist 
of Pessimist? A New Problem Concerning the Basis of Commercial Society.  
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conventional morals.11 Furthermore, because the pursuit of self-perfection remains dependent 
upon preexisting conventional morality whether or not Smith has succeeded in providing a path 
to true happiness remains questionable.  
Praiseworthiness ties the changes made to TMS’ 6th edition together and facilitates the 
successful pursuit of self-perfection. Consequently, to understand the 6th edition, and Smith’s 
intention in writing it, we must explain what praiseworthiness is and how it operates. This 
concept has been largely neglected by the secondary literature. Typically praiseworthiness has 
been treated as another form of moral approbation, little different from propriety and praise.12 
These interpretations subsequently cast praiseworthiness as a mere product of conventional 
morality and thus incapable of leading an individual away from the same existing standards of 
behavior and judgment that produce it. These interpretations, I believe, fail to place the concept 
of praiseworthiness in the context of the changes made to TMS’ final iteration. In the light of 
these changes, I argue, praiseworthiness becomes distinct from, and superior to, mere propriety. 
A significant departure from this approach to understanding praiseworthiness is found in 
Evensky’s analysis.13 According to him, praiseworthiness helps to explain how morality evolves 
and improves over time. More important than the societal progress facilitated by 
praiseworthiness is the individual moral progress it allows. Praiseworthiness is what allows us to 
identity and pursue the path of self-perfection outlined in the 6th edition. To effectively 
accomplish this I argue that it must be disentangled from conventional morality. This is 
facilitated by the teleology present in the final iteration of TMS.  
                                                 
11 Haakonssen (1981) argues that propriety creates a set of shared moral standards that, while far from perfect, make 
social life possible (p.55). Mutual sympathy, he argues, is what facilitates this. Alvey argues that all we require for 
this imperfect social cohesion is a “concord” of sympathy (p.43). See also Evensky (2005) p.39-40. 
12 Otteson (2002) connects praiseworthiness to our approval seeking desire for mutual sympathy (p.125-128). 
Griswold (1999) believes it to be revealed through moral reflection. (Alvey (2003) exposes some of the weakness in 
this characterization by establishing propriety as merely what we can approve of in others, and not something we 
should necessarily strive for (p.43). Forman-Barzilai (2010) sees the emergence of a deistic god, speaking to us 
through the impartial spectator, in the intersection between our conscience and the desire to be praiseworthy 
(p.101).My analysis agrees with the latter two authors. If praiseworthiness were a mere part of propriety there would 
be no motivation to distinguish it from actual praise.  
13 I agree with Evensky’s (2005) claim that praiseworthiness facilitates our separation from the conventional morals 
of the crowd (p.45).  
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 The role final causes play in Smith’s moral philosophy is disputed in the secondary 
literature.14 Alvey (2003) points out that Smith never uses the word “teleology” or its derivative 
“telos”.15 Despite this Smith does frequently refer to a “Deity”, “Author of Nature”, and a 
“Providential plan”.16 Haakonssen (1981) and Campbell (1971) agree that there is logic to 
Smith’s philosophy that is independent from any teleology. Thus, Haakonssen argues that any 
references made to teleology in TMS can be discarded in favor of the purely empirical arguments 
made by Smith.17 Similarly, Raphael (1985) argues that TMS is a product of 18th century 
empiricism and that Smith only makes rhetorical references to final causes. Griswold (2006) 
argues that Smith uses teleology as a means to order and explain a seemingly chaotic universe. 
Campbell (1981), Macfie (1967), Skinner (1979), and Winch (1978) all view Smith as a strict 
social scientist with no practical use for final causes. I agree with Viner’s judgment that 
dismissing teleology from Smith’s philosophy renders it unintelligible.18 Similarly, Alvey has 
convincingly argued that Smith’s philosophy relies on the concepts of spontaneous order and 
unintended consequences. In TMS Smith argues that moral rules are not the product of some 
rational calculation but are instead produced by our passions and obedience to the impartial 
spectator (i.e. our conscience). Similar arguments are made about the benefits of commercial 
society in WN.19 The greater good—for ourselves and society—is produced by the unintended 
consequences of our nature, and not by some rational plan made about how to attain the best for 
us and everyone else.20 Furthermore, Alvey has also argued that Stoic explanations of nature 
were more influential in Britain in the 18th century while purely empirical accounts were more 
widely accepted in continental Europe at the time.21 Thus, any attempt to label Smith as a pure 
                                                 
14 Alvey provides a concise discussion of this in “The Secret, Natural Theological Foundations of Adam Smith’s 
Work” Journal of Markets and Morality Vol. 7 No.2 (Fall 2004). In “The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith” History 
of Economic Thought 8(1) p.1-21 Lisa Hill discusses the potential teleological foundation of Smith’s other major 
work, The Wealth of Nations (WN).  
15 See Alvey, Adam Smith: Optimist of Pessimist? A New Problem Concerning the Basis of Commercial Society 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) p.3. 
16 The debate over whether a deity is necessary to Smith’s moral philosophy is reviewed by Jerry Evensky in Adam 
Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.23-25.  
17 For a refutation of treating Smith’s allusions to teleology as unnecessary see Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez-
Faire,” Journal of Political Economy 35 (1927). 
18 Viner, 1927, p.82. 
19 See WN IV.2.9 
20 See Alvey (2004) p.344-345. 
21 Ibid, p. 338.  
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social scientist, uninterested in teleological explanations, based upon his historical context runs 
the risk of being anachronistic. Dismissing the potential role of teleology in Smith’s philosophy 
is counterintuitive to discovering any authorial intent within the text and would ignore the 
significant changes made to TMS’ last edition. If we wish to take Smith at his word it would 
behoove us to understand what role final causes play in his works rather than merely explain 
them away because they clash with the ethos of modern social sciences. 
Text and Context  
 Like Hanley in Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue I prioritize an accurate 
interpretation of the text over the historical context it was written in. This analysis should be 
capable of revealing the meaning of the text while also providing some insight into the author’s 
intent. Thus, focusing on the changes Smith made to the 6th edition of TMS, and how these 
operate, can provide insight into what he may have intended to accomplish with these changes. 
However, a text’s meaning should not be conflated with authorial intent.22 It is logically possible 
for an author to produce something without intending to. Authorial intent serves an essential role 
in limiting what the meaning of a text could be without clearly and absolutely defining what it is. 
This provides some limited flexibility for the reader in interpreting the meaning of a text.  
Historical context undoubtedly plays a role in shaping an author’s understanding and 
writing. For example, the developing forces of commercial society undeniably influenced 
Smith’s thinking throughout all six editions of TMS. However, the insights and arguments 
outlined by Smith in TMS should not be reduced to the context that inspired them and doing so 
risks transforming Smith into a mere pamphleteer.23 There are portions of TMS that can only be 
understood as responses to the problems and questions of the time; however, these are 
surrounded by insights into human nature that transcend mere context. Consequently, I use 
Smith’s historical circumstances to highlight, explain, and further clarify his arguments. In doing 
this I hope to respect the influence of these circumstances and subsequently avoid violating 
Skinner’s (1969) maxim that “[n]o agent can eventually said to have meant or done something 
                                                 
22 Indeed, if intention creates meaning, then the intention of a reader must play some role in creating meaning. See 
Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
23 see Fleischacker (2005) p.xvi.  
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which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or 
done”.24 However, I simultaneously aim to avoid reducing everything Smith said to a byproduct 
of his time and place. Such a reduction, I believe, would sacrifice the “self-awareness” that the 
history of ideas ought to afford us.25  
 In order to understand how historical context may have influenced Smith’s thought it is 
necessary make some reference to his arguments in WN. The dynamics of commercial society 
loom large in Smith’s arguments and WN undoubtedly represents his most mature understanding 
of these. Thus, to properly explain how commercial society shapes our understanding, and 
pursuit, of praiseworthiness I make regular references to WN. Within WN Smith makes the case 
that economics ought to be governed and directed by our self-interest because this motivation 
can be consistently relied upon.26 Pure self-interest is a reliable and dignified means to manage 
an economic system that aims at generating opulence. However, economic pursuits are but one 
aspect of human existence. According to Smith, politics, friendships, and family life all require 
more benevolent considerations and although self-interest may play some role in these 
relationships to reduce them all to this one motivation would be immoral. Additionally, there is a 
distinction to be made in Smith’s writings between self-interest and selfishness.27 Self-interest is 
one of our first principles that, when properly moderated and directed, aims to provide us with 
the necessities of life while simultaneously and gradually improving our condition over time. 
Selfishness, on the other hand, is perhaps better understood as a disposition to ignore our 
benevolent sentiments in favor of a hapless pursuit of riches and greatness. As Smith makes clear 
in his virtue ethics, we can successfully improve our condition without becoming selfish.28 
Understood this way WN can be better understood as a guide for how an individual and society 
                                                 
24 See Skinner, Quentin, 1969. “Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas”, History and Theory 8: 3-53 
(p.28). 
25 See Skinner (1969) p.52-53. Skinner argues that the key to this awareness is distinguishing what is merely 
“contingent” from what is “necessary” about human experience.  
26 See Muller (1993) p.71. 
27  Griswold rightly points out that “selfishness is key to the conflictual and dissolving nature of human life” (p.81). 
However, self-interest is an inherent part of Nature’s harmony.  
28 I am inclined to agree with Fleischacker’s (2005) argument that “self-betterment and vanity are not the same 
thing” (p.113). Through prudence we can improve our lot in life without succumbing to the love of praise. However, 
unlike Fleischacker I do see vanity as an essential part of commercial society’s generation of opulence (p.114).  
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can consistently improve their condition and not solely as a book about the supposed virtues of 
selfishness.  
 My own reading of Smith’s works attempts to strike a balance between the agnosticism 
offered by Vivienne Brown and a strict reading of authorial intent.29An example that skews 
closer to the latter would be Griswold’s Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. In his 
book Griswold attempts to apply the “principle of charity” to interpret what Smith was 
attempting to say and why he may have said it. According to Griswold when reading TMS we 
must assume “Smith knew what he was doing and […] he wrote exactly what he wanted to 
write”.30 This is a valid approach to reading TMS and one I employ, but only to a degree. 
Pushing the principle of charity too far risks distorting a text into something we would like and 
hope it to be by explaining away any conflicts, oversights, or mistakes made by an author. My 
textual analysis accepts that what an author attempts to do may differ from what they actually 
achieve. Consequently, if there are gaps, inconsistencies, or a mistake in Smith’s writing it is up 
to the reader to acknowledge these and, whenever possible, explain them in a way that is 
consistent with the text itself rather than dismiss them as vestigial or unnecessary. This is 
especially important to my own approach and argument. My focus on the additions to the final 
version of TMS may run contrary to Smith’s belief that these did not alter his argument in any 
significant way.31 Clearly I believe Smith to be incorrect in his assessment; the changes made to 
the 6th edition did more than merely highlight and clarify certain points. Much of the focus in 
TMS is shifted by these changes and an entirely new moral path (i.e. self-perfection) is opened 
by them. Although he may have had the pursuit of praiseworthiness in mind when he originally 
began writing TMS this pursuit only becomes possible within the 6th and final edition. However, 
despite this disagreement I do not believe it wise or practical to dismiss authorial intent 
altogether. Such an approach could create even greater distortions of a text by reshaping it into 
what the reader would have said in the author’s place. Striking a balance between agnosticism 
                                                 
29 According to Brown all we can do is read a text with “the greatest possible fidelity” but admits that “meaning is 
constructed in the process of reading rather than lying immanent in the text awaiting discovery” (p.2). Though I 
disagree with Brown’s conclusion and approach I believe her criticism of historical contextualist readings is merited. 
Contextualists are, according to Brown, “entirely unselfconscious about the act of reading itself” (Ibid).  
30 Griswold (1999) p.26. 
31 In his advertisement to the 6th edition Smith claims the changes he made to the text clarify and substantiate the 
arguments he already laid out in the previous five editions.  
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and strict authorial intent ought to open up a text to various readings and understandings without 
necessarily sacrificing accuracy. Additionally, it ought to help us read these texts beyond their 
historical circumstances. 
Outline 
 The first significant change made to the 6th edition of TMS is the successful creation of 
an authoritative conscience.32 Smith initially developed his theory of conscience in the 2nd 
edition. However, in its initial development conscience was a mere reflection of existing social 
conventions as and such it was not properly authoritative. Smith refers to these social 
conventions as propriety. What is proper is whatever a society has consistently approved of. 
Within this paradigm the impartial spectator was nothing more than an echo of existing 
propriety. Thus, prior to the 6th edition conscience was primarily a means to promote adherence 
to the rules of propriety and functioned to help ensure social cohesion. Conscience accomplished 
this by rewarding us with approbation when we obeyed these rules and punished us with 
disapprobation when we did not. By the 6th edition Smith had come to recognize and appreciate 
the flaws in this theory of conscience. Several of these flaws are functional in nature. With 
propriety as the sole means for our conscience to make judgments moral conventions to be 
remarkably similar across time and space and no individuals would have the opportunity of 
breaking away from these without being disapproved of. Thus propriety promotes social 
cohesion by requiring conformity. Furthermore, Smith recognizes that without an authoritative 
conscience there would be no effective way to evaluate the rules of propriety and no individual 
could reliable break away from the rules of propriety and become more than what society 
requires. Mere propriety creates conformity, mediocrity, and a lack of progress. I discuss the 
flaws inherent to propriety and how they necessitate an authoritative conscience in the first 
chapter. I claim that to overcome this Smith seeks to disentangle the impartial spectator by 
liberating it from mere propriety.  
 In the second chapter I argue that Smith sought to create a truly authoritative conscience 
by linking it to the concept of praiseworthiness. Unlike propriety—and even praise—
                                                 
32 Conscience in TMS can be defined as the “inner voice we hear […] telling us whether we have proper motives 
and whether our actions have merit” (Otteson, 2002,  p.66).  
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praiseworthiness ought to be determined by what is truly worthy of approval and not merely 
what has garnered this in the past. Consequently, praiseworthiness is capable of resolving the 
flaws associated with the rules of propriety. However, Smith fails to provide a clear and distinct 
means to determine what praiseworthiness entails. Without this there would be no way for our 
conscience to confidently determine what is praiseworthy, effectively preventing it from 
becoming authoritative. I believe we can discover what praiseworthiness consists of by tying it to 
the teleology present in TMS. If the purpose of praiseworthiness is to perfect our character and 
moral sentiments then knowing what this perfection is, and how it is attained, should help us 
distinguish what is praiseworthy from what is merely proper. According to Smith, the Author of 
Nature designed the human species to successfully pursue tranquility. The conditions required 
for this telos include security, liberty, wealth, dignity, and mutual sympathy. Commercial society 
helps us satisfy these necessary conditions and, thus, helps us pursue tranquility. Additionally, 
the opulence generated by commerce makes it possible for everyone in society to pursue 
tranquility. Consequently, commercial society makes self-perfection more attainable and more 
accessible. Smith’s advocacy of commercial society is thus predicated on his belief that it will 
allow more people to live a life of tranquility than any other society. The desire to be 
praiseworthy is what directs us to the Author of Nature’s providential path and knowing what 
this path consists of ought to help us determine what praiseworthiness entails. Ultimately Smith 
argues that we can use the golden rule to guide us towards praiseworthiness, self-perfection, and 
a life of tranquility.  
 Smith’s theory of moral corruption reaffirms the dangers of relying solely on propriety 
and the subsequent need for an authoritative conscience capable of opposing moral conventions. 
In the third chapter I outline what this theory is, how it relates to self-perfection, and its potential 
symptoms. Additionally, I discuss the conditions that make corruption possible. These include 
the flaws in our nature (i.e. the limits of our moral psychology) and the inequality created (and 
relied upon) by commercial society.33 Moral corruption is caused by the conventional admiration 
the rich and powerful receive in commercial society. According to Smith this admiration causes 
                                                 
33 Material inequality remains an intractable component of commercial society. However, some level of equality 
must exist for justice. See Fleischacker (2004) p.79. Similarly, to make impartial judgments about others we must 
treat them as equals (p.73).  
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us to emulate the presumably superior rich and great and in the process we stray from our 
intended teleological path. I claim that the admiration of the rich and great creates a false telos in 
our imagination and thus confusion about the true nature of happiness and self-perfection. In 
other words, corruption causes us to believe that being rich and powerful will bring us 
tranquility. The pursuit of fortune and power has serious moral consequences. In chapter three, I 
contend that the most direct consequences of moral corruption are anxiety and loneliness. By 
making us anxious and lonely the pursuit of riches and power makes us miserable rather than 
tranquil. This occurs because the desire to be rich and powerful makes us vain. It is the 
consistent praise the rich and great receive in commercial society that attracts our attention and 
the desire to be similarly praised that prompts our emulation. Consequently, corruption distorts 
our natural desire to be praiseworthy in to a love of praise. This turns praiseworthiness against its 
intended purpose (i.e. self-perfection) places us on the path to misery rather than tranquility.34  
 Smith’s theory of moral corruption has consequences for how he perceives commercial 
society. Given how the rules of propriety are created it seems likely that admiring and emulating 
the rich and great would become the norm in commercial society. If this were to occur the vain 
love of praise would become conventional and commonplace. Consequently, the misery created 
by corruption would become more common than the praiseworthy pursuit of tranquility. Though 
it still provides the opportunity for everyone to pursue tranquility commercial society 
simultaneously encourages, and requires, the pursuit of misery.35 I argue in chapter four that in 
order to make self-perfection more accessible and attainable, commercial society requires the 
vain pursuit of riches and greatness. It is the vain desire for luxury and prestige that makes 
commercial society and all its benefits possible. Thus, Alvey (2003) argues that commercial 
society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human happiness.36 If everyone were to 
successfully pursue tranquility production would grind to a halt, wealth would diminish, and the 
very conditions that facilitated this pursuit would vanish. Moreover, Smith makes it clear that the 
                                                 
34 As Fleischacker (2004) correctly points out, the vain are looking for a positional good (p.113). This creates a 
restless striving for more and more praise that leads to anxiety.  
35 This is the lesson of Smith’s parable of the poor man’s son. All the toiling and effort of this individual fails to 
bring them tranquility, but does to improve and ennoble society (TMS, 211-212). 
36 Alvey (2003), p.207.  
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vain pursuit of fortune and power is a part of Nature’s design.37 My claim in chapter four is that 
moral corruption brings the Author of Nature’s providential plan into conflict with itself. Thus, 
the historical ends of Nature (i.e. opulence) no longer promote the attainment of the final cause 
immanent in our human nature. However, commercial society still remains the best possible 
society for the pursuit of tranquility. The Author of Nature is more concerned with alleviating 
poverty and the problems this creates than with promoting individual happiness. Unfortunately, 
there is little that can be done to alleviate this conflict and make the pursuit of tranquility more 
popular and enticing than the vain pursuit of wealth and greatness. This is especially true of 
politics. Smith argues that the primary goal of legislators should be to promote the peace, order, 
and security of society and the continued generation of opulence. Trying to make everyone 
happy, Smith claims, is more likely to create more social problems and more misery. Tragically, 
it appears as though only a few people will ever break away from the corrupted conventions of 
society while the bulk of individuals toil away in misery. The people most likely to do this are 
the so-called “middling classes”. Their position between the extremes of poverty and riches 
should make it less likely to succumb to the delusional temptations of wealth and power and thus 
more likely to follow the golden rule and live a life of praiseworthiness. 
 The development of an authoritative conscience via praiseworthiness culminates with 
Smith’s virtue ethics. The cardinal virtues of prudence, benevolence, and self-command are 
recommended to us by Nature, and allow us to satisfy the material and psychological conditions 
for tranquility. These virtues represent the self-perfection at which praiseworthiness aims. 
Simultaneously these virtues offer an alternative and potential remedy for the temptations and 
symptoms of moral corruption. Prudence offers a reliable escape from the anxious pursuit of 
wealth that satisfies our desire to better our condition and earn the respect and admiration of 
others. Benevolence helps us to avoid the loneliness caused by corruption by allowing us to build 
and maintain relationships of affection with our relatives, friends, and fellow citizens. These 
relationships afford us the opportunity to contribute to the happiness of other people while also 
supporting our own. In doing so benevolence provides us with the mutual sympathy (i.e. peace of 
mind) we require for tranquility. Mutual sympathy indicates that we are worthy of respect, 
                                                 
37 Without the vain pursuit of wealth and power Alvey argues that the entire human species would become 
“indolent” (p.119).  
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admiration, or love thus informing us that we are good people. Finally, self-command helps 
immunize us against the temptations of wealth and power. Self-command controls our 
passions—especially our selfish ones—so that we can consistently follow the golden rule and 
maintain our pursuit of praiseworthiness. Although all of these virtues are recommended to us by 
Nature and our subsequent desire to be praiseworthy, none of them can bring us tranquility on 
their own. Smith makes this point most effectively when he points out that some of history’s 
most self-commanding individuals are also great criminals (TMS, 282). Thus, while we might 
respect and admire a person’s control over their passions we should not consider them 
praiseworthy nor emulate them if they are not also prudent and benevolent. Similarly, a prudent 
individual can successfully and reliably improve their condition without being benevolent. The 
individuals most worthy of our respect and admiration are those who embody all three virtues 
simultaneously. The key to living a praiseworthy and happy life may be emulating these wise 
and virtuous individuals rather than the more seductive lives of the rich and powerful. 
 In order to identify praiseworthiness so that we can live a virtuous and tranquil life, Smith 
recommends moderating our self-interest and increasing our benevolence. Accomplishing this 
should allow our conscience to listen and adhere to the golden rule. According to Smith, the key 
to this conscientious change is gratitude. Gratitude is the benevolent desire to reward people for 
contributing to the well-being of others. Smith argues that the proper development and 
expression of our gratitude is the surest way to prove to others—and by extension ourselves—
that we are worthy of the respect, admiration, and love (i.e. the recognition and mutual 
sympathy) that everyone desires. Furthermore, gratitude increases our benevolence by nurturing 
affectionate relationships and thus helps us more readily identify and obey the golden rule. A 
properly gracious person will have strong bonds with family, friends, and society as a whole and 
this increased benevolence effectively moderates our self-interest. In the final chapter of this 
work I argue that developing our graciousness allows our conscience to identify and pursue 
praiseworthiness and may inevitably lead us to a life of virtue and happiness. 
Conclusion  
  Smith’s arguments in TMS are not without serious flaws. Though Smith sought to 
provide a path of self-perfection that is distinct from, and superior to, existing moral conventions 
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(i.e. propriety), whether or not he accomplished this is not clear. Smith’s arguments rest on the 
reliability of our impartial spectator to accurately determine what is praiseworthy rather than 
what is merely proper. As I noted above, Smith does not explicitly say how we can achieve this. 
Consequently, the reader is left to determine what the standards of praiseworthiness are on 
Smith’s behalf. This creates obvious problems with determining authorial intent. It is possible 
Smith intended praiseworthiness to be nothing more than a subsection of propriety and sought no 
connection to any teleological understanding of nature.38 However, this interpretation of Smith’s 
intent would call in to question his repeated use of teleological arguments. To counter this 
problem I have tried to connect the concept of praiseworthiness to larger arguments and claims 
made by Smith that fit thematically with the pursuit of self-perfection, including allusions to an 
Author of Nature. I believe that connecting praiseworthiness to the teleology present in TMS and 
subsequent virtues provides an analysis of praiseworthiness that reflects Smith’s intended 
meaning and, more importantly, is consistent with text itself.  
  A subsequent flaw in Smith’s theory of self-perfection is a result of his inability (or 
unwillingness) to completely divorce the standards of praiseworthiness from those of mere 
propriety. This occurs at two different levels. According to Smith, the development of our 
conscience begins as an internalization of conventional morality. Smith makes it clear that an 
individual born and raised without any type of societal contact would effectively have no 
conscience (TMS, 134). Exactly at what point the conscience becomes authoritative is thus 
unclear but it seems as though this only occurs after an individual has absorbed and adopted the 
general rules of propriety. Consequently, in order to become praiseworthy a person may first 
have to conform to the potentially corrupt conventions of society. Furthermore, even 
praiseworthy individuals appear to be reliant on the approval of others in order to develop a clear 
conscience and tranquility. Though Smith argues that praiseworthiness is its own reward the 
praise of our own impartial spectators appears to be a poor substitute for mutual sympathy. 
Mutual sympathy is a pervasive and immutable part of Smith’s moral psychology and it cannot 
be achieved if we are not approved of by others and are incapable of returning this approval. 
This problem is reflected in Smith’s virtue ethics. The cardinal virtues outlined by Smith in 
TMS’ 6th edition are still respected and admired by the potentially corrupted, non-virtuous, 
                                                 
38 see Haakonssen (1981) and Campbell (1971).  
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members of commercial society. Even though virtue is recommended to us by Nature (and not 
the praise or approval of others) Smith still constructs a virtue ethics that can be approved of by 
the vain and miserable. Given the rarity of virtue suggested by Smith it seems likely that a 
praiseworthy and virtuous individual would have to rely on the approval of their moral inferiors 
to attain mutual sympathy.  
 As an alternative to moral corruption Smith’s virtue ethics may not sufficiently account 
for the effect our admiration and emulation of the rich and great has on our moral judgment. By 
transforming our natural desire to be praiseworthy into a vain love of praise moral corruption 
may make us incapable of appreciating the merits of a virtuous life and thus unlikely to follow 
the Author of Nature’s plan. Consequently, Smith’s admonishments to live a prudent, 
benevolent, and self-commanding life may fall on deaf ears and those individuals who have been 
seduced by wealth and greatness may see nothing enticing about the sacrifices required to 
become virtuous. This may inevitably reduce the scope of Smith’s normative argument. It may 
be that in attempting to direct our consciences towards praiseworthiness and tranquility, Smith is 
preaching to the converted. Additionally, since commercial society requires moral corruption in 
order to function properly there is little incentive to increase this scope and relieve more people 
of their delusions about happiness. I believe Smith has underestimated the damage moral 
corruption can do to a society. A corrupt commercial society may be capable of making life 
possible without making it desirable and consequently might be generating opulence without any 
of the associated moral benefits. However, without a proper solution corruption may become 
widespread and serious enough to threaten the fabric of society itself. Widespread and 
continuous adulation of the rich and powerful may eventually lead to the undignified dependence 
and dangerous injustices that defined past, barbaric, societies. 
 Regardless of these flaws and Smith’s obviously different historical circumstances I 
believe TMS can help guide our contemporary economic, moral, and political lives. In the 6th 
edition of TMS, Smith offers an understanding of self-perfection that contains important insights 
capable of liberating us from many of our own erroneous assumptions about the nature of 
happiness and prosperity. Consequently, we should not read Smith’s works as mere products of 
their historical conditions, isolated from ours completely, and incapable of addressing our current 
problems and pursuits. Within TMS Smith highlights persistent problems associated with the 
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human condition and possible resolutions to these. Smith’s wisdom and insights should not be 
discarded merely because we find ourselves in a variant of capitalist society instead of a 
commercial one. I believe TMS provides a moral foundation to commerce; a guide to living an 
authentic (i.e. natural) life; a description of happiness that is both attainable and desirable; and a 
means to distinguish ourselves without sacrificing this happiness.39 All of these are contained 
within---and are satisfied by—our pursuit of praiseworthiness. However problematic this pursuit 
of praiseworthiness may be it provides a viable alternative to the vain and miserable quest for 














                                                 
39 Haakonssen (1981) is correct in his assessment that it is our natural desire to be recognized via mutual sympathy 









The Problems of Propriety and the Authority of Conscience 
1.0 Introduction 
 The first significant change Smith made to the final edition of TMS was the development 
of a conscience capable of evaluating and overruling preexisting moral standards. The creation of 
this authoritative conscience facilitates the pursuit of self-perfection. Prior to the 6th edition of 
TMS conscience was dependent on and restricted by the general rules of propriety.40 These rules 
are the unintended, yet necessary, product of the routine operation of our sympathy. Without 
propriety, social life would be impossible.41 Additionally, because our conscience develops first 
as an internalization of propriety these general rules play a fundamental role in shaping our 
conscience. However, so long as our conscience remains bound to these rules it cannot become 
truly authoritative. Our conscience’s role as a reflection of propriety would be to reward our 
obedience to the general rules and punish our disobedience.42 In order to become authoritative 
our consciences must be capable of making judgments about propriety and whether or not we 
should obey its general rules. Otherwise our conscience would operate as nothing more than a 
                                                 
40 In addition to the authority of conscience Smith included an expanded theory of moral corruption and a discussion 
on the cardinal virtues in the 6th edition. For a helpful analysis of the connection between these two other additions 
see Ryan Patrick Hanley, Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). My own discussion of these other additions and how they fit together appears in later chapters.  
41 For a helpful discussion of propriety and its importance see Montes, Adam Smith in Context (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) esp p.97-129. For a more critical understanding of the concept see McKenna, Adam 
Smith: The Rhetoric of Propriety (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006). Additionally, for 
insights into what propriety may actually been for Smith see Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, 
Britain, 1660-1800 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).  
42 For a historical treatment of the development of conscience see Richard Sorabji, Moral Conscience through the 
Ages: Fifth Century BCE to the Present (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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means for ensuring thoughtless adherence to preexisting rules of morality. To become truly 
authoritative our conscience needs standards of moral judgment that are distinct from—and 
superior to—mere propriety. These distinct and superior standards will enable us to make 
judgments about the merits of propriety and, when necessary, overrule it. Smith’s concept of 
praiseworthiness satisfies these conditions. As both a moral motivation and criteria for moral 
judgment praiseworthiness can direct us away from social conformity and mediocrity and 
towards virtue and moral perfection.43 Smith’s development of the authoritative conscience in 
TMS’ final edition exposes several weaknesses inherent in propriety. Though capable of 
producing a tolerably (i.e. imperfectly) just, stable, and happy society, the general rules of 
propriety cannot prevent—or cure—the false beliefs that divert us away from our pursuit of 
happiness.   Through the authority of conscience Smith superimposes a path of self-perfection 
overtop of the pre-existing system of practical social morality.44 This superimposition provides a 
means of escaping the flaws inherent in mere propriety as well as a means for counteracting the 
false ideas and beliefs that may make us miserable.  
The general rules of propriety are a product of our sympathy. According to Griswold 
(1999) these general rules are best understood as maxims or even “rules of thumb”. In other 
words, the general rules of propriety are a convenient tool for everyday moral judgment. 
Griswold adds that these rules are continuously “modified and reinterpreted over time” but that 
they are never “reinvented wholesale”.45 Moreover, these general rules are an unintended 
consequence of the routine—and ordinary—operation of our sympathy.46 Consequently, 
                                                 
43  Smith is sometimes characterized as the “father” of so-called “bourgeois virtues”. For an understanding of what 
this label means see McCloskey The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007).  
44 Forman-Barzilai argues that the system of practical (and attainable) morality is Aristotelian in Adam Smith and the 
Circles of Sympathy (San Diego, CA: University of California Press, 2010) p.79-80. Forman-Barzilai concludes that 
Smith’s system of propriety matches Aristotle’s virtues. For the Stoic influence on Smith’s thought see Raphael, 
D.D., and Macfie, A.L. “Introduction” to The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D.D. Raphael, and A.L. Macfie, eds. Vol 
1. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976). Gloria 
Vivenza offers a more comprehensive look at the classical influence on Smith in Adam Smith and the Classics: The 
Classical Heritage in Adam Smith’s Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
45 See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
Griswold adds to this by arguing that these moral “rules of thumb” are developed by observing particulars and that 
they are inevitable (p.186-189). 
46 Accordingly, Haakonssen argues that “the general rules of morality are thus the unintended outcome of a 
multitude of individual instances of natural moral evaluations” in The Science of a Legislator: The Natural 
Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.61.  
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although these standards of moral judgment align with our natural sense of propriety they are not 
necessarily a product of conscious deliberation.47 Although the general rules of propriety are 
unforeseen and unintended Smith does not see them as either arbitrary or unnecessary. Initially 
(i.e. prior to TMS’ 6th edition) Smith conceived of these general rules as a fortuitous byproduct 
of a harmonic moral psychology and economic system that—although far from perfect—always 
tended towards the greatest good.48 By the 6th edition of TMS Smith had softened on this 
harmonic position.49 The substantial changes Smith made to the final edition of TMS make 
suggest that he no longer believed propriety was enough to ensure the flourishing of society. In 
other words, by the 6th edition Smith had come to realize that on its own propriety could not 
promote and guarantee the pursuit of happiness.  However, though Smith backed away from this 
belief in a natural harmony of morals he did not abandon the argument that the general rules of 
propriety were necessary.50 Without these general rules neither society nor virtue would be 
possible. For society—and by extension virtue—to exist we must be capable of generating, and 
adhering to, common moral standards.51 In the first section of this chapter I outline how the 
routine operation of our sympathy generates common moral standards that inevitably contribute 
to the development of conscience. This opening section will touch upon how the general rules of 
propriety help to shape society as well as individuals. These shared moral standards are 
moderated by our desire for mutual sympathy.52 This desire for mutual sympathy operates as a 
“golden mean” that eliminates extreme behaviors.53 
                                                 
47 This natural sense of propriety is created by our desire for mutual sympathy and recognition.  
48 see Otteson’s claim that “the natural exercise of our faculties—including our moral faculties—[…] leads to the 
development of a system of morality that is ultimately conducive to general utility” in Adam Smith’s Marketplace of 
Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
49 According to Otteson (2002) this harmonious order was a product of our natural desire to be worthy of other 
people’s approval (see p.125-128). Otteson argues specifically that the “marketplace of morals” will inevitably 
produce the perfect society and perfect virtue (p.127).  
50 Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that, though Smith had come to realize the imperfections in his system, he 
remained focused on the benefits of “social coordination” offered through adherence to the rules of propriety 
(p.106). Cropsey makes similar arguments throughout Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Principles of 
Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957).  
51 See Hanley (2009) p.43-44 (especially notes 39 and 40) for a brief discussion of propriety as a precondition for 
virtue.  
52 Haakonssen (1981) highlights the essential role mutual sympathy plays in shaping propriety by arguing “the 
operation of mutual sympathy unintendedly creates common social standards—standards which are at least 
sufficiently common to make social life possible” p.55.   
53 Evensky provides an insightful discussion on how society generates a “golden mean” in Adam Smith’s Moral 
Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.49-53. 
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The second section of this chapter focuses on the initial development of conscience. 
Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator is essential to the generation of propriety and the 
development of conscience.54 According to Smith our conscience develops after we have 
internalized the general rules of propriety.55 Our impartial spectators play a fundamental role in 
this development. It is the voice of the impartial spectator that informs us when we have—or 
have not—conformed to the rules of propriety.56 Thus, the impartial spectator can be understood 
as a metaphor for the voice of conscience. In its initial role as conscience, the impartial spectator 
is represented as the “practical man”.57 As the so-called “practical man” our conscience’s 
function is to approve or disapprove of our own behavior based upon the rules of propriety. To 
fulfill this role the impartial spectator or “man within the breast” needs no access to special (i.e. 
transcendent or objective) moral standards.58 The only standards our conscience requires in its 
initial development are the ones that have been created by the routine operation of sympathy in 
society. However, Smith’s attempt to develop an authoritative—and independent—conscience in 
TMS’ 6th edition changes how the impartial spectator operates. An authoritative conscience must 
be capable of more than merely adhering to the general rules of propriety. The authoritative and 
independent conscience developed in TMS’ 6th edition must also be capable of evaluating these 
rules and—when necessary—transcending them. In order to successfully evaluate and transcend 
propriety our impartial spectators need access to standards of moral judgment that are distinct 
from the socially generated rules of propriety. Praiseworthiness not only allows our conscience 
                                                 
54 For a concise discussion on the impartial spectator as conscience see Raphael, “The Impartial Spectator” in Essays 
on Adam Smith. Andrew Skinner and Thomas Wilson, eds. (Oxford, UK, Clarendon Press, 1975) p.83-99. See also 
Macfie, The Individual and Society: Papers on Adam Smith (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967) p82-100. 
These views present a strictly conventionalist interpretation of the impartial spectator and conscience. This 
interpretation has been challenged by Otteson (2002) and Forman-Barzilai (2010).   
55 See Raphael, The Impartial Spectator : Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) p. 35. 
56 For the various roles conscience plays in TMS see Otteson (2002) p.66. 
57 This view is held in opposition to Firth’s (1952) view of the impartial spectator as the “ideal observer”. See Firth, 
“Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 12(3):317-345. Those 
who see the impartial spectator as the “practical man” include; Campbell in Adam Smith’s Science of Morals, 
(London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1971); Raphael (2007), and Otteson (2002). I agree that the impartial 
spectator begins as a practical judge. However, over the development of TMS the impartial spectator becomes more 
and more transcendent, culminating in the final edition where it needs distinct moral standards.  
58 Though Griswold (1999) accepts the normativity present in TMS he rejects the need for distinct, transcendent, 
moral standards. See esp. p.131 and 213.  For a discussion on the role—and necessity—of transcendent moral 
standards see Hanley (2009) p.141-142. 
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to make judgments about the content of propriety, it also makes it possible to reject and/or 
disobey any existing rules we determine to be unworthy of our approval.    
A significant portion of TMS—throughout all of its iterations—is focused on empirical 
analysis. Consequently, it is possible to read TMS exclusively as a description of how moral 
judgment operates to create rules and why we feel obligated to follow them.59 However, such a 
reading misses key normative passages throughout TMS as well as the overarching moral 
prescription.60 Thus, a strict empirical reading of TMS must explain away frequent normative 
claims made by Smith. Additionally, I do not believe empirical readings convincingly explain 
why Smith was motivated to make significant changes to TMS’ final edition. In this chapter I 
argue the development of an authoritative conscience reveals Smith’s dissatisfaction with the 
results of mere propriety.61 By the 6th edition of TMS he was no longer convinced that the 
general rules of propriety were sufficient. Smith recognized that mere propriety was incapable of 
solving certain moral problems linked to conventional propriety.62 The most serious of these 
problems is propriety’s inability to prevent the genesis and spread of moral corruption. 
Corruption, and the misery it creates, is more likely to become a part of propriety than a possible 
solution to it. By the 6th edition of TMS Smith seems to have become aware of the problems 
inherent in propriety and offers a potential solution to them. Before discussing how the authority 
of conscience is established this chapter analyzes the problems this authoritativeness seeks to 
resolve. The specific flaws in propriety relevant to the authority of conscience are its inherent 
                                                 
59 For strict empirical readings of TMS see Campbell (1971); Skinner, A System of Social Science (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979); and Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay on Historiographic Revisionism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978). A pioneering refutation of this empirical stance is found in Lindgren, The Social 
Philosophy of Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), esp p.15-19.  
60 Otteson (2002) argues that Smith’s normativity only becomes clear when the larger picture of TMS is understood. 
For the most part I agree with Otteson’s claim. I believe the changes made to the 6th edition provide insight into this 
larger picture. For other works on the normativity present in TMS see Hanley (2009); Muller, Adam Smith in His 
Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society (New York: The Free Press, 1993); and Fleischacker, On Adam 
Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations”: A Philosophical Companion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
61 Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that Smith developed the authority of conscience in the 6th edition in response to 
the moral corruption he saw endemic to commercial society (p.98).  
62 Ignatieff (1986) argues that Smith and Rousseau are linked by their shared Stoic belief in the corruptive influence 
of conventions. See Ignatieff, “Smith, Rousseau, and the Republic of Needs,” in Scotland and Europe 1200-1850, 
ed. T.C. Smout (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986). For a more in depth analysis of the connection between Smith and 
Rousseau see Rasmussen, The Problems and Promise of Commercial Society: Adam Smith’s Response to Rousseau 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). Forman-Barzilai (2010) ”In his evolving 




relativity and its conformity. Because of its inherent flaws propriety may authorize and 
perpetuate immoral behaviors (i.e. vanity). Consequently, we need a means to judge and evaluate 
the general rules of propriety and a way to transcend them.  
By establishing the authority of conscience Smith transforms the role of the impartial 
spectator. In the final edition of TMS the impartial spectator takes on the role of “demigod”.63 In 
TMS’ 6th edition Smith establishes both the authority of conscience and its independence from 
propriety by linking it to praiseworthiness.64 As both a moral motivation and criteria for 
judgment, praiseworthiness allows our impartial spectators to evaluate and transcend mere 
propriety. As such, the role of conscience is no longer merely to match our behavior with the 
general rules of propriety. As a demigod the impartial spectator’s role is to direct us towards the 
life of virtue. In the final section of this chapter I argue that by linking conscience to 
praiseworthiness Smith offers a system of self-perfection as a remedy for the moral ills inherent 
in the existing (i.e. pre-6th edition) system of social morality based on propriety.65 This pursuit of 
perfection involves aligning our character with the providential wisdom of the Author of Nature 
and in doing so we become virtuous and happy.66 Though difficult to attain for most, this self-
perfection offers a resolution to the flaws in propriety by allowing individuals to identify and 
pursue moral excellences distinct from the relativistic and conformist rules of propriety. 
Furthermore, this pursuit of self-perfection via praiseworthiness explains the other significant 
changes Smith made to the 6th edition of TMS and transforms it from an analysis of the operation 
of social morality into a discussion of the merits—and necessity—of self-perfection.  
                                                 
63 This “demigod” is both metaphorically and practically superior to the impartial spectator’s initial role as the 
“practical man”. Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that this demigod in TMS is a “deistic God” which emerges in order 
to determine praiseworthiness (p.101). Similarly, Otteson (2002) argues that the voice of the impartial spectator 
inevitably becomes “the voice of God” (p.66). For a conventionalist reading of Smith’s “demigod” see Hope, 
“Smith’s Demigod,” in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Vincent Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1984).  
64 Forman-Barzilai (2010) connects praiseworthiness to authority of conscience, arguing that it creates a “third-way” 
between conventionalism and transcendental moral standards (p.102). 
65 For a discussion on Smith and self-perfection see Forman-Barzilai (2010). Also see Fleischacker, A Third Concept 
of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and for 
a connection between perfection and Stoicism see Alvey,“Moral Education as Means to Human Perfection and 
Social Order: Adam Smith’s View of Education in Commercial Society,” History of the Human Sciences 14 (2001): 
2. 
66 On the role the “Author of Nature” plays in our pursuit of happiness see TMS 126. See TMS 105-106 for Smith’s 
claim about the “wisdom of God” and the “natural principles” that keep us in harmony with it. Note that Smith here 
invoking “God” in the same way as he would the “Author of Nature” and “Nature”.   
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This chapter concludes by summarizing the major points and a brief discussion on how 
the authority of conscience connects to the other changes Smith made to the 6th edition of TMS. I 
recognize that Smith provides no immediate means to determine exactly what the standards of 
praiseworthiness are. Thus, our impartial spectators may be left without a means for effectively 
and consistently distinguishing praiseworthiness from mere propriety. This would severely limit 
our ability to identify and pursue self-perfection and may make us incapable of differentiating 
moral corruption from virtue and happiness. The secondary literature on this potential problem 
tends to be one-sided. A common and influential argument claims that, because Smith was a 
conventionalist, no distinct and transcendent standards of morality are available or necessary to 
his system.67 However, I do not believe that this conventionalist account adequately explains the 
changes Smith made to the 6th edition or the distinctions he makes between propriety, praise, and 
praiseworthiness. If existing conventions were all that we had or needed to make moral 
judgments, there would be no need to make sharp distinctions between what is praised and what 
is praiseworthy. If propriety determines both of these then they should be identical.68 Because no 
guidelines for determining the standards of praiseworthiness are readily available in TMS it is up 
to the reader to determine what these might be and how they can overcome the limitations of 
propriety and, more importantly, the corruptive influence conventions may have on our morality. 
I argue that a possible source for the standards of praiseworthiness—and thus the life of virtue 
and happiness—is nature.  
1.1 Sympathy and Propriety 
According to Smith the routine operation of our sympathy is what inevitably establishes 
the general rules of morality that govern our day to day lives. Haakonssen (1981) argues that 
these general rules ought to be “sufficiently common to make social life possible” (p.55). These 
conventional rules are based upon propriety sympathetic concord between actors and spectators 
wherein right and wrong are determined by what are approved of and disapproved of 
                                                 
67 Griswold (1999) argues that the structure of moral psychology and judgment is enough to determine the 
differences between propriety and praiseworthiness. Thus, no moral standards beyond conventional rules are 
necessary or available (p.131). Otteson (2002) agrees, arguing that when the impartial spectator directs us to adhere 
to general rules these become the manifestations of God’s will (p.75-77).  
68 In short, if praiseworthiness was a mere subsection of propriety then whatever in society is praised would be 
worthy of that praise.  
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respectively. This sympathetic concord produces the general rules of propriety which we use to 
judge other individuals and expect to be judged by. Because we expect to be judged by these 
standards they serve an essential and unavoidable role in shaping our character.69 Additionally, 
the rules of propriety play a crucial role in ensuring the peace and order of society.70 However, 
propriety contains specific flaws that Smith tried to repair in the 6th edition of TMS. These flaws 
are an unavoidable product of the process that creates the general rules of propriety.71 
Smith introduces his theory of sympathy in TMS by distinguishing it from two other 
theories. First, Smith begins by distinguishing his theory of sympathy from Hume’s by 
characterizing this theory of sympathy as a form of contagion.72 Hume argues that sympathy 
enables us to adopt the idea of a passion or sentiment when we witness another person 
experiencing them. This idea is then transformed into an impression by our imagination.73 For 
instance when we see someone who is angry we adopt a similar, though perhaps muted, feeling 
as a result of our sympathy. The distinction between Smith and Hume’s theories of sympathy is 
made through an important observation. According to Smith the contagion theory of sympathy 
fails because it cannot account for the fact that we frequently experience sentiments and passions 
that the people we sympathize with do not, or cannot, feel (TMS, 16). Smith’s observation is 
supported by three examples. First, mothers routinely sympathize with their infants when they 
see them in distress. However, Smith contends that the feelings mothers develop as a result of 
this sympathy cannot be shared by the infant. Because an infant has no foresight it cannot 
develop the “[…] most complete image of misery and distress the mother feels on their behalf” 
(TMS, 17). Similarly, Smith acknowledges our propensity to pity the dead for their loss of life. 
However, the dead are incapable of feeling any sentiments or passions (Ibid). Finally, we 
frequently feel a deep sense of shame when people embarrass themselves in public, yet these 
people are often blissfully unaware of this embarrassment (TMS, 16-17). Smith concludes from 
                                                 
69 Evensky (2005) offers the claim that “The reciprocal nature of [sympathy] is the tie that binds society together” 
and that our subsequent need for approval shapes our character and behavior (p.40). 
70 Propriety is responsible for establishing the rules of justice. Otteson (2002) discusses the essential role justice 
plays in preserving society (p.228). 
71 See Hanley (2009) p.72-78 for a concise discussion on the limitations of general rules. 
72 See Frazer (2010), The Enlightenment of Sympathy for an analysis of Hume’s theory of sympathy as contagion as 
well as a comparison to Smith’s theory. For an account of Smith’s theory of sympathy as contagion see Cropsey 
(1957). 
73 See Hume, T 2.1.11.8; SBN 319-20. 
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all of this that sympathy is not a matter of contagion but one of projection.74 We feel certain 
sentiments or passions on behalf of the very young, dead, or foolish because we place ourselves 
in their position and imagine what we would feel in those circumstances. Although Smith rejects 
Hume’s theory of contagion he does preserve the important role imagination plays in our 
sympathetic judgment of other people.75  
The second theory of sympathy Smith refutes is Rousseau’s (TMS, 15). Smith refers to 
Rousseau’s theory of pity in order to refute it as simplistic and narrow. According to Rousseau, 
our ability to sympathize with suffering—and feel pity—ought to prevent us from causing harm 
to others.76 Smith agrees that sympathy may have once referred to pity and/or compassion; 
however, he claims that now it must be used “to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion 
whatever” (Ibid.). Smith critiques Rousseau in order to demonstrate the importance of our 
sympathy with the positive (i.e. pleasurable) sentiments. For Smith, sympathizing with emotions 
like joy is as important to the generation of moral standards and the development of our own 
character and behavior as our sympathy with sorrow. Although our sympathy with the positive, 
pleasurable, sentiments is different than with the negative (i.e. painful) both are essential to the 
formation of the standards of propriety and our own character. By distinguishing his theory of 
sympathy from these other two Smith lays the foundation for how sympathy operates to create 
general rules.  
Smith’s theory of sympathy contains within it a theory of moral judgment (Forman-
Barzilai, 2010,p.6).77 Thus, when we sympathize with another person we do so—at least 
partially—in order to judge their character and behavior. Forman-Barzilai adds that our 
sympathy is an “ordinary exchange of approbation and shame” that socializes us over time (p.12-
13). Haakonssen argues that it is our natural desire to agree with others that mobilizes our 
                                                 
74 See Frazer (2010), 97-100 for an explanation of Smith’s “projective empathy”. 
75 Montes (2003) also argues that Smith rejected Hume’s “proto-utilitarianism” (p.45) Otteson (2002) agrees, adding 
that propriety is based on past experiences and not future utility. See also Haakonssen (1987) for a “backward 
looking” understanding of propriety (p.47). 
76 See Rousseau’s Second Discourse.  
77 This is an important component of Smith’s argument. When we sympathize we not only create rules, we also 
evaluate them. The creation , and refining, of rules and determination of their merit occurs simultaneously. 
Consequently, we need some means for making these judgments. The impartial spectator, as conscience, is 
responsible for judging these rules. My argument in this chapter is that our impartial spectators should not use 
conventions to judge conventions.  
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sympathetic judgment (Haakonssen, 1981, 49). Propriety is the standard we use to make these 
sympathetic judgments. Propriety, Smith argues, is reached “[w]hen the original passions of the 
person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotion of the 
spectator” (TMS, 21).78 We attain this concord by considering “the suitableness or 
unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause 
or object which excites it” (TMS, 24).79 We approve of another person’s character or behavior 
when we judge that we would adopt the same character or behave the same way if we were in 
their particular situation. Conversely, we judge something to be improper when we fail to reach a 
sympathetic concord with the actor. In this case we determine that we would not adopt a similar 
character or behaved similarly if we were in their situation.80 Sympathy thereby allows for case 
by case judgments of other people’s character and behavior as well as our own. Weighing as 
many of the mitigating factors that contributed to another individual’s character or behavior is 
essential to proper (i.e. fair and impartial) moral judgment. However, such thorough judgments 
of every incident we encounter in our lives are impractical. Simply put, we do not have the time 
or ability to gather all of the information required to make perfect judgments about others all the 
time. Smith highlights this problem with an analogy about a grieving stranger (TMS, 23). 
Although we do not—and cannot—know all of the factors that have contributed to this stranger’s 
grief, we do know that grieving over the death of a loved one is proper. Consequently, we reach 
a “conditional sympathy” with this stranger based upon “general rules derived from preceding 
experience” (Ibid.).81 Should more information about the particular circumstances we are judging 
come to light we ought to be open changing our judgment. The general rules are an aggregate of 
past judgments of propriety. According to Haakonssen these rules are the “unintended outcome 
of a multitude of individual instances of natural moral evaluations” (Haakonssen, 1981, 61). 
                                                 
78 Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that the level of concord required only needs to reach the level necessary for 
sociability (p.68). 
79 Montes (2003) includes two relevant definitions for propriety in Adam Smith in Context; (a) “an inner sense that 
ought to be exercised in order to reach mutual sympathy” and (b) an agreement between motives and actions (p.101-
102). Montes links propriety to duty via Cicero’s officia (p.98).  
80 An offshoot of this judgment is the sense of merit or demerit we award to any character or behavior that does 
some good or harm respectively. However, merit and demerit are still dependent upon the judgment of propriety or 
impropriety. Montes (2003) argues we determine merit and demerit based upon indirect sympathy with the affected 
person and direct sympathy with the actor (p.103). 
81 In TMS Smith argues when we “observe in a great variety of particular cases what pleases or displeases our moral 
faculties, what these approve or disapprove of, and, by induction from this experience, we establish those general 
rules” (TMS, 376). 
28 
 
Ultimately, because they are based upon what has repeatedly been approved or disapproved of, 
the conventional standards of propriety are reducible to popular opinion. 
 In order to properly create and apply the rules of propriety we use what Smith terms as 
our impartial spectators.82 The impartial spectator aims at preventing us from injecting any bias 
or subjectivity into the rules of propriety by acting as “an extension or idealization of our 
society’s mode of moral judgments” (Fleischacker, 2005, 52).83 Here “idealization” refers to the 
impartiality Smith believes is axiomatic to moral evaluation.84 This, ideally, allows us to make 
judgments about others—and ourselves—through a general point of view rather than a purely 
subjective one. Thus, the vantage point of the impartial spectator ought to help us to avoid 
subjectivity and create general rules that may apply equally to everyone.  
The general rules of propriety are also shaped by our natural desire for mutual sympathy. 
This desire acts as a golden mean, eliminating all excesses and deficiencies from these rules and 
by extension our character and behavior.85 Without this desire for mutual sympathy we may not 
have any interest in either (a) making judgments about other people or (b) having those 
judgments influence our behavior in any significant way. Accordingly, Haakonssen (1987) 
argues that “sympathy is put to work by an even more fundamental principle in human nature, 
the desire to agree, to be in accord with our fellow men” (p.49).  Smith explains how this desire 
                                                 
82 It is worth noting that Smith did not introduce the impartial spectator until the 2nd edition of TMS. For insight into 
the development of the impartial spectator throughout TMS six editions see D.D. Raphael,(1975), “The Impartial 
Spectator” in Essays on Adam Smith. Raphael (1975) argues that Smith’s development of the impartial spectator 
may have been in response to the criticisms of Sir Gilbert Elliot (p.91). Montes (2003) provides a more recent 
general summary of the impartial spectator (p.82-100). 
83 In “Adam Smith and Cultural Relativism” Fleischacker  (2011) defines the impartial spectator as an “idealized 
version of our friends and neighbors” (p.8). Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that the impartial spectator is a “self-
referential” standpoint when used to judge others. She makes this argument in distinction to Nagel’s (1986) “view 
from nowhere” argument (p.70). In Poetic Justice (1997) Nussbaum places Smith’s impartial spectator closer to 
Rawls’ original position (p.134 n.23). All three of these arguments may accurately explain how the impartial 
spectator can make proper judgments of others. Additionally, they may provide insightful explanations for how the 
impartial spectator operated before the 6th edition of TMS. However, for our impartial spectators to facilitate the 
authority of conscience we need access to moral standards that transcend conventions (i.e. idealized individuals or 
self-references) and contain more discernable content than some abstract neutral position.   
84 Without this impartiality Smith’s moral theory would be reduced to a Hobbesian system where right and wrong 
are determined solely by the preferences and desires of each individual, creating a social cohesion problem. 
Sympathy and impartiality, according to Smith, avoid this cohesion issue by creating shared (albeit imperfect) 
values.  
85 Evensky (2007) argues that social rules themselves act as a golden mean (p.49). While it is true social rules help 
moderate our behavior they are only capable of doing so after they have been appropriately moderated by our desire 
for mutual sympathy. 
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works, and why it is important, with the example of shared literary tastes among friends (TMS, 
19). Smith explains that when we enjoy a book or a poem we are inspired to share it with a friend 
and are subsequently “amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus enlivens our own” 
(Ibid). In other words, we find it pleasurable when people close to us enjoy the same things we 
enjoy. Conversely, if this friend dislikes the book or poem we are fond of Smith argues that we 
are “vexed” and can “no longer take any pleasure in reading it to him” (Ibid). According to 
Smith all of this occurs because “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-
feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the 
appearance of the contrary” (TMS, 18). However, this natural desire for mutual sympathy is not 
confined to aesthetic tastes. Through this aesthetic analogy Smith makes a much larger argument 
about our human nature and moral psychology. Our desire for mutual sympathy also compels us 
to seek out moral agreement with other individuals. We seek to approve of others while also 
attaining their approval. This satisfies our desire for mutual sympathy because, Smith points out 
“[t]o approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to 
approve of them” (TMS, 22). This agreement helps to prevent the rules of propriety from 
becoming solipsistic. More to the point, this need for mutual agreement effectively moderates 
propriety and any subsequent behaviors.86  
Smith’s discussion of the bodily passions—and our reactions to them—demonstrates 
exactly how mutual sympathy moderates propriety (TMS, 34-39). According to Smith the bodily 
passions are our appetites and pain. Smith argues that our ability to sympathize with the 
expression of appetites is naturally restrained. This restraint arises from our aversion to strong 
expressions on these passions (TMS, 35). Thus, we are capable of sympathizing with the 
appetites but only to a certain degree. The same can be said of our reactions to pain. Smith 
argues that it is both “unmanly” and “unbecoming” to cry out in pain (TMS, 36).87 However, 
Smith does admit that we do have a strong, instinctual, ability to sympathize with pain even if 
the reciprocal pain we feel is much different in degree and kind, we just prefer to sympathize 
                                                 
86 The moderating effect of mutual sympathy highlights the Aristotelian character of Smith’s system of propriety. 
For a discussion of the Aristotelian themes found in the literature on Smith see Hanley (2009) p.54 n.4. 
87 Seemingly this would be because of moral conventions regarding masculinity. However, Smith argues throughout 
TMS that we have an inherent and natural dislike for extremes and thus sympathizing with extreme reactions is 
always difficult.  
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with more controlled expressions of this pain, likely because doing so is less painful for us. 
Smith adds that our ability to sympathize with bodily pain is enlivened by both the novelty of 
that pain and any danger that may accompany the pain. To the latter point Smith claims that 
“[p]ain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied with danger.” (TMS, 
37). Smith adds that what we truly sympathize with in such an instance is the fear—a product of 
our imagination—and not the actual pain (Ibid.). Furthermore, though the novelty of a particular 
cause of pain may enliven our sympathy this inevitably wears off as we grow more and more 
accustomed to it. Our sympathy with the bodily passions helps to determine the general rules of 
propriety. Our desire for mutual sympathy naturally restrains our reactions to—and expressions 
of—these bodily passions. This natural restraint on our ability to sympathize with appetites and 
pain oblige us to moderate our own responses to these passions in order to ensure we receive 
sympathy. Because we are disgusted by the excessive reactions others have to the bodily 
passions we know to expect disgust if we should react the same way. The moderation of our 
appetites gives rise to the virtue of temperance (TMS, 36). Similarly, Smith claims the ability to 
control our reactions to pain “is the foundation of the propriety of constancy and patience” 
(TMS, 38). 88 Smith argues that all of our passions—and not just our bodily ones—must be 
moderated to the point of “mediocrity” so that we can attain mutual sympathy arguing that “if we 
consider all the different passions of human nature, we shall find that they are regarded as 
decent, or indecent, just in proportion as mankind are more or less disposed to sympathize with 
them” (TMS, 34).89 This principle of mediocrity—determined by the desire for mutual 
sympathy—is a defining feature of the rules of propriety.  
By moderating it through the desire for mutual sympathy, Smith establishes propriety as a 
socially created mean between two extremes.90 These general rules of propriety are necessary to 
both the creation and continuation of society. First, propriety makes social cohesion possible. 
The shared moral standards created by our sense of propriety—and moderated by mutual 
sympathy—may prevent society from becoming a collection of antagonistic individuals. 
                                                 
88 Temperance, constancy, and patience would seem to qualify as “lower-order virtues” (Brown 1994 p.183). These 
are the “imperfect but attainable virtues” (TMS, 343). See Forman-Barzilai (2010) p.108. 
89 The other types of passions discussed by Smith include the unsocial, social, and selfish passions (TMS, 34-54). 
90 Forman-Barzilai (2010) argues that Smith’s propriety is akin to Aristotelian virtue (p.79-80). However, she is 
careful to distance the cardinal virtues in TMS from Aristotle (p.80 n.21). 
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Furthermore, by establishing right and wrong that everyone is expected to adhere to, propriety 
contributes to the perpetuation of society. Smith’s discussion of the so-called “sacred” rules of 
justice demonstrates exactly how propriety achieves both of these. Justice, Smith contends, 
consist in not harming others and punishing those who do. Accordingly, Smith defines justice as 
a negative virtue:  
[m]ere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from 
hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or 
the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He 
fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which 
his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. 
We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing (TMS, 99). 
Smith goes on to explain that justice is a necessary pillar for society, claiming that it is “the main 
pillar that upholds the whole edifice” and that, without tolerable adherence to its rules “the 
immense fabric of human society […] must in a moment crumble into atoms” (TMS, 104). 
Unlike all of the other virtues justice can be reduced to a list of strict rules. According to Smith 
these rules include “the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour […] those which 
guard his property and possessions [and] those which guard what are called his personal rights, 
or what is due to him from the promises of others” (TMS, 102). Thus, unlike other virtues justice 
can be legislated and enforced with relatively strict accuracy. Because of how necessary they are 
to society Smith refers to the rules of justice as sacred. These rules are produced by—and are a 
part of—propriety.91 Though propriety may be imperfect it is nonetheless necessary to the 
functioning of society.  
In addition to its contributions to society, propriety is also essential to the moral well-
being of the individual. Prior to the 6th edition of TMS the system of propriety was the sole 
means for determining right from wrong. Although Smith introduced a new means—via the 
authority of conscience and praiseworthiness—for judging right from wrong in the 6th edition he 
did not abandon propriety altogether. For most people the rules of propriety remain the sole 
means for determining right from wrong, virtue from vice, and a good character from a bad one. 
A majority of individuals use their conscience to conform to existing conventions and thus fail to 
properly exercise their conscience’s authoritativeness. Though such individuals will fail to attain 
                                                 
91 Like the other components of propriety the rules of justice are also moderated. However, these sacred rules appear 
to be more effectively moderated by a “divided sympathy” with the perpetrator and victim (TMS, 87-89). 
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the level of self-perfection Smith outlines later in the 6th edition they are still considered moral 
and good so long as they follow the rules of propriety.92 Moreover, though they people who 
conform to propriety may not experience the happiness of the wise and virtuous they are still, by 
all indications given my Smith, capable of living happy lives.93 Consequently, though Smith saw 
the need to supplement propriety he still recognized the role its rules played in shaping the moral 
lives and character of everyone, even those who eventually seek to transcend mere propriety. 
Most importantly, propriety plays an essential role in the individual’s development of 
conscience.  
1.2 Propriety and Conscience 
 In Adam Smith in His Time and Ours Muller argues that Smith’s theory of conscience is 
a product of our “egoistic desire for approval, and our ability to imagine ourselves in the place of 
others” (Muller, 1993, p.101). Otteson (2002) adds that conscience is at least partially explained 
by our realization that we have been judged unfairly by others (p.67-68). Resultantly, we become 
aware that we are observed and judged by others and that to attain their approval we must behave 
in a certain way. Thus, we initially use our conscience to ensure that we will attain the approval 
of others and avoid their disapproval by conforming to the rules of propriety. Smith explains the 
initial development of conscience through the mirror of society metaphor (TMS, 134). Smith 
uses this metaphor to explain our conscience’s dependence on social relations, arguing that, 
[w]ere it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, 
without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own 
character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or 
deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face (TMS, 133-
134). 
When attempting to judge our own character and behavior society serves the same purpose a 
mirror does when we examine our own physical appearance. Accordingly, conscience can be 
understood as the internalization of existing standards of conventional propriety. Raphael (2007) 
argues that conscience begins as “a social product, a mirror of social feeling” (p.35). 
Consequently, our conscience only emerges after we have lived in society for some period of 
                                                 
92 Forman-Barzilai (2010) points out that a failure to achieve self-perfection does not constitute a moral failure 
(p.108). See also Waszek, “Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith’s Ethics and Its Stoic Origins,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984): 591-606.  
93 See Otteson (2002) p.235. 
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time.94 Because we have no access to any a priori moral standards (or aesthetic standards) we 
must use the existing standards of our present society to judge ourselves. When we internalize 
the standards of propriety we also internalize any potential flaws or limitations associated with it. 
Moreover, because our conscience is initially dependent on propriety any judgments we make 
about ourselves are necessarily informed by, and confined to, popular opinion. Consequently, so 
long as our conscience is solely dependent upon the rules of propriety it will be fundamentally 
flawed and incapable of asserting its authority. Without the ability to overrule propriety, our 
conscience would remain dependent upon it. Praiseworthiness inverts this relationship, making 
the standards of propriety dependent on our authoritative conscience. 
  According to Vivienne Brown (1994) Smith’s theory of conscience operates dialogically. 
Whereas our sympathy operates as an imaginary dialogue with the principal actors our 
conscience is an imagined conversation with ourselves. Brown characterizes this conversation as 
“soliloquy, a dialogic relation with one’s own self” (Brown, 1994, 48-49). This need to converse 
with ourselves is what defines Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator. Although the impartial 
spectator was originally introduced by Smith to correct for any subjectivity in moral judgments 
its role as the voice of our conscience is also essential to his arguments.95 In order to have a 
proper dialogue about my own character and behavior Smith claims I must “divide myself […] 
into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from the 
other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of” (TMS, 135-136).96 To 
facilitate this dialogue and necessary division we require the voice of the impartial spectator. 
However, the impartial spectator may not be a preexisting part of our moral psychology. Rather, 
it is possible to see it as creation of our imagination we employ out of necessity and convenience 
(Raphael, 2007, 35). The impartial spectator can be conceived of as a metaphor for how our 
                                                 
94 For similar understandings see Fleischacker (1999) and Muller (1993) esp. p.100. Berry, in “Sociality and 
Socialization” suggests that conscience in TMS is a mere “reflex” of existing general rules (p.253) albeit a reflex 
which was capable of “evaluating all aspects of social life” (p.254). Otteson (2002) argues that this internalization of 
general rules is all our impartial spectators need and that ultimately our conscience speaks to us through habit and 
experience (p.70-71). 
95 Raphael (1975) argues that the impartial spectator—as a judge of social behavior—is implicit in Hume and what 
truly distinguishes Smith’s theory is the use of the impartial spectator in self-approbation (p.87). See also Otteson 
(2002) p.66. In Virtue by Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) and “Smith’s Demigod” Hope claims that 
Smith’s focus on the role of conscience is ultimately his great contribution to moral philosophy.  
96 The same form of judgment does not apply when judging other people. When we judge others we imagine 
ourselves in their position as use the impartial spectator to eliminate as much bias and subjectivity as possible.  
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conscience does—and should—operate. However, for our conscience to operate properly our 
impartial spectators must overcome two defects in our human nature.  
 Our natural capacity for selfishness is the first defect our impartial spectators, in the role 
of conscience (i.e. when we judge ourselves), are tasked with overcoming. Although Smith does 
not characterize humans as selfish per se, our self-interested nature does give us the capacity for 
selfish behavior.  For example, Smith characterizes envy as a selfish passion that prevents us 
from properly sympathizing with other people’s happiness (TMS, 51). Fortunately, according to 
Smith, we also contain enough benevolent tendencies to offset our self-interest (TMS, 13). For 
our conscience to function properly and judge impartially we must balance our self-interest with 
our benevolence. Otherwise we risk judging ourselves in either a too favorable or unfavorable 
way. To balance this Smith argues that “the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be 
corrected only by the eye of [the] impartial spectator” (TMS, 159). Our impartial spectator 
achieves this balance not by diminishing self-interest but by increasing our benevolence. We 
attain this balance between self-interest and benevolence when we “feel much for others and 
little for ourselves” and when we love ourselves only as much as “our neighbour is capable of 
loving us” (TMS, 31). Smith refers to this as the “perfection of human nature” that “can alone 
produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole 
grace and propriety” (Ibid).97 Consequently, when each individual has achieved this state of 
perfection society itself will be perfected. However, how we achieve this perfect balance is more 
complex than mere adherence to propriety. Smith argues later that:  
[i]t is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which 
Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest 
impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself 
upon such occasions (TMS 159). 
It is, Smith argues shortly thereafter, “the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, 
and dignity, and superiority of our own characters” that allows our impartial spectator to 
properly balance our self-interest with benevolence. 98 However, we cannot attain this balance 
solely by adhering to the mediocrity generated by propriety. 
                                                 
97 Here Smith anticipates his theory of virtue which only appears in the 6th edition of TMS.  
98 Some authors have claimed that Smith’s use of these terms is vestigial. See Justman, Autonomous Male; 
Minowitz, Profits, Priests, and Princes; and Cropsey, Polity and Economy. For discussion of what nobility and 
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 The impartial spectator is also charged with managing out capacity for self-delusion. 
According to Smith, self-delusion is produced by our aversion to seeing ourselves in any bad 
light. It is “the violence and injustice of our own selfish passions” that “induce the [impartial 
spectator] to make a report very different from what the real circumstances of the case are 
capable of authorizing” (TMS, 181). In other words, our excessive selfish passions make it 
difficult for us to judge ourselves as the circumstances would require. These passions make it “so 
disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposefully turn away from those 
circumstances which might render that judgment unfavourable” (TMS, 182). Notice Smith uses 
the word purposefully when describing our tendency to self-delude, suggesting that this is often a 
choice we make rather than a mere mental lapse. We might choose to delude ourselves, Smith 
argues, because most of us are not the “bold surgeon […] whose hand does not tremble when he 
performs an operation upon his own person” (Ibid). Smith claims that it takes incredible courage 
to “pull off the mysterious veil of self-delusion” and see and judge ourselves as we really ought 
to (Ibid). He goes on to argue that, instead of choosing the difficult task of removing this veil of 
self-delusion: 
we too often, foolishly and weakly, endeavour to exasperate anew those unjust passions 
which had formerly misled us; we endeavour by artifice to awaken our old hatreds, and 
irritate afresh our almost forgotten resentments: we even exert ourselves for this miserable 
purpose, and thus persevere in injustice, merely because we were once unjust, and because 
we were ashamed and afraid to see that it were so (Ibid).  
 
Our capacity for self-delusion makes is easier for us to indulge in our often violent and unjust 
selfish passions than to merely look at our own actions and characters in a fair and proper 
manner. Smith adds, this capacity for self-delusion is most dangerous and egregious when it is 
most important for our judgments to be fair and proper (TMS, 181). Ideally our natural love for 
what is noble and truly superior ought to compensate for self-delusion and allow our conscience 
to operate as it should. However, Smith admits that “[the] coarse clay of which the bulk of 
humanity are formed, cannot be wrought up to such perfection” (TMS, 187). Accordingly, nature 
has provided us with a remedy; a “sense of duty” to the existing standards of propriety (TMS, 
                                                 
honor might mean see Welsh, What is Honor? A Question of Moral Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008). I see no reason to dismiss Smith’s allusions to honor and nobility as superfluous relics. A more 
charitable reading of Smith gives every indication that he believed we could—and should—strive to live honorable 
and noble lives. 
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183).99 The individual who is incapable of pursuing nobility and superiority ought to have 
“reverence for the rule[s] which past experience has impressed upon him” which in turn “checks 
the impetuosity of his passion, and helps him to correct the too partial views which self-love 
might otherwise suggest, of what is proper to be done in his situation” (TMS, 185). The sense of 
duty thus compels the individual to conform to the standards of propriety and in doing so curbs 
the more violent tendencies of self-delusion. This allows our impartial spectator and, by 
extension, our conscience to operate properly. However, because it is still chained to the 
standards of propriety this sense of duty does not liberate our conscience and make it 
authoritative. 
The initial role of conscience in TMS (i.e. prior to the 6th edition) was to ensure 
individuals adhered to the general rules of propriety. To accomplish this, conscience must first 
mitigate our self-love (through the voice of the impartial spectator) and overcome self-delusion 
through a sense of duty. After controlling for these two natural defects our conscience can 
adequately promote our conformity with the general rules of propriety. Conscience does this by 
rewarding our good behavior with the approval of the impartial spectator and punishing our 
misbehavior with its disapproval.100 Consequently, conscience plays an essential role in 
promoting a certain level of well-being for society as a whole and the individual. Adherence to 
the general rules of propriety—which includes the sacred rules of justice—is in large part 
guaranteed by the operation of our consciences. Similarly, the development of our character is 
dependent upon our conscience’s internalization of propriety. This internalization is the “mirror” 
that lets us begin to judge ourselves properly. 
 The system of propriety and theory of conscience offered in the first five editions of 
TMS align well with Smith’s overarching philosophy. Throughout both WN and TMS Smith 
indicates that there is a harmonious order to the universe that tends to create the most good for 
                                                 
99 Montes (2003) conflates this sense of duty with propriety (p.98). Similarly, Otteson (2002) conflates this sense of 
duty with the authority of conscience (p.75). Both authors may be guilty of exaggerating the importance of duty in 
TMS. Smith characterizes duty as a type of failsafe to ensure reasonable adherence to the general rules of propriety. 
However, duty is neither the sole nor the primary moral motivation in TMS. Other, more important, motivations 
include the desire for mutual sympathy and the love of honor and beauty. 
100 Otteson (2002) claims that there are three essential functions to our conscience in TMS; (a) an inner voice that 




the most people. For example, the rich’s endless appetite for luxuries and childish vanities has 
contributed to the opulence of commercial society (WN, III.4.10). Similarly, in TMS Smith 
mocks the common deference people have for the rich and great, yet holds that the peace and 
order created by this is beneficial for all (TMS, 62-65). However, by the 6th edition of TMS 
Smith had apparently softened on the belief that the unintended consequences of our moral 
faculties and the subsequent rules of propriety would necessarily—and harmoniously—
contribute to order, justice, and happiness.101 Within the 6th edition of TMS Smith recognizes 
that propriety itself might be flawed and thus work against the general well-being of all.102 
Additionally, because conscience is initially entirely dependent on propriety it cannot act as an 
effective measure against any potential flaws in propriety. Instead, our conscience would merely 
internalize and perpetuate these flaws. Without the authority of conscience self-perfection would 
be improbable—if not altogether impossible—and the solution to moral corruption offered by 
Smith later in the 6th edition of TMS would be inert.  
1.3 The Flaws in Propriety 
 The changes Smith made to TMS’ final edition may be a product of his recognition that 
propriety was inherently flawed and that these problems make the pursuit of happiness more 
difficult than it ought to be. The flaws inherent in propriety include the relativity of its general 
rules and its conformist requirement. These lead to specific moral problems that Smith attempted 
to repair via the authority of conscience. The most serious problem created by the relativity 
inherent in propriety is its inability to pass judgment on its own general rules. Subsequently, 
because propriety cannot judge its own rules, it cannot adequately detect or solve any false 
beliefs about morality and happiness it may create. Additionally, the conformity required by 
propriety leads to both a lack of moral autonomy and mediocrity of character. Consequently, 
with propriety as the sole means for moral judgment we would have no means for escaping or 
improving upon its inadequacies. The changes Smith made to the 6th edition may indicate that 
                                                 
101 Accordingly, Griswold (1999) argues that Smith developed a “protreptic we” in order to persuade the reader to 
pursue virtue (instead of mere propriety) p.329. 
102 This recognition is part of Smith’s growing dissatisfaction with the moral consequences of commercial society. 
See Hanley (2009) p.24-52. See also Heilbroner, “The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in The Wealth of 
Nations,” in Essays on Adam Smith, ed. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 
and Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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propriety is the source of the false beliefs that plague our lives, making us miserable and 
threatening the order and justice of society.103 Accordingly, the authority of conscience 
established in the 6th edition of TMS may provide a reasonable means for judging propriety’s 
general rules and escaping its inherent flaws.  
 The first flaw inherent in propriety is its relativity. Smith may have attempted to repair 
this flaw with his introduction of the impartial spectator in the 2nd edition of TMS. However, the 
impartial spectator—in its initial form as unbiased judgment of others—can guard against 
subjectivity but not against conventional or cultural relativism. This second type of moral 
relativity (i.e. conventionalism) is a necessary product of propriety’s origins and the conscience’s 
necessary internalization of its general rules. The unintended general rules created by our 
sympathy will always be relative and specific to the society in which we live. If Smith were a 
moral relativist then the relativistic nature of propriety would be unproblematic. However, there 
is evidence that Smith believed these conventions could be judged. For example, when Smith 
compares the morals of commercial societies to “barbaric” (i.e. pre-commercial) ones he 
demonstrates both how propriety can differ between societies and the superiority of the former’s 
general rules.104 Similarly, in TMS Smith dedicates all of Part V to explaining the role “custom 
and fashion” (i.e. culture) has on our sentiments and subsequent rules of propriety.105 In TMS’ 
Part V Smith compares the influence custom and fashion have on our morals to the similar affect 
they have on our perception of beauty (TMS, 231-233).106 Smith concludes that, like our 
perception of beauty, our particular society’s rules of propriety are so entrenched that we see 
them as both natural and superior to all other society’s (Evensky, 2005, p.50). However, unlike 
our sense of beauty—which seems to be arbitrary—the rules of propriety appear to be grounded 
in some natural order. Thus, though there can be great variation in the conventions of different 
                                                 
103 Smith’s inclusion of a refined theory of moral corruption in the 6th edition suggests that propriety is incapable of 
preventing the creation and continuation of warped or distorted moral values. I believe the danger of moral 
corruption is not what it does the individuals, but what it can do for an entire society once it infects the standards of 
propriety.  
104 See Smith’s comments on “barbaric” societies who are incapable of properly adhering to the rules of justice, “In 
some countries, the rudeness and barbarism of the people hinder the natural sentiments of justice from arriving at 
that accuracy and precision which, in more civilized nations, they naturally attain to. Their laws are, like their 
manners, gross and rude and undistinguishing” (TMS, 402). 
105 TMS, 227-246. 
106 See Evensky (2005) p. 49-53. 
39 
 
societies they all appear to have some relation to a universal standards.107 This explains why all 
societies (including many barbaric ones) seem to deplore “wanton murder” (Ibid. p.51). 
Consequently, although propriety may appear to be relative across societies there must be—and 
needs to be—some means to judge these general rules while still allowing for variations. Prior to 
the final edition of TMS Smith provided no such means.  Consequently, the mores of a crude 
barbaric society would have to be considered equal to those of a refined and civilized 
commercial society.108  
 A second problem directly linked to propriety is the lack of moral autonomy.109 In the 
first five editions of TMS propriety was the sole criteria for moral judgment. Consequently, 
moral autonomy in these editions was reduced to conformity.110 Prior to the 6th edition this 
conformity to propriety was both inescapable and necessary. Subsequently, the preceding 
editions of TMS fail to adequately explain variations in moral standards or how these might 
change over time. Though the influence of custom and fashion can explain variations in 
propriety across different societies it cannot adequately explain variations among people from 
the same society, especially a culturally homogenous one. Furthermore, so long as conformity to 
propriety remains absolutely necessary moral standards within society should remain relatively 
static. Without some other mechanism to explain how moral autonomy works to change rules 
moral approbation ought to remain remarkably similar throughout history. Thus, Smith’s moral 
theory should provide some explanation for how the standards of propriety evolve over time.  It 
is possible that changes in material circumstances might inspire some incremental changes to 
morals over time but it is difficult to conceive how this might occur without these changes being 
viewed as improper and thus worthy of disapprobation. Without moral autonomy the earlier 
                                                 
107 Evensky (2005) refers to this as “invisible absolutes” which society is continuously progressing towards. 
108 Smith consistently praised commercial society for its ability to generate opulence and thus relieve the miseries of 
poverty. However, these speaks more directly to the supposed material benefits of commercial society and not its 
perceived moral superiority. Smith clearly believes commercial societies are morally superior to “barbaric” ones but 
any explanation as to why this is the case (prior to the 6th edition) is reducible to chauvinism.  
109 By “moral autonomy” I mean the capacity to deliberate, reflect upon, and create our own moral rules rather than 
merely following the rules that been created for you.  
110 In Politics and Vision, Wolin argues that this conformity is necessary so that conscience can become “social 
rather than individual” p.344. Wolin’s argument appears to place the cart before the horse; As Smith correctly points 
out, conscience begins social (as internalization of social values) and only becomes individual once socially 
determined values are reflected upon.  
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editions of TMS fail to adequately explain how morals can progress within a society over time as 
well as what these morals ought to progress towards. 
This final problem is propriety’s lack of moral incentive, especially in instances where 
any impropriety may be concealed. This lack of incentive produces mediocrity of character.111 
Although propriety is capable of producing certain virtues like temperance and patience it cannot 
create the type of moral excellence outlined by Smith in the 6th edition of TMS. Despite 
references to honor and nobility throughout TMS’ different editions Smith hardly seems 
concerned with promoting these over the general rules created by our sympathy. However, as I 
have argued earlier, by the 6th edition Smith had changed his tone and was no longer seemed 
convinced that “mere propriety” was a reliable means of producing happiness and good moral 
character on its own. Smith’s dissatisfaction with the type of character created by adherence to 
propriety is reflected in all three of the major changes he made to the final edition of TMS.112 All 
three of these changes combine to provide a means to overcome the rules of “mere propriety” 
and ultimately attain a type of happiness that transcends the pleasure experienced by conforming 
to existing conventions. When Smith refers to propriety as “vulgar and ordinary” and claims that 
it requires nothing more than what the “weakest of mortals is capable of exerting” we can get a 
more accurate picture of the type of character it produces (TMS, 32). Undoubtedly, adherence to 
mere propriety produces a character unworthy of any special attention or admiration. Hanley 
characterizes the mediocrity of character created by propriety as a product of commercial 
society, arguing that it pacifies our aspirations and desensitizes us to the transcendent (Hanley, 
2009, 42). Whether or not this mediocrity is specific to commercial society is debatable; 
however, what is clear is that propriety is neither aspirational nor transcendent. The mediocrity 
of character created by propriety makes individuals—and society—incapable of pursuing the 
“uncommonly great and beautiful” virtues they ought to aspire to (TMS, 32). Although the 
system of propriety and the mediocre social rules it creates are still essential to both society and 
the individual Smith concluded that this system needed to be supplemented. Consequently, Smith 
began superimposing a system of self-perfection that aims for conformity with Nature over top 
                                                 
111 See Hanley (2009) for an analysis of this mediocrity. 
112 The authority of conscience, theory of moral corruption, and virtues ethics all outlined in TMS’ final edition all 
demonstrate a need to supplement conventional morals with something more transcendent.  
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of this, beginning with the authority of conscience. This superimposed system of self-perfection 
is capable of inspiring people to transcend the mediocre conventions of their society and attain 
virtue. Although only a few individuals may be capable of aspiring to this self-perfection it is no 
less necessary to the moral well-being of both individuals and society. 
 On their own each of these flaws are worthy of amelioration. However, taken together 
these flaws create a moral problem in need of immediate resolution. In short, the relativist, 
conformist, and mediocre nature of propriety may render us incapable of detecting and 
overcoming false beliefs and the moral ills these can create. Consequently, propriety may 
authorize and perpetuate immoral and unjust practice and behaviors. The idea that propriety may 
be the source of immorality is the conclusion Smith eventually draws in his theory of moral 
corruption.113 Similarly, Smith’s condemnation of infanticide in TMS highlights exactly how the 
flaws in propriety create this overarching problem. Smith strongly condemns the ancient Greek 
practice of infanticide, specifically blaming customs (i.e. culture) for authorizing and 
perpetuating this practice (TMS, 246). However, if the sole grounds for determining what is 
moral are the conventional rules of propriety then this condemnation makes little sense. As long 
as the ancient Greeks considered infanticide to be proper (as Smith’s criticism indicates they did) 
then the only determination Smith could truly make is that the practice would have been wrong 
in 18th century Scotland. However, Smith specifically blames propriety for perpetuating 
infanticide in Greece arguing that is was a product of “[uninterrupted] custom” which had “so 
thoroughly authorized the practice” (TMS, 246). Furthermore, conformity with the propriety of 
infanticide was so strong that “even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought to have been more 
just and accurate, was led away by the established custom [and] instead of censuring, supported 
the horrible abuse” (Ibid.). Smith goes on to specifically name Plato and Aristotle as guilty 
parties in the promotion of the “barbarous prerogative” (Ibid.). Smith continues to hint at the role 
mediocrity of character plays in perpetuating the atrocity, arguing that for most people the fact 
that “[such] a thing […] is commonly done […] is a sufficient apology for what, in itself, is the 
most unjust and unreasonable conduct” (Ibid.). Smith’s discussion of infanticide makes it clear 
                                                 
113 See TMS, 73-78. Smith argues that it is our love and admiration of the rich that corrupts our morals. This 
corruption leads to anxiety, loneliness, and misery.  
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that we require some means for judging—and transcending—the general rules of propriety. The 
development of an authoritative and independent conscience may provide such a means.  
 
1.4 Conscience and Praiseworthiness 
 The alterations he made to the 6th edition of TMS suggest that Smith was no longer 
convinced that mere propriety was capable of promoting the happiness and good character for 
everyone. Furthermore, given the flaws inherent in propriety its general rules may actually be the 
source of immorality and even misery. Consequently, Smith repairs the flaws in propriety by 
establishing the authority of conscience in tine final edition of TMS.114 For the authority of 
conscience to be meaningful we must be able to disagree with the existing rules of propriety 
(Raphael, 1975, 90-91). Muller (1993) agrees, arguing that within TMS “lies a theory of the 
development of conscience through internalization of social norms, as well as a theory of how 
the morally developed individual is able to ascend from moral conformity to moral autonomy” 
(p. 100). Without the ability to disagree our conscience would be a mere echo of conventional—
and possibly immoral—popular opinion. Accordingly, we need standards of moral judgment that 
are both distinct and independent from mere propriety. The concept of praiseworthiness, 
developed in the 6th edition of TMS, provides these distinct and independent standards.115 As 
both a moral motivation and a form of moral judgment praiseworthiness is capable of 
overcoming the relativity and conformity inherent in propriety. By providing us with, and 
directing us towards, superior (i.e. transcendent) moral standards praiseworthiness is capable of 
distinguishing what is considered moral (i.e. propriety) from what ought to be considered 
moral.116 Consequently, praiseworthiness is a means for judging and evaluating the general rules 
                                                 
114 Raphael (1975), Montes (2003), Otteson (2002), and Forman-Barzilai (2010) all agree that authority of 
conscience only appears in TMS within the 6th edition. 
115 For a connection between conscience and praiseworthiness see Forman-Barzilai (2010) p.96-105. 
116 The presence of transcendental standards in TMS is generally refuted within the secondary literature. The 
empirical readings of Smith all dismiss the need or existence of such standards. See Campbell (1971), Winch 
(1978), and Skinner (1979). Furthermore, several authors have acknowledged the need for our conscience to 
“detach” itself from propriety but maintain that this can be done without distinct moral standards. Griswold (2002) 
asserts that the structure of our moral psychology and judgment are enough to distinguish praiseworthiness from 
propriety (p.131). Similarly, Haakonssen (1981) argues that our impartial spectators are capable of detaching itself 
from conventions (p.56). Also see Raphael (2007) p.90-99). Forman-Barzilai (2010) tries to walk a middle line 
between conventions and transcendence (p.102). Ultimately she accepts the “quasi-theological” conscience Smith 
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of propriety. Additionally, by providing distinct moral standards praiseworthiness facilitates the 
development of moral autonomy. The moral autonomy established by praiseworthiness also 
allows for the pursuit and attainment of self-perfection. The development of praiseworthiness 
and its link to the authority of conscience transforms the role of the impartial spectator. Prior to 
this development the impartial spectator’s role as the voice of our conscience was that of the so-
called “practical man”. In this role the sole tasks of our impartial spectators was to properly 
evaluate the character and actions of others and promote and ensure our own adherence to the 
rules of propriety. However, the impartial spectator becomes a “demigod” tasked with directing 
us towards a life of virtue and happiness via praiseworthiness.117  
In the 6th edition of TMS Smith defines praiseworthiness by describing it as “that thing 
which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however the natural and proper object of 
praise” (TMS, 137). Unlike propriety, which is generated by our sympathy and approval, 
praiseworthiness exists independently from any actual acknowledgment of it. Smith further 
defines praiseworthiness by distinguishing it from praise, arguing the latter indicates what 
society actually does approve of while the former indicates what it should approve of (TMS, 
150). Smith goes on to claim that“[the] love of praise is the desire of obtaining the favorable 
sentiments of our brethren. The love of praise-worthiness is the desire of rendering ourselves the 
proper objects of those sentiments” (Ibid). This distinction between praise and praiseworthiness 
indicates that the former is specifically linked to propriety. Significantly, Smith goes on to claim 
that a love of praise is derived from our more natural love of praiseworthiness (TMS, 137) 
Another distinction between praise and praiseworthiness is the former is externally recognized 
while the latter is internal. Smith argues that the praiseworthy person is unconcerned with actual 
praise. The praiseworthy person thus contrasts with the vain individual who seeks only praise 
and is unconcerned with the actual merit of this praise (TMS, 139). Although the praiseworthy 
person is aware that they may never receive any actual praise they remain motivated, and 
comforted, by the knowledge that their behavior truly merits praise even if this praise only comes 
                                                 
developed in response to charges of conventionalism (p.76). Forman-Barzilai’s “third-way” tries to strike a balance 
between empiricist/conventionalist accounts and transcendentalism (p.102). 
117 Smith’s definition of praiseworthiness was popular enough to be included in Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of 
the English Language. Admittedly this detail is more significant to a strict contextual analysis of TMS. I am more 
interested in how we can determine what praiseworthiness is than how Smith’s contemporaries may have understood 
the term.  
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from their own impartial spectator (Ibid). Accordingly, Muller argues that “[the] individual’s 
love of praise makes him dependent on the reactions of those around him. The love of 
praiseworthiness, by contrast, can be satisfied whether or not the individual actually receives the 
praise of those around him” (Muller, 1993, 106). The approval we receive from our own 
conscience when we are praiseworthy seems to be more than enough to satisfy our need for 
mutual sympathy. Finally, an important feature of praiseworthiness is its inherent motivation to 
transcend the “vulgar and ordinary” standards of propriety. It is the desire to be praiseworthy that 
inspires within us the “real love of virtue” and “real abhorrence of vice” (TMS, 140). This real 
love of virtue, Smith claims, was given to us by “Nature” (Ibid.). Subsequently, it is our natural 
desire to be praiseworthy that inspires us to pursue self-perfection through a life of happiness and 
virtue.     
In order to determine what praiseworthiness is we use our impartial spectators to judge 
our own character and behavior. When used to determine whether or not we are praiseworthy (or 
blameworthy, depending on our actions) our impartial spectators take on the role of the 
“demigod within the breast” (TMS, 153). Thus, when determining what is praiseworthy the 
“practical” man definition of the impartial spectator no longer suffices. Instead, our consciences 
must take on a semi-divine role and guide us towards the real love of virtue and abhorrence of 
vice. Forman-Barzilai (2010) and Otteson (2002) both suggest that what Smith has in mind here 
is a specifically protestant understanding of conscience.118 The former argues that Smith’s 
demigod is “a deistic formulation of the independent and irrefutable authority of the Protestant 
conscience” (p.102). I believe that Smith has a deistic conscience in mind that is grounded in a 
teleological understanding of nature rather than a strict Protestant one.119 Nevertheless, what 
seems certain is that, when determining what is praiseworthy, our conscience can no longer rely 
on the general rules of propriety. Smith further illustrates this point much later in TMS when he 
distinguishes between “exact propriety and perfection” and “that degree of approximation to this 
idea which is commonly attained in the world” (TMS, 291). These two measures correspond to 
                                                 
118 See Otteson p.76-77 and Forman-Barzilai p.101. 
119 Smith makes no references to scripture or revelation in his discussion of God or a deity. More frequently he 
alludes to “Nature” or the “Author of nature” as a stand in for God (TMS, 16, 29, 59, 140). Smith also makes direct 
reference to the Author of nature’s “plan of Providence” (TMS, 191). See Alvey (2003), Adam Smith: Optimist or 
Pessimist? p.3.  
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praiseworthiness and propriety respectively. Exact propriety and perfection (i.e. 
praiseworthiness) “exists in the mind of every man, [the] idea of this kind, gradually formed 
from his observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people” 
(TMS, 291). Determining what is praiseworthy and living our lives by it thus appears to be a 
slow, deliberate, and trying process of keen observation rather than a quick, practical, reference 
to a set of general rules. However, these general rules remain essential to our judgment of other 
people’s character and behavior. Smith characterizes praiseworthiness as a standard of self-
approbation. Thus, though we ought to praise people when they are truly worthy of it, we can 
neither expect nor demand that others pursue self-perfection so long as they are obeying the rules 
of propriety.120 
Praiseworthiness allows our conscience to overcome the relativity and conformity 
inherent in propriety. Because it is distinct from propriety praiseworthiness gives our impartial 
spectators a means to judge the practical general rules generated by our sympathy. Rather than 
determining right and wrong based upon past experiences, our authoritative conscience can use 
the idea of perfection naturally ingrained in our moral psychology.121 Although the actualization 
of this idea perfection may vary depending on differing circumstances it should not vary so much 
as to allow great acts of barbarity (i.e. infanticide) to endure. Instead of permitting any act that 
has attained approval in the past our authoritative conscience—when directed by 
praiseworthiness—compels us to act in a way that is truly worthy of approval. Similarly, 
praiseworthiness overcomes propriety’s inherent conformity by establishing moral autonomy. 
Thus, though our conscience begins as an internalization of propriety, praiseworthiness allows it 
to evolve into a means for attaining moral autonomy (Muller, 1993, p.100). This moral autonomy 
facilitates the progress of morals at both the individual and societal level. Individually, 
praiseworthiness makes it possible individuals to break away from vulgar and ordinary propriety 
and pursue self-perfection Accordingly, Evensky (2005) argues that praiseworthiness is an 
“independent assessment of worthiness [that] makes the progress of individuals towards virtue 
possible” (p.45). At the societal level praiseworthiness can help morals progress via emulation. 
                                                 
120 This becomes problematic with the inclusion of Smith’s theory of moral corruption. It is possible for propriety to 
become corrupted enough to make people unhappy and vicious. Smith fails to adequately acknowledge this.  
121 Consider Smith’s suggestion that our concept of praiseworthiness precedes any notion of mere praise (TMS, 
137). See also TMS, 291.   
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Smith suggests in TMS that moral progress is at least partially explained psychologically. Smith 
argues that our inspiration to pursue praiseworthiness begins with our faculty of emulation, 
claiming that “the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally founded in our 
admiration of the excellence of others” (TMS, 137). Accordingly, we try and adopt the same 
characteristics that we find admirable in other people (Ibid.).122 Consequently, praiseworthy 
individuals can improve upon the rules of propriety by inspiring people to adopt and adhere to 
different and superior moral standards. What may be considered praiseworthy can, over time, 
become a part of propriety when enough people adopt it.123 For instance, if enough individuals of 
admirable (i.e. praiseworthy) character had adopted the belief that infanticide was unjust and 
cruel then the practice may not have persisted so long in ancient Greece. Similar arguments can 
be made about the eventual abolition of institutional slavery. Though it may need to work in 
tandem with material circumstances in order to change general rules, the authoritative and 
autonomous conscience created by praiseworthiness can facilitate—and explain—changes in 
morality in a way that conformist propriety cannot. 
Smith’s concept of praiseworthiness explains how we are capable of judging existing 
moral standards and how these standards progress over time. Additionally, the discussion of 
praiseworthiness in TMS offers a persuasive prescriptive analysis of the merits and benefits of 
pursuing a praiseworthy life. Smith not only makes self-perfection possible in the 6th edition of 
TMS he also explains why it is desirable by continually establishing its inherent superiority over 
other lifestyles, especially the love of praise. Recall for a moment the absence of actual approval 
associated with the love of praiseworthiness. Though nobody may praise or even approve of the 
praiseworthy person—and it is possible they may even be disapproved of—Smith makes it clear 
that the internal approval of the demigod-like impartial spectator more than compensates for this 
(TMS, 138-139). Contrast this with the person who is actually praised but is unworthy of this 
approval, Smith refers to them as both a “foolish liar” and an “important coxcomb” who will 
                                                 
122 Griswold (2002) sees this as the key to determining what is praiseworthy, arguing that wishing to be “praised for 
what we find praiseworthy in [others]” is enough to make such a determination (p.131). However, like the other 
conventionalist readings I believe Griswold has failed to account for the differences between these two forms of 
approval as well as the acute difference between virtue and propriety.  
123 See Evensky (2005), “social progress is not made when one individual transcends the norm. It is made when the 
norm itself, and thus the common standard of civic ethics, progresses. Refined individuals can contribute to this 
progress, but the process of this progress is larger than any one individual” (p.48-49). 
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never be truly satisfied with their undeserved praise (TMS, 138). Smith makes it two important 
points clear here. First, the pleasure of actual praise is always superseded by praiseworthiness, 
even in instances when the praiseworthy person is disapproved of or blamed. Additionally, we 
appear to be intrinsically aware of undeserved praise and thus incapable of being truly satisfied 
by it. I believe that Smith is suggesting here that our impartial spectators—in the role of 
demigods—have some access to moral standards that are distinct from, and superior to, mere 
propriety.  
Conclusion 
 Throughout the first five editions of TMS conscience was entirely subservient to the 
general rules of propriety. Consequently, the role of conscience (i.e. the impartial spectator) in 
these editions was to ensure obedience to these general rules. As a result the moral system 
developed by Smith in these editions can be reduced to conformity to popular opinion. As the 
sole means for making moral judgments propriety contains two flaws. The first of these is 
propriety’s inherent relativity and subsequent inability to judge its own rules. Additionally, 
conformity to the rules of propriety perpetuates mediocrity and prohibits the moral progress of 
individuals and society.  In the final edition of TMS Smith overcomes these problems by 
establishing the authority of conscience. He accomplishes this by developing the concept of 
praiseworthiness. Praiseworthiness liberates our consciences from propriety’s general rules by 
providing our impartial spectators with distinct and superior moral standards. The development 
of praiseworthiness in the 6th edition of TMS transforms the impartial spectators from the 
“practical man” and into a “demigod”.   
The authoritative conscience developed in the 6th edition of TMS makes the critical 
evaluation of propriety possible. This allows us to properly judge when adhering to propriety is 
truly warranted and when it is not and improving its general rules when appropriate. Moreover, 
our authoritative consciences make us truly morally autonomous and thus capable of creating 
and following our own moral standards. This autonomy makes it possible for us to transcend 
mere propriety and pursue self-perfection. By asserting the superiority of this self-perfection (i.e. 
the life of praiseworthiness) Smith appears to prioritize it over the conventionalism of propriety 
However, Smith does not abandon the general rules of propriety in the 6th edition. Smith 
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recognizes that propriety remains essential to society and for most people, offers a means for 
living a decent, dignified, life. Instead, Smith supplements this existing system for those 
dissatisfied with the mediocrity inherent in propriety. For the vast majority of people the path to 
good moral character and some measure of happiness remains adherence to the general rules of 
propriety. Although it is not necessary—or possible—for each individual to pursue 
praiseworthiness its standards are still essential. Moral progress presumes the existence of 
praiseworthy individuals worthy of emulation who inevitably reshape the general rules of 
propriety. Thus, although most people are not required to pursue praiseworthiness the moral 
well-being of society as a whole would seem to depend on it. Additionally, for the small minority 
of “wise and virtuous” individuals who recognize the flaws and limitations of propriety the 
autonomy and self-perfection offered may be necessary for their happiness. Being aware of any 
standards of praiseworthiness may make pursuing and attaining them a requirement. 
The authority of conscience established in TMS’ 6th edition may be more clearly 
significant and relevant when understood in relation to the other changes Smith made. 
Praiseworthiness may offer a means for avoiding (or escaping) the moral corruption Smith 
outlines in the final edition of TMS. Choosing to pursue praiseworthiness rather than praise (or 
even mere propriety) may prevent us from ever developing the false beliefs created by this 
corruption and thus capable of avoiding the misery associated with it. Similarly, the cardinal 
virtues outlined in the 6th edition may provide the necessary content to the self-perfection 
facilitated by the authority of conscience. However, for our conscience to direct us away from 
moral corruption and towards virtue we need a reliable means for determining what is 
praiseworthy and what is not. Smith does not include a clear means for determining what 
praiseworthiness is or a method for distinguishing it from propriety. It is therefore tempting to 
conclude that no distinct standards are necessary. Although I agree Smith never abandoned his 
initial conventionalism, nor did he waver in his belief in the necessity of propriety, I do not 
believe that praiseworthiness can be understood as purely conventional. The firm distinction 
Smith makes between praiseworthiness and praise (as well as propriety and virtue) suggest to me 
that there are moral rules that are separate from—and superior to—the rules of propriety. 
However, because Smith does not directly tell us what these superior standards are we must 
determine what these are on his behalf. The teleological theory of human nature Smith develops 
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in TMS is a possible source for these standards. Knowing what humanity’s final cause is and 






















Teleology and the Voice of Nature 
2.0 Introduction  
 For an authoritative conscience to be meaningful it needs to be capable of going against 
the conventional standards of propriety. To accomplish this, conscience needs access to moral 
standards that are distinct from, and perhaps superior to, mere propriety. Praiseworthiness is 
capable of providing the moral standards that allow us to pursue self-perfection. However, how 
our conscience is able to determine what praiseworthiness is needs to be explained. In the 
previous chapter I argued there is good evidence the standards of praiseworthiness exist and that 
they are distinct from the standards of propriety.124 These standards of praiseworthiness are also 
necessary to the clarity and coherency of TMS’ 6th edition. Without distinct standards for 
praiseworthiness it is unlikely any individual would ever be capable of successfully pursuing the 
Stoic self-perfection outlined in this final edition. The problem then becomes where exactly we 
might find these standards. A potential source for the standards of praiseworthiness, and by 
extension virtue, is Smith’s theory of human nature. Smith’s theory begins with empirical 
observations about what human beings are.  However, this theory goes beyond mere description, 
to suggest that human beings may have been designed with a particular purpose. Throughout 
TMS Smith simultaneously describes what humans are while also providing insights on what 
humans should be. In other words, Smith’s theory of human nature contains an immanent 
teleology.125 This telos represents perfection. This may intuitively tell us what praiseworthiness 
is. The specific end the Author of Nature designed us to attain is tranquility, which Smith defines 
as both ease of body and peace of mind.126 We achieve this tranquility when we live according to 
our natural design. Consequently, our conscience can distinguish the standards of 
praiseworthiness from mere propriety by listening to the metaphorical voice of Nature.127  
                                                 
124 These reasons include the distinction between praise and praiseworthiness as well as propriety and virtue.  
125 See Alvey (2003) p.31. Alvey argues that this immanent telos “favors ordered human society, morality, 
comfortable preservation, and commerce”.  
126 See Otteson (2002) p.235 for a discussion of Smith’s theory of happiness as tranquility. 
127 Smith makes no reference to any voice of Nature. However, I contend that when our conscience aligns with the 
Author of Nature’s design what we are hearing is akin to Nature’s voice.  
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 The role teleology plays in TMS is a matter of dispute within the secondary literature.128 
Generally, those who read Smith as a strict empiricist dismiss or explain away the role final 
causes play in TMS.129 However, I argue that teleology plays an essential role in both TMS and 
WN.130 This teleology gives both TMS and WN a consistency and coherence and renders these 
two seemingly different works complimentary. More importantly, I argue that this teleology may 
help to determine the standards of praiseworthiness. Subsequently, knowing what our telos is and 
how we can attain it helps us distinguish praiseworthiness from mere propriety. Smith’s 
teleology centers on his idea of the Author of Nature.131 This Author of Nature designed the 
universe and humanity with a specific purpose. This purpose—our telos—represents human 
perfection which is reached through the exercise and adherence to the authoritative conscience.  
To live a life according to nature and attain our telos we must have some access to 
Nature’s design. We gain insights into Nature’s design by exercising our imagination.132 For 
Smith, imagination played a fundamental role in explaining how the universe works and what 
our place within it was. Thus, through imagination we can know what our telos is and how we 
can attain it.133 However, because our moral faculties are imperfect, our understanding of 
Nature’s plan will always be incomplete. As a consequence of this, the pursuit of our telos will 
be imperfect; it will not always be perfectly clear what our final cause is and how we can attain 
it. However, although we are incapable of a perfect understanding of Nature’s design and our 
place within it, we are capable of closer (i.e. better) approximations of true perfection. Thus, we 
                                                 
128 For a concise discussion of this dispute see Alvey “The Secret, Natural Theological Foundations of Adam 
Smith’s Work” Journal of Markets and Morality Vol. 7 No.2 (Fall 2004).  
129 Macfie (1967), Campbell (1971), Haakonssen (1981), and Raphael (1985) all reject any necessary role for 
teleology in TMS, and argue that efficient causes are sufficient for explaining everything. 
130 For the role teleology plays in WN see Lisa Hill “The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith” History of Economic 
Thought 8(1) p.1-21. 
131 Smith uses “Author of Nature”, “Nature”, “deity” and even “God” interchangeably. Whenever he makes 
reference to these in TMS he is, I claim, referring to a design or providential plan.  
132 Pack (1991) claims that for Smith “science can be viewed as essentially a product of the imagination. The 
purpose of science is to explain nature and to soothe the imaginations of mankind”. See Capitalism as a Moral 
System; Adam Smith’s Critique of the Free Market Economy. (London: Edward Elgar) p,199. 
133 Evensky (2005) argues that imagination is our only means of discovering what the design of the universe is and 
what our role in it may be (p.4). 
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are capable of evaluating moral standards by how close they approximate our intended natural 
perfection.134  
 Smith’s teleology may have been implicit before the 6th edition of TMS. However, the 
changes Smith made to the 6th edition make this teleology truly significant. The independent and 
authoritative conscience developed in this final edition is what allows us to successfully pursue 
self-perfection (i.e. our telos). The teleology present in TMS is revealed in Smith’s theory of 
human nature. Frequently, when referring to our nature Smith uses terms such as “Author of 
nature” or “providence” to indicate that a specific component of our human nature is part of a 
purposeful design. By focusing on these instances we can get a sense of what our purpose is and 
some insight into how we can attain it. A careful reading of TMS reveals that happiness is our 
telos (TMS, 171).135 Smith characterizes happiness as tranquility, which requires both ease of 
body and peace of mind. This state of tranquility is where we are most capable of experiencing 
and appreciating all the joys and pleasures of life. Tranquility is our final cause, and the efficient 
causes that direct us to it are contained within our human nature.  
 Smith’s theory of human nature begins with empirical observations. Smith forms his 
teleology by observing what human nature is and then hypothesizing about the possible purpose 
behind it.136 Smith presents his theory of human nature at the very beginning of TMS by stating 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. (TMS, 13). 
 Human beings are thus simultaneously self-interested and beneficent. After establishing the first 
principles of human nature Smith goes on to provide a hierarchy of efficient causes that (ideally) 
compel us towards our telos. These efficient causes are our moral faculties which includes 
instincts, passions, and sentiments. These components of our human nature exist somewhere in 
                                                 
134 Smith appears to put his faith in a linear understanding of progress here and circular reasoning. He considers 
commercial society is considered the best possible society because it approximates a telos, and we know what this 
telos is because commercial society has approximated it.  
135 Smith argues that tranquility is our “natural and usual state” (TMS, 172). Thus, when we are disturbed or upset 
we seek out means to recover out “natural” state of tranquility.  
136 Fleischacker (2005) argues that Smith’s theory of human nature is based in part on empiricism yet still skeptical 
about it. He argues that Smith is “open to information about what people might seek and achieve if they understood 
themselves differently” (p.62). Thus, Smith’s theory of nature still draws upon empirical observation without being 
entirely confined by it. 
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between our self-interest and beneficence.137 When our moral faculties are properly satisfied, 
controlled (by our conscience), and developed they direct us towards the pursuit of tranquility 
and tell us exactly how to attain ease of body and peace of mind. Understanding our human 
nature provides us with the information necessary to pursue and attain tranquility. Thus, knowing 
our nature—and its purpose—can play a fundamental role in helping us determine the standards 
of praiseworthiness.  
In order to perfect our moral faculties and bring us in line with the Author of Nature’s 
design, Smith recommends the Christian golden rule. Unlike his version of the golden mean—
which only creates conventional morals—Smith’s golden rule actually perfects our human nature 
by bringing seemingly conflicting parts of it into harmony. The golden rule differs from mere 
propriety because it aims for perfection rather than social cohesion. By loving our neighbors and 
ourselves as our neighbors loves us we inevitably make our self-interest and beneficence 
complimentary (rather than conflicting) and subsequently perfect our moral faculties. 
Consequently we pursue self-perfection and attain tranquility when our impartial spectators use 
the golden rule to guide and govern our character and behavior. By compelling us to obey the 
golden rule—rather than mere propriety—our impartial spectators speak to us with the voice of 
nature and act as demigods. It is this obedience to the golden rule that defines praiseworthiness 
for us and leads us to the life of virtue and tranquility.   
 The specific teleology outlined in TMS by Smith is suited to commercial society. The 
social and economic forces of commercial society have a profound influence on our pursuit of 
self-perfection. Commercial society, I argue, affects our pursuit of self-perfection in two 
significant ways. First, commercial society makes tranquility more accessible. Commercial 
society liberates individuals from the undignified direct dependence of past societies by 
replacing it with mutual interdependence.138 Unlike the dependence of past societies, wherein 
most individuals (i.e. the poor) had to rely on the benevolence of others for their survival and 
well-being, this interdependence allows each and every individual to pursue and attain ease of 
body and peace of mind. Additionally, the opulence generated within commercial society 
                                                 
137 See Force, Self-Interest Before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) for a discussion on first principles in TMS. 
138 For a discussion of mutual interdependence see Muller (1993) p.72 and Hanley (2009) p.19-20.  
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contributes significantly to the greater accessibility of tranquility. Unlike past societies, everyone 
in commercial society ought to have enough wealth to successfully pursue ease of body and 
peace of mind. In addition to its increased accessibility, commercial society also makes our telos 
more attainable. In the so-called “barbaric” societies of the past (i.e. any non-commercial 
society) attaining tranquility required faculties and abilities far superior to the norm. Thus, not 
only was our telos only open to a few elites, but attaining it required heroic effort and 
determination. According to Smith, commercial society “softens” the virtues by eliminating their 
martial and austere edges.139 Though still relatively uncommon and beautiful, the “bourgeois” 
virtues of commercial society do not require the same superiority as they did in the past.140 
Consequently, in commercial society perfecting our nature and attaining ease of body and peace 
of mind is easier than in any other society. The greater accessibility and attainability of 
tranquility within commercial society largely explains why Smith was cautiously optimistic 
about it. Although it has its imperfections, our pursuit of happiness (i.e. tranquility) is best served 
within commercial society. 
 If tranquility—as ease of body and peace of mind—is our natural and perfect final cause 
(i.e. our self-perfection) then knowing how to attain it ought to tell us how to determine what 
praiseworthiness is. Thus, our conscience may be able to determine what is praiseworthy by 
knowing exactly how to attain ease of body and peace of mind. Ultimately, it is our knowledge 
of Nature’s design that might tell us how to pursue and attain tranquility. Consequently, our 
conscience becomes truly authoritative and leads us to praiseworthiness—and by extension 
tranquility—when we listen to the voice of Nature spoken through the impartial spectator.   
2.1 The Role of Teleology 
Smith never specifically mentions “teleology” or “telos” in TMS.141 However, he does 
refer to ideas such as the “Author of nature”, a “Deity”, and “Providence” several times 
throughout TMS.142 We adhere to and promote the “plan of Providence” when we act “according 
                                                 
139 See Muller (1993) and Fleischacker (2005). 
140 For a seminal discussion on the “bourgeois virtues” see McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtue: Ethics for an Age of 
Commerce (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
141 See Alvey (2003) p.3. 
142 See Chapter One, no.80. For a strong example of how the Author of Nature designed us with a specific purpose 
see TMS, 125-129.  For a concise analysis of the debate on the role of a deity in Smith’s philosophy see Evensky, 
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to the dictates of our moral faculties” (TMS, 191). Furthermore, Smith claims that these dictates 
may be conceived of as “the commands and laws of the Deity” (i.e. the Author of Nature) and 
compares them to the laws of motion and the laws of a sovereign (Ibid).143 We follow to the 
Author of Nature’s plan when we obey the dictates of our moral faculties and consequently attain 
our telos.  
While the role teleology plays in TMS is disputed in the secondary literature I argue that 
teleology not only plays an essential role, but also that it is the key to distinguishing 
praiseworthiness from propriety. Accordingly, I connect Smith’s teleology directly to the 
authority of conscience and the pursuit of praiseworthiness. However, before linking this 
teleology to the authoritative conscience I will first establish the necessity of the former in TMS. 
Both the empirical and normative claims Smith makes in TMS rely on this Natural teleology. 
Consequently, without it TMS loses coherence and cohesion. The propensity to dismiss the role 
of final causes (i.e. teleology) in TMS is treated at length by Viner.144 In The Role of Providence 
in the Social Order he argues that those who dismiss Smith’s teleological arguments are either 
blinded to their importance or—perhaps more frequently—treat them as mere “ornaments” to the 
more significant empirical components of Smith’s moral philosophy.145 There is an influential 
body of Smith scholarship that has rejected the teleology present in Smith as superfluous. For 
example, Haakonssen (1981) argues that nothing significant is lost when Smith’s allusions to 
teleology are dismissed entirely. Similarly, Griswold treats Smith’s teleology as an “ordering 
principle” we use to make sense of the world rather than an existing part of some providential 
plan (Griswold, 2006, p.48). Raphael (1985) argues that TMS fits best with the rise of 18th 
century empiricism, claiming that any references Smith makes to teleology is purely rhetorical. 
This would appear to make Smith a particularly poor rhetorician. If empiricism was the accepted 
                                                 
p23-25. The debate itself focuses on whether or not a deity is necessary to Smith’s philosophy. Haakonssen (1981) 
and Campbell (1971) agree that there is a logic to Smith’s philosophy independent of any deity or design argument. 
I would agree that the empirical component of Smith’s philosophy survives without a deity. However, this may not 
hold true for his normative claims. Our progress, both as individuals and a species, would seem to depend on the 
existence of a benevolent deity.  
143 Smith claims that the laws generated by our moral faculties “have a much greater resemblance to what are 
properly called laws, those general rules which the sovereign lays down to direct the conduct of his subjects. Like 
them they are the rules to direct the free actions of men: they are prescribed most surely by a lawful superior” (TMS 
191). 
144 Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire,” Journal of Political Economy 35 (1927) p.98-132. 
145 Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1977)  p.81. 
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norm at the time then using outdated and unpopular teleological claims would presumably do 
little to further Smith’s arguments. The literature that casts Smith as a strict social scientist has 
also implicitly rejected any teleological foundation to TMS.146  
Alvey (2004) has provided a convincing counter-argument to these rejections of Smith’s 
teleology by pointing to a growing body of literature that accepts the teleological foundation of 
TMS and argues against its ornamental treatment (Alvey, 2004, p.336). According to Alvey the 
tendency to dismiss the role of teleology in TMS is likely a product of the secular nature of 
contemporary social science (Ibid). Thus, in order to frame Smith as a social scientist any 
allusions to non-empirical claims must be disregarded. However, Alvey argues that the caricature 
of Smith as a pure social scientist clashes with the intellectual culture of 18th century Britain. 
Although the empirical claims of Hume and others may have been popular in continental Europe 
at the time, Alvey contends that teleological arguments—especially Stoic ones—were much 
more influential in Britain (p.338). Consequently, dismissing this teleological foundation may 
amount to an ahistorical and anachronistic reading of TMS.  
The tendency to treat the teleology in TMS as ornamental appears to be done on purely 
ideological grounds. Furthermore, such dismissals would seem to violate the principle of a 
charitable reading of TMS. TMS went through six editions and the teleological language did not 
disappear. In fact, I believe Smith develops and refines the role of teleology throughout all of 
TMS’ iterations, culminating in the sixth and final one. Instead of explaining away Smith’s 
allusions to final causes it would seem more appropriate that the reader explain why they are 
there to begin with and how they add (or subtract) to Smith’s arguments. Rather than dismissing 
them as superfluous I believe Smith’s allusions to a deity and providence suggests a telos 
immanent in human nature. I agree with Viner’s conclusion that this dismissal renders Smith’s 
entire philosophical project unintelligible (Viner, 1927, p.82). The most serious effect this 
treatment of Smith has may be on his theories of spontaneous order and unintended 
consequences. Smith makes it clear throughout both WN and TMS that commercial society and 
all of its benefits are the product of the individual pursuit of self-interest. This individualistic 
pursuit of self-interest created the conditions of commercial society over time and thus explains 
                                                 
146 See Campbell (1981), Macfie (1967), Skinner (1979), and Winch (1978).  
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the transition from more primitive types of society (e.g. pastoral and feudal). Similarly, the 
general opulence generated within commercial society is produced by the pursuit of self-interest. 
However, Smith argues that commercial society and its benefits are not part of some rational 
human plan. The social benefits produced by the pursuit of self-interest (i.e. opulence, peace, 
justice etc.) are unforeseen and unintentional (WN IV.2.9). We generate these benefits when we 
obey the dictates of our moral faculties—such as our passions—and not by rationally calculating 
what would be best for all. When we amputate the teleological foundation of Smith’s philosophy 
we jeopardize the coherence of this theory.147 Absent this teleology there is no satisfying 
explanation for why the pursuit of self-interest would necessarily contribute to the general good 
of all society or the progress towards a better (i.e. wealthier) society.148 The same holds true for 
other aspects of Smith’s philosophy. In TMS he argues that our natural deference to superiors is 
essential to the peace and order of society (TMS, 65-66). This deference helps maintain the 
distinction of ranks Smith perceives as necessary to society. Additionally, deferring to our 
superiors may help to establish the legitimate authority of government. However, despite these 
benefits Smith characterizes our deference as both unreasonable and potentially damaging (TMS, 
64, 65, 67). He even goes so far as to mock one its recipients “Lewis” XIV (TMS, 67). 
Regardless of its apparently irrational and harmful nature the deference is a net good because of 
its indirect and unintentional contribution to the peace and order of society. The necessity of this 
peace and order is an essential part of Smith’s teleological framework. 
Removing teleology from Smith’s philosophy may also render TMS incompatible with 
WN. The teleological foundation of WN and TMS makes both of these works compatible and 
complimentary thus resolving the so-called Adam Smith Problem (hereafter ASP).149 The crux of 
the ASP is the perception that WN and TMS are two disparate works that contradict each other. 
According to this problem WN is a book entirely focused on the virtues of self-interest, while 
TMS exposes the merits of benevolence. Consequently, both books could only be read in 
                                                 
147 See Alvey (2004) p.344-345. 
148 The best example of how this works is Smith’s famous quote about the butcher, brewer, and baker (I.2.2). Each 
individual pursuing their self-interest—with absolutely no regard for the public good—will necessarily contribute to 
the greater good of society. The invisible hand metaphor is also relevant here, as it highlights how the pursuit of 
self-interest distributes wealth in a way that alleviates the worst poverty. 
149 For a historical discussion of the ASP see Montes (2003) “Das Adam Smith Problem: Its Origins, the Stages of 
the Current Debate, and One Implication for our Understanding of Sympathy.” Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought. 25(1): 63-90. 
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complete isolation from the other. Adherents to the ASP typically frame WN as a treatise on the 
benefits of selfishness and TMS on the merits of benevolence. There is strong argument to be 
made that the ASP is a pseudo-problem based entirely on a misunderstanding of Smith’s core 
arguments.150 However, although the problem itself is widely dismissed there is no accepted 
consensus for how WN and TMS complement each other. Smith’s teleology may explain how 
both these works can be understood as complementary. This teleology links the benefits of 
commercial society and self-interest to the theory of self-perfection outlined by Smith in TMS’ 
6th edition. The wealth, security, and liberty created by the pursuit of self-interest in commercial 
society are all necessary to the teleological pursuit of self-perfection. All of these benefits are not 
ends in themselves but a means for the pursuit and attainment of our telos. 
In his most definitive teleological statement Smith establishes his belief in both a 
designer and a design universe. According to Smith;  
In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the 
ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or animal 
body, admire how every thing is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, 
the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species […] When by natural 
principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and enlightened reason 
would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient 
cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that 
to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God (TMS, 105-106).151 
Here Smith admits that humans were created by an “Author of Nature” with a specific purpose. 
Smith defines this purpose as the “happiness and perfection of the species” (TMS, 126). It is this 
purpose that links Smith’s teleology to the authority of conscience and the concept of 
praiseworthiness. The goal of praiseworthiness is to direct our conscience towards self-
perfection. Consequently, knowing what perfection is (i.e. our telos) and how we attain it is what 
determines the standards of praiseworthiness. In the Stoic tradition, Smith argues we attain 
perfection when we conform to the Author of Nature’s plan. In order to achieve self-perfection 
our impartial spectator must speak to us with the voice of nature so that we can properly 
determine and adhere to the standards of praiseworthiness. However, to accomplish this we first 
need some information and insight into what the Author of Nature’s plan is. 
                                                 
150 Haakonssen (1981), Skinner (1979), and Winch (1978) all argue that the ASP is a pseudo-problem that can be 
ignored.  




2.2 Nature and Imagination  
 Smith’s natural, Stoic, teleology may hold the key to determining the standards of 
praiseworthiness that properly facilitate the authoritative conscience. However, in order to 
properly adhere to this providential plan we require some insight into what the plan is. In other 
words, to recognize our telos and properly pursue it we require some understanding of Nature’s 
design. Such insight will help us distinguish the natural and intended operation of our moral 
faculties from their conventional, and possibly corrupted, operation. The same faculty we use to 
determine the laws of motion (i.e. imagination) is capable of revealing Nature’s design to us.152 
However, because imagination is inherently limited the insights and information derived from it 
are necessarily imperfect and incomplete. Thus, our understanding of Nature’s design and 
subsequent teleology are imperfect and as a result, our pursuit of tranquility will be imprecise.  
The roots of Smith’s contingent teleology can be traced back to his “History of 
Astronomy” (hereafter, HA).153 Within HA Smith argues that philosophy is tasked with 
“representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to 
introduce order into chaos of jarring and discordant appearances” (HA, Preamble). In other 
words, the job of philosophy is to impose meaning and order upon a seemingly meaningless and 
chaotic universe by discovering the natural laws that govern it. Unfortunately our ability to 
accomplish this is hindered by the limits of our understanding. We have no immediate (i.e. 
sensory) access to the “chains which bind together” the universe which is why Smith identifies 
them as “invisible”. However, we can form plausible explanations for, and ideas of, these 
principles through our imagination. It is our imagination, Smith argues, that allows us to order 
and explain the seemingly chaotic universe we inhabit. Over time existing explanations of the 
universe become more and more tenuous as we attain additional knowledge and information. As 
                                                 
152 According to Evensky Smith uses the invisible hand metaphor to represent the “connecting principles” that make 
up the Author of Nature’s design (Evensky, 2005, p.4). He further claims that “Smith believes we can only imagine 
the invisible connecting principles designed by this hand. We cannot know them” (Ibid).    
153 Evensky (2005) uses HA to demonstrate exactly how Smith’s invisible hand metaphor explains the teleological 
foundations of his thought. My own reading of HA and TMS is inspired by Evensky’s work. However, unlike 
Evensky I do not focus on the invisible hand. Furthermore, I disagree with Evensky’s assessment of what Smith’s 
believes our telos to be. Evensky characterizes this telos in more broad social terms as general opulence while I 
understand it to be individual tranquility. Nevertheless, Evensky’s arguments are essential.  
60 
 
these existing explanations lose their credibility and veracity the former sense that the universe is 
chaotic creeps back into our minds and we lose the pleasing sense of order and meaning these 
explanations offered us.154  
We seek out new explanations for the universe that properly fit with the new data we 
have acquired.155 This is why Smith admired Newton; Newton offered a new explanation for the 
operation of the universe that satisfied our curiosity and restored order and meaning to our 
perception of the universe. However, though new explanations may be truer than those replaced 
they cannot be properly understood as absolutely true. Instead these explanations should be 
understood as closer approximations of truth or as explanations that better accommodate new 
information. Furthermore, these better explanations remain open to necessary revision should 
any new relevant information be discovered. Because the true nature of the universe is 
unknowable to us all we can manage is to progress closer and closer to a perfect explanation 
without ever truly attaining it. Perhaps the first instance of this process is the creation of religion. 
In HA Smith contends that we develop religion as an explanation for spectacular and seemingly 
random events; 
Comets, eclipses, thunder, lightning, and other meteors, by their greatness, naturally 
overawe [us] and [we view] them with a reverence that approaches to fear. [Our] 
inexperience and uncertainty with regard to everything about them, how they came, how 
they are to go, what went before them, what is to come after them, exasperate his sentiment 
into terror and consternation (HA, 48).  
 
Initially we explained events like these by imagining they were caused by personified deities.156 
Eventually these polytheistic explanations lost their explanatory power and gave way to 
monotheism. From this it is easy to see how religious theories have (mostly) given way to 
scientific explanations of the universe. However, because even scientific explanations are also 
limited by the evidence that can be gathered these are also incapable of capturing absolute truth. 
Regardless of how sophisticated our explanations become over time they still necessarily fall 
short of perfection. 
                                                 
154 Smith’s philosophy of science appears to be similar to Kuhn’s account of paradigm shifts. For a brief account of 
their similarities see Christopher Berry, “Smith and Science,” in Cambridge Companion, p.112-135. 
155 See Skinner, 1979, p.15. 
156 For Smith’s arguments on the origins of polytheism see HA 49-50. 
61 
 
The same imaginative process used in HA to examine the causes of natural phenomena is 
employed by Smith in TMS to understand the potential causes behind moral phenomena. Similar 
to our discovery of the laws of motion we can use our imagination to discover the laws and 
commands that ought to govern our moral faculties. This is the method Smith uses to develop his 
theory of human nature. First, Smith observes a particular moral phenomenon and then explains 
how our moral faculties operate to produce it. However, Smith goes further by imagining what 
the final cause behind our moral faculties might be. In other words, Smith’s theory of human 
nature attempts to discern our place and purpose within the Author of Nature’s providential plan. 
An example of this epistemological process is Smith’s theory of justice. Smith defines justice as 
a largely negative virtue (TMS, 99). Thus, by not harming anyone we adhere to the rules of 
justice. The only instance when it is just to harm someone is when punishment is due. According 
to Smith, any violation of justice requires appropriate punishment for the offender. Punishing 
anyone who violates the rules of justice helps to appease people’s resentment, preventing it from 
turning into hatred and anger which Smith refers to as “the greatest poison to the happiness of a 
good mind” (TMS, 47).  Smith’s theory of justice is based upon two important observations. 
First, Smith observes the resentment felt towards a person who inflicts harms on others. This 
resentment inevitably compels us to seek punishment for the offending party. From these 
observations Smith analyzes the circumstances that give rise to the feeling of resentment and 
exactly when, and what, punishment is due. This allows him to develop particular rules of 
justice.  
Smith transitions from observation and description to an eventual speculation about the 
possible purpose to his particular definition of justice. Justice, he imagines, must have been 
given to human to serve some purpose and argues that “[…] Nature, antecedent to all reflections 
upon the utility of punishment, has in this manner stamped upon the human heart, in the 
strongest and most indelible characters, and immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred 
and necessary law of retaliation (TMS, 86). Here Smith establishes the role of Nature in giving 
us this desire for vengeance as well the necessity of this desire. Later he explains that resentment, 
and by extension vengeance, “seems to have been given to us by nature for defense” adding that 
they are “the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence” (TMS, 96).  Smith concludes 
that justice contributes to our natural need for peace and order by making society possible and 
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sustainable (TMS, 103-105). Justice, Otteson claims, is essential to society and Smith sees all 
other things (e.g. friendship) as “ornaments that embellish and make the edifice of society 
agreeable” (Otteson, 2002, p.228).157 A second example of this process is Smith’s analysis of our 
sympathy with joy and grief. Smith observes that we are much less willing to sympathize with 
other people’s grief than we are with their joy (TMS, 51-52). Because the former is painful, 
Smith argues, we are much less inclined to experience it. Often this causes us to become 
apathetic towards those who suffer. However, Smith speculates that our hesitation to sympathize 
with grief is a purposeful part of our natural design, stating that “Nature, it seems, when she 
loaded us with our own sorrows, thought that they were enough, and therefore did not command 
us to take any further share in those of others, than what was necessary to prompt us to relieve 
them” (TMS, 59). These are only two examples of Smith’s teleological understanding of human 
nature. The more we know about human nature the better we understand our potential purpose. 
Like our understanding of the universe our insight into the Author of Nature’s providential plan 
for humanity improves as we collect more and more data.  
If humans were perfect creatures our understanding of nature and our place within it 
would yield absolute, universal, moral truths.158 Unfortunately our natural imperfections ensure 
that we will never acquire any unconditional knowledge of Nature’s providential plan. 
Additionally, the experiential nature of morality guarantees that any insights into our human 
nature—and its potential final cause—will be pre-conditioned by the conventions of our 
particular society. Consequently, the teleology outlined by Smith in TMS ought to be considered 
contingent. If better explanations of human nature became available or society itself were to 
fundamentally change then our telos—and how we attain it—ought to change accordingly. 
Smith’s teleology is thus based upon the best available evidence available to him about human 
nature and the dynamics of commercial society that influence our perception of this evidence. As 
                                                 
157 Although justice has a clear and measureable social utility but it is pursued for the purpose of satisfying 
individual resentment (Evensky, 2005, p.72). 
158 Evensky (2005) refers to our imperfection as “frailty” and argues that this is what makes humans unique 
creatures and what distinguishes natural philosophy from moral philosophy (p.8). He further adds that because of 
this frailty the pursuit of our telos is neither “fluid nor inevitable” (p.28). 
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a result of our natural imperfections our perception of our telos and any moral standards derived 
from this will always be flawed and imprecise.159 
 The first relevant imperfection that limits our understanding of the Author of Nature’s 
plan concerns the quantity and quality of information we are capable of attaining about moral 
phenomena. Sympathy is the primary means we have of attaining the necessary information for 
understanding our moral faculties. By imagining ourselves in the positions of others we gain 
valuable insight into the causes of moral phenomena. However, the amount of information we 
are capable of gathering about another person’s circumstances is significantly limited. At any 
given time we can only know so much about a person’s character and behavior. Often the 
variables that contribute to these are too numerous for us to make anything more than a 
superficial judgment about another individual. This seems especially true when we consider how 
quickly our sympathy acts. More often than not our sympathy with another person is reflexive 
and automatic. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that we are projected into the place of 
another rather than that we project ourselves. As a result of this immediacy we often have very 
little time to collect the data necessary to make a proper judgment about an individual’s character 
or behavior. Because it is possible that we may judge another without access to all the necessary 
facts or the proper time to collect them it is reasonable to assume that our judgments are often 
flawed. Consequently, any moral judgments we make ought to be conditional. Should more or 
better evidence become available we must be willing to revise past judgments we held to be true. 
More importantly, the limited information we are capable of gathering affects our insight into the 
operation of our moral faculties. There could been hidden variables we have no knowledge of 
that influence the character and behaviors of others and ourselves. Admittedly, the amount of 
information about the operation of our moral faculties will continue to accumulate, and thus 
improve, over time. However, it would be naïve and presumptuous to assume that this could ever 
reach a perfect understanding of other people’s circumstances and motivations. 
 Our understanding of our moral faculties and telos is also affected by the quality of 
information we are capable of gathering. The first qualitative influence is our inability to 
                                                 
159 My claim here is that, for Smith, universal morals standards exist but that our ability to perceive them is flawed. 
Moreover, how these standards are perceived may necessarily vary across different societies, depending on their 
understanding of human nature.  
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completely abandon our own perspective.. Smith argues that even after we project ourselves into 
another’s place we still retain our own experiences and perspectives (TMS, 24-25). If human 
beings were perfect, this limitation could potentially be overcome with the impartial spectator. 
The primary purpose of the impartial spectator, when judging others, is to remove any biases we 
may have when we assess the behavior and character of other people. However, in these 
instances the impartial spectator is a practical tool and not a perfect one. Though it can help 
mitigate the influence any biases may have on our judgments the impartial spectator cannot 
eliminate them altogether.160 In order to make judgments about others and ourselves our 
impartial spectators must make reference to our experiences which inadvertently allows bias to 
creep in. Consequently, when we make judgments we may often only apply our own 
interpretation of propriety rather than propriety in its strictest sense. Ultimately, because our 
impartial spectators must use previously biased information to make judgments it is possible that 
it can only effectively distance us away from our biases but never escape them.   
 An additional, more malignant, influence on our perception of moral faculties deals 
specifically with our ability to properly and fairly sympathize with other individuals. Smith 
argues that, because we are imperfect creatures, we often let our passions interfere with our 
sympathy and consequently we form improper judgments of others. An example of a passion that 
interferes with our sympathy and skews our moral judgment is envy. In TMS Smith defines envy 
as a selfish passion that interferes with our sympathy with joy (TMS, 51). Smith specifically 
cites the envy we are prone to feel when someone has had a quick and drastic change in fortune. 
These individuals often end up unhappy because people refuse to share their joy. Smith goes so 
far as to argue that we expect these fortunate individuals to “have more sympathy with our envy 
and aversion to [their] happiness, than we have with [their] happiness” (TMS, 51). Inevitably this 
envy leads to reciprocal hatred. More importantly, our potentially unfair sympathy with others 
may influence our understanding of how our moral faculties operate. By routinely interfering 
with fair and proper sympathy our passions affect our ideas of approbation and disapprobation 
and, by extension, the standards of propriety. Consequently, it is conceivable the we may see 
                                                 




envy and hatred as proper responses to other people’s good fortune, which in turn can alter our 
perception of our telos.  
Finally, the type of society we live in affects our perception and understanding of our 
telos. Smith argues that the specific type of society influences and conditions moral standards 
and subsequently moral truths as well.161 What is proper or even praiseworthy in one type of 
society (hunter/gatherer, pastoral, commercial etc.) will not necessarily be proper or 
praiseworthy in another type. For instance, past societies had a greater need for martial virtues 
than commercial society where martial duties can fall to standing armies. Consequently, past 
societies valued characteristics and behaviors differently. For example, courage is more prized in 
societies where there are no standing armies for defense. Individuals would thus be expected to 
act with a certain amount of courage in these societies that may never be required in commercial 
society. Additionally, culture also has a determining influence on a society’s morals. As a 
consequence it is possible for moral standards to vary across different commercial societies. The 
consequence of this is the recognition that our perception of moral faculties—and the telos 
derived from this understanding—is irrevocably conditioned by our particular society. 
Consequently, how an individual perceives and pursues praiseworthiness may vary from one 
society to the next. 
Because our understanding of Nature’s providential plan is imperfect any moral standards 
we derive from this understanding ought to be considered contingent. The flaws in our judgment 
(our natural imperfection) and the influence of our society all prevent us from perceiving any 
absolute, universal, moral truths. This does not mean that such truths are nonexistent but, rather, 
that they may always remain invisible to us. If the task of philosophy is to discover and 
explain—through imagination—the natural laws that govern a designed universe then the task of 
moral philosophy may be to find the analogous moral laws. Like the operations of the universe 
itself morals may appear to be chaotic because of our relative and imperfect perception of them. 
However, much like our attempts to explain the nature and operation of the universe we can use 
                                                 
161 Smith distinguishes types of society by their mode of production and the division of labor. Subsequently, 
commercial society differs from other types because it is merchant based and has a greater division of labor. 
Additionally, because everyone in commercial society sells something, including workers who sell their labor, each 
person can effectively be considered a merchant.  
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our imagination to develop similar explanations of morals. For Smith this explanation is 
ultimately a teleological one. Though he never uses the term, the teleology offered by Smith is 
one that is contained within human nature. By studying our nature and imagining its purpose and 
possible final cause (i.e. our telos) we can gain some insight into what we ought to become. This 
insight can help our conscience distinguish what is praiseworthy (i.e. what we ought to do or 
become) from the mere standards of propriety. Consequently, knowledge of the Author of 
Nature’s plan and our according telos facilitates both the authority of conscience and the pursuit 
of the virtues. This idea of a designed and purposeful human nature appears to be axiomatic to 
Smith. Smith makes no effort to either defend or explain the reasoning behind this axiom.162 
Nevertheless, Smith offers a theory of human nature in TMS that reflects a providential plan. 
This plan provides a goal that both the individual and society ought to progress towards. The 
more knowledge we accumulate about this plan (i.e. our teleology) the closer we will be to 
achieving the perfection of the species. More importantly, knowledge of the Author of Nature’s 
providential plan gives a voice to our impartial spectators and liberates our conscience from the 
fundamentally arbitrary—albeit practical—standards of propriety. Ultimately, our conscience 
becomes truly independent and authoritative when it speaks to us with the voice of Nature.  
 
2.3 The Pursuit of Tranquility 
 Given our knowledge of human nature—and commercial society’s potential influence—
Smith concludes happiness is our telos. Happiness, Smith argues, “may very well be called the 
natural and ordinary state of mankind” (TMS, 57). More definitively, Smith argues that “The 
happiness of mankind, as well as all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original 
purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into existence” (TMS, 191). 
Here Smith not only clearly establishes what our telos is but also establishes the role of a deity in 
creating this purpose. Smith characterizes happiness as tranquility. “Happiness”, Smith argues, 
“consists in tranquility and enjoyment” (TMS, 171). Happiness is thus best understood as the 
                                                 
162 This is not unique to Smith; all moral philosophy (and philosophy in general) begins from some irreducible 
starting point. What may be noteworthy about Smith’s axiomatic position is how out of step it is with his 
contemporaries (especially Hume) and the bulk of modern thought.  
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completion of a process; as what we attain when we successfully perfect our moral faculties. 
Tranquility is the state of being that allows us to truly enjoy life’s pleasures and without it “there 
can be no enjoyment” (Ibid.). Happiness is thus an end state for Smith, one that Griswold argues 
“consists in one’s being at rest in the sense of lacking discord” adding that it “is more like 
coming to a stop than a process of moving towards a goal” (Griswold, 1999, p.218). However, 
Smith believed that tranquility required more than just peace of mind. Tranquility also requires 
ease of body. Accordingly, Evensky argues that, for Smith, “the ideal human life is not 
tranquility in the face of oppression, it is secure tranquility, that peace of mind that one enjoys 
along with peace of body” (Evensky, 2005, p.15). Otteson (2005) adds to this by claiming to live 
a tranquil life “one’s material needs are met, one’s physical condition is good, one has led (or is 
leading) a life of virtue and wisdom, and one has established and maintained relations with 
others that are mutually agreeable (p.235). Consequently, happiness has both psychological and 
physical conditions that must be fulfilled. Knowing what these conditions are and how they are 
fulfilled may ultimately help to define the standards of praiseworthiness.  
 Tranquility’s first necessary condition is wealth. Smith makes it clear (both in TMS and 
WN) that a certain amount of wealth is a pre-condition to human happiness. It is certainly 
tempting to exaggerate how much wealth is necessary for human happiness; as the author of WN 
Smith has gained an undeserved reputation as an apologist for capitalism.163 However, Smith 
claims that the amount of wealth necessary for tranquility is modest. It may be the case that all 
we need are the “necessities of nature” which Smith explains can be attained with the “wages of 
the meanest labourer” (TMS, 62).  The wealth necessary for tranquility is ideally available to all 
members of society regardless of social rank. This underpins Smith’s vindication of commercial 
society and its capacity to “raise all boats”. When unobstructed by such things as mercantile 
interests commercial society is capable of generating, and circulating, enough wealth for 
everyone, including the meanest laborer. This does not mean that Smith is blind to the 
detrimental impact poverty has on the moral well-being of the individual; both WN and TMS 
consistently lament the mean condition that the poor experience.164 However, even at its worst 
                                                 
163 For counters to the view of Smith as a “Pollyanna” see Evensky (2005) p.164 and Hanley (2009) p.32. 
164 For an analysis of Smith’s concern for the poor see Hanley (2009) p.15-36. See also Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice 
in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay,” in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Hont and Ignatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-44. 
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commercial society is capable of making the life of the common laborer superior to that of any 
African king (WN, I.1.11).  
Though a common laborer may not be capable of acquiring the trinkets and baubles that 
captivate the attentions of the rich their relative wealth ought to provide for all of life’s 
necessities while also ensuring some amount of leisure time. This leisure time is as essential to 
tranquility as the material necessities are. Without some amount of leisure time an individual is 
incapable of adequately developing themselves outside of the workplace and consequently 
becomes “as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.” (WN, 
V.1.3.2). To grow morally, mentally, and emotionally an individual requires opportunities for 
both enjoyment and education, both of which are impossible without leisure time. It follows from 
all this that laborers ought to be paid a sum that allows them to purchase the essential shelter, 
food and clothing for themselves and their families. All individuals, Smith claims, ought to be 
capable of pursuing and attaining happiness. Inequality will still necessarily exist, but in a proper 
commercial society nobody ought to be so poor that they cannot hope to ever be happy. In 
addition to providing the necessities for ease of body, wealth is also essential to our peace of 
mind. Poverty, Smith assures us, is shameful and those who live in it take care to hide 
themselves from “the sight of mankind” (TMS, 62).165 Thus, to attain tranquility we must have 
some measure of wealth in order to ensure we are properly esteemed (by ourselves and others) 
and can thus avoid the perpetual shame of poverty. On its own wealth is insufficient for ease of 
body and peace of mine. However, a severe lack of wealth may be more than enough to make a 
person miserable. Consequently, it would be naïve to dismiss the essential role wealth plays in 
the pursuit of our telos.  
 A second necessary condition for ease of body and peace of mind is security. We cannot 
reasonably hope to attain and enjoy tranquility if our person and property are perpetually 
threatened by both internal (i.e. violations of justice) and external threats (i.e. foreign invasion). 
Both internal and external security requires a society and, more specifically, a sovereign. The 
sovereign ensures internal security by enforcing the rules of justice.166 Smith lists the following 
                                                 
165 See Hanley (2009) p.50-52. 
166 In WN Smith lists the three primary duties of the sovereign as “protecting the society from violence and invasion 
of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from 
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as the “sacred rules” of justice the sovereign must enforce as the laws which guard the life and 
person of our neighbour […] which guard his property and possessions [and] those which guard 
what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others” (TMS, 
102). The sovereign enforces these sacred rules of justice largely by punishing offenders. 
Punishing those who violate any of these rules restores justice and promotes the security of 
society by satisfying the resentment people feel but also has the added benefit of discouraging 
further violations.167 The sovereign also plays a significant role in promoting internal security by 
passing good laws.168 These laws ideally help shape citizens to make them more just and thus 
less prone to infringe upon the property and person of others. Thus the enforcement of justice 
ensures our ease of body by preventing undue harm and ensuring the use and enjoyment of 
property. Additionally, believing we will not be attacked or robbed contributes to our peace of 
mind. Perhaps indirectly, the sovereign’s enforcement of justice also establishes the ground rules 
for the accumulation of property.169 By enforcing the rules of justice the sovereign sets the rules 
for property accumulation and ensures everyone plays by these rules. The sovereign is also 
charged with protecting us from external threats. This is another area where commercial society 
is superior to other types. The invention of firearms and the professional armies employed by 
commercial society helps to protect them from foreign threats.170 This protection is essential to 
our tranquility; we cannot live a life of tranquility if we have cause to believe our society will be 
conquered. Like wealth, security is not enough to guarantee tranquility. It is perfectly possible to 
live in a completely secure society, with the strictest enforcement of justice, and still live a life of 
misery.  
                                                 
the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; 
and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can 
never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit 
could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much 
more than repay it to a great society” (IV.9.51). 
167 Smith highlights the importance of punishing violations of these sacred rules by arguing that “mercy to the guilty 
is cruelty to the innocent” (TMS, 107). 
168 Evensky claims that, for Smith, “positive law serves as an active tool for the inculcation of values” (Evensky, 
2005, p.62). Alvey (2003) agrees, arguing that good laws help make good people (p.156).  
169 According to Evensky, Smith saw the protection of property rights as an essential function of the government. 
This protection ensures that the poor will either “continue poor or acquire wealth in the same manner as [the rich] 
have done” (p.64). 
170 Haakonssen (p.171) and Alvey (.107-108) both argue that Smith say firearms as necessary to commercial 




 In addition to wealth and security, tranquility also requires liberty.171 Being reasonably 
free from external constraints is essential to our pursuit of wealth and the development of our 
own independent, authoritative, conscience.172 Liberty allows us to engage in the economic 
activities that are most likely to increase our wealth. Should the markets change and our current 
economic endeavors become unprofitable we must be free to adapt and pursue new, more 
profitable, opportunities. Commercial society offers this freedom, especially to laborers, who are 
free to move from one job to another as they see fit. Liberty also allows us the opportunity to use 
our own standards of judgment to determine our character and behavior, rather than merely 
conforming to existing propriety. Additionally, liberty makes the internal and external security 
meaningful. Being protected from harm means less if we are forced to live under the rule of a 
tyrant whose rule will make us dependent and undignified. Similarly, the fear of being conquered 
has less meaning if it results in one tyrant replacing another. Most importantly, liberty is 
essential to our dignity and subsequent peace of mind. Perhaps the biggest affront to our dignity 
is having our lives determined for us by someone else.173 Being dependent upon someone else—
like a child is to their parent or a puppy to its master—to provide for you and determine who you 
are is perhaps the most undignified life a person is capable of living. To truly pursue and attain 
tranquility we need the freedom to define our own character and to provide for ourselves. 
Compared to previous societies commercial society offers more liberty and thus better facilitates 
this pursuit.  
 The final necessary condition for tranquility is order. More specifically, Smith believes 
that a class-based society is essential to our happiness.174 This belief reveals the limitations of 
Smith’s more egalitarian arguments. Regardless, Smith argues that a respect for the “distinction 
of ranks” is a necessary part of Smith’s teleology. A stratified society seems to be essential to our 
dignity and subsequent peace of mind. Stratification in to classes helps to set the parameters for 
                                                 
171 Alvey (2003, p.34) argues that, for Smith, anyone with liberty is capable of pursuing happiness.  
172 Winch (1978) characterizes Smith’s theory of liberty as a “sense of security under the law” (p.40). Muller (1993) 
claims that Smith’s theory of liberty is the “freedom to control one’s own passions” (p.2). Both arguments have 
merits however both are too narrow. In A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam 
Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) Fleischacker argues that the ability to develop and exercise our 
own judgment is an essential feature of Smith’s theory of liberty. 
173 This argument forms the crux of Smith’s criticism of feudalism, which he likens to slavery for its extreme 
dependency. See Hanley, 2009, p.20. 
174 Smith argues that the “distinction of ranks” is both natural and necessary. Without it we might never develop the 
ambition required for the improvement of our condition. See TMS p.62-73. 
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respectability and also explains why accumulating wealth contributes to our sense of dignity. 
This necessary distinction of ranks is best-served when the rich and powerful are deferred to 
(Alvey, 2003, 39).175 This deference helps to ensure a certain level of obedience within society 
while also protecting and promoting the accumulation of wealth. The distinction of ranks 
reinforces the accumulation of wealth and internal security. Though this ultimately establishes an 
unequal society, the knowledge that superiority will be recognized and rewarded is a necessary 
part of tranquility. 
 For all of these conditions to be fulfilled we must live in a society. Accordingly, Smith 
argues that Nature has designed us specifically to live in society.176 A society can be valued 
insofar as it offers its citizens wealth, security, liberty, and order.177 Thus any society can be 
measured and appraised by its ability to provide and sustain these conditions. Although these 
conditions are essential to our tranquility they do not necessarily make us happy; rather, wealth, 
security, liberty, and order facilitate our pursuit of happiness. It is only after these conditions 
have been established that we can truly pursue and attain our telos.  
2.4 Nature’s Hierarchy  
 Smith’s theory of human nature contains a hierarchy of efficient causes that, when 
adhered to, bring us ease of body and peace of mind.178 This hierarchy begins with Smith’s two 
first principles of human nature; self-interest and benevolence.179 These principles are our 
foundational motivations that ultimately explain all human activity. Additional components of 
this hierarchy exist as expressions of one of these first principles. These efficient causes include 
                                                 
175 See TMS 65-66.  
176 Smith claims that “man, who can only subsist in society, was fitted by nature to that situation for which he was 
made” (TMS, p.103). 
177 See Alvey, 2003, p.38. 
178 Smith’s personal and philosophical relationship to Hume has potentially skewed our understanding of his theory 
of human nature. Hume sought to establish the new “science of man” by empirically analyzing what human nature is 
rather than speculating about what it could be (or why it is this way). The strong connection between Smith and 
Hume makes it tempting to read Smith in a similar fashion. It is true that Smith’s and Hume’s philosophies have 
much in common. For instance, their shared interest in sympathy (though they disagree on how it operates) places 
them both within a similar vein of moral philosophy. However, a closer reading of Smith’s outline of human nature 
reveals that, at least on this point, he may have had more in common philosophically with Rousseau than Hume. The 
descriptive components of TMS align Smith with Hume. However, Smith’s normative concerns appear to be 
inherited from Rousseau. For literature comparing Smith and Rousseau see; Rasmussen (2008) and Hanley (2009).  




instincts, passions, and sentiments. Knowing what these are and how to properly adhere to their 
intended design will ultimately tell us how we can reach our telos. 
Smith begins his theory of nature by refuting egoistic assumptions about human 
motivation. According to Smith humans are both self-interested and beneficent (TMS, 13). This 
refutation of egoism establishes the very essence of human nature in TMS. To be human, 
according to Smith, is to be caught between two opposing poles; self-interest and beneficence. 
Human nature is consequently defined by two conflicting motivations. The rest of our human 
nature aligns with either our self-interested or beneficent self or, perhaps more likely, contains a 
mixture of the two. For instance, our desire to improve our condition (the very foundation for 
WN) corresponds to our self-interested nature. Our self-interested desire to improve our lot in 
life ultimately generates our “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” 
and by extension the division of labor that ultimately distinguishes commercial society (WN, 
I.2.1). Conversely, our beneficent nature may be more properly reflected in our desire for mutual 
sympathy, though the pleasure that accompanies this may also be linked to our self-interest. 
These two simultaneous motivations lay the groundwork for the rest of Smith’s theory of human 
nature and subsequently shape how we pursue—and attain—ease of body and peace of mind. 
The cardinal virtues of prudence, beneficence, and self-command (explored in a following 
chapter) are conditioned by our apparently conflicted human nature. Because our other efficient 
causes reflect these two first principles in order to attain tranquility we must be properly self-
interested and beneficent.  
 Our instincts are the first efficient causes embedded within our human nature. Our 
instincts contain both self-interested and beneficent elements and aim towards self-preservation 
and the propagation of the species (TMS, 94).180 Accordingly, Smith argues that Nature has 
“endowed us […] with a love of life, and a dread of dissolution; with a desire of the continuance 
and perpetuity of the species, and with an aversion to the thoughts of its intire extinction” (Ibid.) 
Our own survival and the propagation of the species are the first end of our nature; without these 
there would be little to no hope of ever attaining our final end. However, Smith argues we do not 
pursue survival out of reason or intent. Instead, “Nature has directed us to [the survival and 
                                                 
180 See also Alvey, 2003, p. 34. 
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perpetuation of the species] by original and immediate instincts” (Ibid.). These instincts include: 
“[h]unger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of 
pain” (Ibid.). Smith claims we pursue these instincts for their own sake and not out of 
“consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature 
intended to produce by them” (Ibid.). We share these original instincts with all other animals. 
However, one other instinct that may be unique to our species could be added to these. Our 
desire to please others (i.e. mutual sympathy) is also instinctual.181 This instinctual desire to 
please others ultimately makes society possible (Alvey, 2003, p.37). Subsequently, this desire to 
please (which is accompanied by an aversion to offending) contributes to the survival of the 
species. By ensuring the survival and propagation of the species the instincts facilitate the pursuit 
of more noble and lofty goals. We can only pursue perfection after we have adequately 
guaranteed our survival. Consequently, in order to attain tranquility we must properly satisfy our 
instincts. The best way to ensure the success of our instincts is to live in a society, especially one 
with wealth, liberty, security, and order. 
The second component of our human nature that drives us towards our telos is the 
passions. The passions appear to be our reactions to our original instincts.182 Like our instincts 
the passions reflect our self-interested and beneficent poles. Smith groups these passions into 
five different categories. The first of these categories are the passions that arise from our body 
(TMS, 34-39). According to Smith the appetites and pain are two examples of such passions. 
Smith argues that our ability to sympathize with the expression of the appetites is naturally 
restrained. This restraint arises from our aversion to strong expressions of these passions (TMS, 
35).We are capable of sympathizing with the appetites but only to a certain degree. The same can 
be said of our reactions to pain. Smith argues that it is both “unmanly” and “unbecoming” to cry 
out in pain (TMS, 36). However, Smith does admit that we do have a strong, instinctual, ability 
to sympathize with pain even if the reciprocal pain we feel is much different in degree and kind. 
Smith adds that our ability to sympathize with bodily pain is enlivened by both the novelty of 
that pain and any danger that may accompany the pain. To the latter point Smith claims that 
                                                 
181 Hanley (2009) argues that this desire to please (i.e. mutual sympathy) is foundational to Smith’s moral theory 
(p.51). 
182 Smith is never quite clear on the demarcation between the passions and sentiments.  
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“pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied with danger.” (TMS, 
37). Smith adds that what we truly sympathize with in such an instance is the fear the person 
feels (and we imagine we would feel in their place)and not the actual pain (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
though the novelty of a particular cause of pain may enliven our sympathy this inevitably wears 
off as we grow more and more accustomed to it. Our bodily passions help to determine how we 
behave and expect others to behave in certain situations. The natural restraints we have on our 
ability to sympathize with appetites and pain oblige us to moderate our own responses to these 
passions in order to ensure we receive sympathy. Because we are disgusted by the excessive 
reactions others have to the bodily passions we know to expect disgust if we should react the 
same way. As a consequence, we must control our responses to appetites so that we may more 
easily attain the sympathy of others. 
 The second category of passions Smith discusses is “those derived from the imagination 
[…] which take their origin from a particular turn or habit” (TMS, 39). This particular category 
is, admittedly, more of a necessary caveat. This category is an acknowledgment of the passions 
that emerge from our own idiosyncratic personalities. Although these passions are a reflection of 
our first principles, they are specific to us both in their origination and direction. Examples of 
such passions include our love for another person or our own particular aesthetic tastes. We do 
not have a great deal of sympathy for these particular passions, nor, should we be expected to. 
For instance, though we can share our friend’s anger over an injury we cannot share the love they 
feel for another person (TMS, 39). As a result of these idiosyncratic passions we must be careful 
to keep certain behaviors in check. Though it is reasonable to be in love we should be careful to 
keep our expressions of this passion from becoming excessive. While we cannot expect anyone 
to sympathize with our love we can be sure to arouse their ire if we demonstrate this passion to 
excess.  
Smith goes on to categorize two opposite sets of passions; the unsocial and the social 
(TMS, 42-50). Smith describes the former of these passions as those that drive humans from 
each other. In particular, Smith labels the passions of hatred and resentment as unsocial. Hatred 
and resentment arise when someone injures or offends us, or someone else. In the second 
instance Smith argues that “our sympathy is divided between the person who feels [hatred and 
resentment], and the person who is the object of them” (TMS, 43). This division forces us to 
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make a judgment about whether these passions are truly deserved. Additionally, this divided 
sympathy compels the injured party to moderate them so that we can truly sympathize with their 
hatred and/or resentment. Smith goes so far as to argue that “Before resentment […] can become 
graceful and agreeable, it must be humbled and brought down below that pitch to which it would 
naturally rise” (Ibid). This is because our divided sympathy causes us to “fear for what the one 
may suffer” which subsequently lessens “our resentment for what the other has suffered” (Ibid).  
Conversely, Smith defines the social passions as those that bring us together. Within this 
category Smith includes passions such as generosity, kindness and compassion. In fact, these 
passions all seem to flow from our beneficent nature. Moreover, we have “the strongest, 
disposition to sympathize with the benevolent affections” (TMS, 48). Smith adds that these 
passions always “appear in every respect agreeable to us” (TMS, 48-49). Finally, unlike the other 
passions, any excessive demonstrations of the social passions will not evoke aversion or 
disapproval. Smith argues: 
There is a helplessness in the character of extreme humanity which more than any thing 
interests our pity. There is nothing in itself that renders it either ungraceful or disagreeable. 
We only regret that it is unfit for the world, because the world is unworthy of it (TMS, 50).  
 
We keep our social passions in check not out of fear of disapproval but because we wish to avoid 
dangers such as exploitation.  
 The “selfish passions” are the final category discussed in TMS (TMS, 50). These selfish 
passions are located somewhere between the social and unsocial passions (TMS, 50). Smith adds 
that these selfish passions are never as “graceful” as the former tend to be nor as “odious” as the 
latter can often be (TMS, 50-51). These selfish passions are comprised of “[g]rief and joy, when 
conceived upon account of our own private good or bad fortune” (TMS, 51). Our sympathy with 
these two passions depends on the level of their expression. Excessive demonstrations of 
personal grief or joy are never as disagreeable as excessive hatred or resentment. However, 
Smith claims that great expressions of joy can be difficult for others to sympathize with. This is 
due to the envy other people experience when fortune brings others great joy. On the other hand, 
Smith argues that small and continuous expressions of personal joy, or a “habitual cheerfulness”, 
are eagerly sympathized with (TMS, 52). Our sympathy with people’s personal grief works in 
the opposite manner. We typically find people who are frequently aggrieved by the smallest of 
things to be obnoxious. Smith contends that the “man who is made uneasy by every little 
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disagreeable incident […] will seldom meet with much sympathy” (TMS, 52-52). Conversely, 
we appear to have a “strong and very sincere” sympathy with people who feel profound grief as 
a result of a tragedy (TMS, 53). The sympathy we can expect when expressing the selfish 
passions ought to govern our behavior when we experience either good or bad fortune. We 
cannot hope to attain mutual sympathy if our joy arouses people’s envy or if they are annoyed by 
our petty grief. 
 Our instinctual need to please others—and avoid offending them—forces us to control 
our passions. Subsequently, we moderate our passions so that we can reach a sympathetic 
concord with other people and avoid being disapproved of. This control over the passions 
ensures our own survival and the survival of the species (by properly satisfying our instincts) 
while also making social life viable. Our passions, when properly moderated and directed 
towards proper things, inevitably contribute to the pursuit of tranquility.  
 The final component of our human nature that directs us towards our telos are the 
sentiments. Smith provides only a vague definition of the sentiments as “affection[s] of the heart, 
from which any actions proceed” (TMS, 81). This does not usefully distinguish sentiments from 
passions. However, I believe sentiments can be best understood as judgments made by our 
impartial spectators.183 Consequently, the sentiments play a necessary role in shaping the 
standards of propriety. According to Evensky there are three “broad categories of sentiments in 
Smith’s representation of human nature: self-love, justice, and beneficence” (Evensky, 2005, 
p.35).184 The sentiments of self-love correspond directly to the self-interested portion of our 
human nature. These sentiments help to explain our desire to continuously improve our 
condition. The sentiments that arise from beneficence correspond to our initial desire to 
contribute to the well-being of others. These sentiments explain our capacity for kindness, 
generosity and even affection. Finally, our just sentiments are located somewhere between our 
selfish and selfless poles. Our desire to be free from harm and to have any harm redressed 
                                                 
183 It is possible Smith is referring to the same things when he speaks of passions and sentiments. However, I believe 
a charitable reading of TMS necessitates distinguishing the two in some way. If passions and sentiments did indeed 
refer to the same thing, my analysis of their role in our teleology would remain the same, albeit more concise.  
184 Evensky argues that only the sentiments of self-love can be the “spring for action” (35). However, this directly 
clashes with Smith’s definition of sentiments. Furthermore, it is clear that actions do indeed arise from justice and 
beneficence. Acts of charity arise from our beneficent sentiments while punishment arises from our just sentiments.  
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through punishment is linked to our self-interested nature. Our just sentiments appear to be a 
mixture of our two first principles that depends on the particulars of a situation. Our sentiments 
play a role in determining our character and behavior. We act self-interestedly, beneficently or 
justly when we have judged that a situation warrants these. Knowing how the sentiments operate 
provides insight in to the Author of Nature’s design, which in turn helps to shed light on our 
possible telos. By determining how we can and do act in particular circumstances the sentiments 
may help to shed some necessary light on how we should act. Consequently, these sentimental 
categories shape of the pursuit of our potential telos. Unlike our passions, the sentiments are 
responsible for more than the mere satisfaction of our original instincts. The sentiments bring us 
above and beyond survival and reproduction. Whereas the instincts and passions aim to make life 
possible our sentiments aim at making it desirable.185 The sentiments contribute to our quality of 
life in two fundamental ways. First, the sentiments of self-love help us secure and expand our 
own well-being by contributing to our pursuit of wealth and the dignity and joy that this entails. 
Subsequently, the sentiments of self-love help us transcend mere subsistence and acquire a level 
of material well-being that affords us ease of body. Similarly, the beneficent sentiments allow us 
to cultivate the personal relationships (i.e. family, friendship, and citizenship) that help satisfy 
the requirements for peace of mind. By developing these relationships we can attain mutual 
sympathy while simultaneously contributing to our need to promote the happiness of others. It is 
the perfection of our sentiments that facilitates personal and social flourishing and brings us 
lasting and secure ease of body and peace of mind.  
 The Author of Nature gave us instincts, passions, and sentiments so that we could 
successfully pursue and attain tranquility. These three components of our nature, when properly 
satisfied and directed towards the right ends, eventually bring us ease of body and peace of mind. 
Thus, we attain our telos when we adhere to Nature’s design. It is the voice of Nature that directs 
us towards perfection. Consequently, this voice of Nature should be the voice we listen to when 
distinguishing between propriety and praiseworthiness. Instead of merely telling us what society 
has approved—or disapproved—of, Nature is capable of telling us what ought to be approved of 
                                                 
185 In particular, it is the beneficent sentiments that make life worth living. It is entirely possible to have a stable, 
opulent, society based entirely on self-love and justice. However, it seems unlikely, to Smith, that we would choose 
to live in such a society. Friendship, love, generosity, etc. all help to make society desirable (TMS, 103-110).  
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by confirming what accords with our designed purpose. We can judge what is praiseworthy by 
determining what is in harmony with Nature’s design (i.e. our human nature). By conforming to 
this design, rather than the standards of mere propriety, we live a life of tranquility. However, 
how this tranquility is attained is in some measure shaped by the type of society we live in. The 
material conditions of society shape both how tranquility is attained and who can attain it. 
 
2.5 Natural Perfection and the Golden Rule 
 Left alone the efficient causes discussed in the previous section are enough to ensure the 
survival and continuation of the human species. Because he sees the universe as fundamentally 
harmonic Smith believes that our moral faculties will necessarily promote these ends even when 
they appear to have negative outcomes. In other words, the routine operation of these faculties is 
enough to generate the rules of propriety that make society—and all its subsequent goods—
possible. However, Smith’s changes to TMS’ final edition indicate (if nothing else) that the mere 
survival of the species is not enough. His inclusion of an entire section on virtue indicates that 
there is more to life than mere survival and reproduction. The self-perfection we can, and should, 
pursue with our authoritative conscience requires more than spontaneous order and unintended 
consequences. To successfully attain tranquility and achieve self-perfection (i.e. 
praiseworthiness) we must perfect our moral faculties and direct them towards proper things. To 
accomplish this we must govern these faculties with something more than mere propriety. The 
golden rule provides a means for perfecting our moral faculties our nature. When our impartial 
spectator uses the golden rule to guide us it speaks to us with the voice of nature and guides us to 
self-perfection. Thus the praiseworthy individual is the person who shapes their character with 
the golden rule.  
 Early in TMS Smith argues “that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to 
restrain our selfish and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human 
nature” (TMS, 31). Thus, to perfect our moral faculties and attain our telos we must cultivate and 
grow our beneficent first principle and all of its correlates. When our benevolence surpasses and 
eclipses our self-interest our natural efficient causes will contribute to our pursuit of tranquility 
rather than mere survival (without sacrificing the latter of course). However, this does not mean 
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that our self-interested principle disappears or becomes unimportant but, rather, that any tensions 
between these two motivations ought to disappear. Consequently these principles lose any 
apparent conflicting qualities and become complementary to each other. In perfecting our nature 
we limit our self-interested tendencies to those which necessarily contribute to our ease of body 
and peace of mind.  The way we accomplish this is by adhering to the golden rule.  
If the purpose of praiseworthiness is to liberate our conscience from the flawed standards 
of propriety so we can achieve self-perfection then a potential means for determining what it 
consists of, and how to attain our telos, is the golden rule. Traditionally, the golden rule demands 
that we treat others as we would expect to be treated. This rule presupposes our ability to 
sympathize with each other and thus remains consistent with Smith’s overall approach to 
morality. However, although Smith retains the traditional Christian meaning of this rule he also 
reformulates it in order to express its double meaning. According to Smith the golden rule 
demands that we “love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same 
thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us” (Ibid). This reformulation accounts for both of 
our (apparently) conflicting first principles, allowing us to care for our own self-interest without 
infringing upon our beneficent desire to contribute to the well-being of others. By limiting our 
self-love so that it infringes upon neither the well-being of others nor our own beneficence we 
effectively increase the latter. Moreover, the second component of the golden rule asks us to seek 
the love of others rather than merely satisfying our own self-interested desires. The best way to 
obtain the love of others (to be “lovely” in Smith’s terms) is through acts of benevolence that 
demonstrate or love for others. Consequently, adhering to the golden rule increases our 
benevolence while simultaneously moderating our self-interest so that we will  be loved by 
others and, indirectly, by ourselves. Though it increases our benevolence and restrains our self-
interest the golden rule does not eliminate the latter. Instead the golden rule requires us to direct 
our self-interest towards the right types of things so that it may complement our beneficence.186 
This balance between self-love and beneficence is outlined by Smith in discussion of the cardinal 
virtues. Because it is capable of increasing our benevolence and restraining our self-interest, 
adhering to the golden rule represents the perfection of our nature. Consequently, it is reasonable 
                                                 
186 These proper things are outlined by Smith in his discussion of prudence. See TMS, 250-256. See also Chapter 
Five of this work.  
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to suggest that the standards of praiseworthiness are derived from the golden rule and that our 
conscience becomes authoritative and directs us towards our intended telos when it follows these 
standards. 
 The desire to perfect our nature by following the golden rule is a fundamental part of our 
nature. However, Smith argues that the Author of Nature did not implant us with a love of 
humanity sufficient enough to inspire us to the golden rule and self-perfection (TMS, 156). 
Rather, Smith claims, it is the natural love for a superior character that directs us towards 
benevolence and the golden rule (Ibid). This love of moral superiority is reiterated by Smith in 
one form or another throughout TMS. It is this love of superiority that underpins our desire to be 
praiseworthy and makes our self-perfection possible.   
 Because the instincts are non-cognitive they do not require the perfection of our nature to 
achieve their intended ends (survival and continuation of the species). However, the expression 
of these instincts (i.e. the passions) and our sentiments can be significantly affected by our 
adherence to the golden rule. Choosing to act in accordance with the golden rule will necessarily 
restrain our unsocial and selfish passions as well any other passions people may have difficulty 
sympathizing with (i.e. the bodily passions). Simultaneously this rule encourages the expression 
of our social passions, which are always agreeable and thus tend be awarded with the love and 
approval of others. Similarly, the golden rule perfects our sentiments, encouraging the 
development of the more beneficent ones like gratitude and justice which contribute to our own 
happiness and the well-being of society. Developing proper self-interest and benevolence by 
obeying the golden rule perfects our moral faculties and in doing so helps us develop the 
qualities of character that ensure ease of body and peace of mind. When we love our neighbors 
and ourselves in the proper way we will inevitably attain tranquility.  
 Imagination can tell us that the Author of Nature has designed us with a purpose and even 
what this intended purpose may be. However, it is the golden rule that directs us towards this 
purpose. Consequently, the golden rule completes the impartial spectator’s transition from a tool 
for reflecting social standards and into demigod implanted within the human breast by the 
Author of Nature. This golden rule ensures that we properly develop our first principles, satisfy 
our instincts, and express our passions. In doing so this rule facilitates the successful pursuit of 
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self-perfection and allows us to attain the final cause predetermined for us by the Author of 
Nature, tranquility (understood as both ease of body and peace of mind). Because they are both 
designed to direct us to self-perfection, praiseworthiness and the golden rule may be considered 
synonymous with each other. Both of these concepts are linked to our conscience (via the 
impartial spectator) and both give us a means to develop our moral character without merely 
conforming to the standards of propriety. Subsequently, a praiseworthy person is any individual 
who shapes their character and behavior by following the golden rule rather than merely 
conforming to propriety. 
 
2.6 Happiness and Commercial Society  
Though our human nature and subsequent telos are universal the path between the two is 
not. Society has a determining influence on our pursuit of tranquility. The perception of 
happiness will differ across different societies. Therefore, happiness in a pastoral society may 
differ in degree and kind to that of a commercial society. To properly understand how we 
become praiseworthy and attain tranquility we must consider society’s formative influence on 
these pursuits. Understanding how commercial society shapes our teleology helps to explain 
exactly what this telos is, how it can be attained, and who is capable of attaining it.  The 
fundamental affects commercial society has on our pursuit of tranquility is to make it more 
attainable and accessible. Commercial society accomplishes this by generating opulence, 
changing social roles, and softening the virtues.   
 In WN Smith argues that commercial society’s defining feature is its division of labor. 
Though all societies contain some division of labor it reaches its most extreme in commercial 
society.187 As a result of this extreme division of labor, tranquility may be more attainable and 
accessible. The first consequence of the division of labor that affects our pursuit of tranquility is 
the generation of opulence. The division of labor in commercial society produces an abundance 
of wealth by creating more goods than other societies are capable of producing through  
                                                 




the increase of dexterity in every particular workman […] the saving of the time which is 
commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and […] the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do 
the work of many (WN, I.1.5). 
The opulence generated by these three factors makes our telos (in commercial society) more 
attainable and accessible by reducing poverty.188 In a well governed and ordered commercial 
society wealth is redistributed, by the invisible hand, in a way that “raises all boats”.189 Although 
opulence does not—and should not—create equality it can eliminate abject poverty which allows 
the “meanest labourer” to earn a wage that affords them all the necessities of life.190 This places 
ease of body within the grasp of the poor and, in turn, ought to allow them to avoid shame and 
attain peace of mind. All of this is of course predicated on the markets being truly open and free. 
If corporations (guilds, merchant groups etc.) exert any undue influence on the markets then the 
creation of opulence will be stunted. As long as these corporations influence the markets for their 
benefit commercial society will be incapable of abolishing abject poverty and the path to 
happiness will remain open to only a select few (i.e. the rich). Thus, in order to properly ensure 
that abject poverty is eliminated and the pursuit of tranquility is truly opened to everyone 
mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that corporations do not influence the markets for 
their own benefit. Much of Smith’s advice in WN is targeted towards this specific problem. WN 
not only describes how commercial society works but how it can be made to work properly and 
effectively to ensure that each individual, even the poor, can become happy if they choose to 
pursue what is praiseworthy rather than mere praise. 
 In addition to the creation of opulence, commercial society’s division of labor also makes 
our telos more attainable and accessible by altering our social roles. In WN Smith argues that in 
commercial society “Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a 
merchant” (WN, I.4.1). In other words, commercial society effectively transforms each 
individual into a merchant. As merchants each individual subsists by selling something for 
                                                 
188 The opulence created by commercial society has the potential to eliminate poverty altogether but only if society 
is perfected.  
189 By well governed and ordered here I mean a commercial society that has “peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable 
administration of justice” (Lecture in 1755, quoted in Dugald Stewart, Account Of The Life And Writings Of Adam 
Smith LLD, Section IV, 25. 
190 Some relative poverty will still necessarily exist. Though Smith frequently laments the condition of the poor in 
WN and TMS he was not an absolute egalitarian.  
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something else even if this only means selling labor for a wage. The change in social roles 
affects our pursuit of tranquility by liberating us from direct dependence on the whims and 
benevolence of other people. Smith’s criticism of feudalism in WN establishes his contempt for 
direct dependence which he ultimately likens to slavery (WN. II.3.9; WN. III.2.9; WN. 
III.4.6).191 Direct dependence, Smith argues, is undignified and unlikely to provide the proper 
necessities of life. Consequently, to exclusively rely on the benevolence of others for one’s 
subsistence is incompatible with tranquility. Smith treats this reliance as if it were sub-human, 
likening the reliant individual to a fawning puppy; 
When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no 
other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy 
fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the 
attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes 
uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to 
act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to 
obtain their good will (WN, I.2.2).  
The direct dependence common to pre-commercial societies made it impossible for the large 
group of dependents to attain tranquility. Humanity’s telos within pre-commercial societies was 
only within reach of society’s masters. Commercial society, by making everyone effectively a 
merchant, eliminates this direct dependence and replaces it with mutual interdependence.192 Each 
individual in commercial society exchanges some necessary good on the open market and 
receives something back. Consequently, individuals within commercial society all depend upon 
each other. For example, laborers need factory owners as much as factory owners need laborers. 
This change in relationship is much more compatible with the pursuit of tranquility because it 
allows individuals to speak to each other’s self-interest. Speaking to self-interest, Smith argues, 
is not only more effective at providing individuals with the necessities of life it is also more 
dignified since it does not require that anyone debase themselves. Consequently, the mutual 
interdependence created by commercial society opens the pursuit of tranquility to everyone.  
                                                 
191 Though direct dependence is a part of feudalism it is not unique to it. Other societies (eg. pastoral) also contained 
this type of dependence.   
192 Christopher Berry explains the transition from direct dependence to mutual interdependence in “Adam Smith: 
Commerce, Liberty, Modernity,” in Philosophers of the Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gilmour (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1989), p114-118. Also see Muller p.71-72.  
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 Finally, commercial society makes our telos more attainable and accessible by 
“softening” the virtues.193 Commercial society renders the martial and austere virtues of pre-
commercial societies obsolete. Smith establishes this point by comparing “civilized” nations (i.e. 
commercial societies) with “barbarous” nations (ie. pre-commercial societies). According to 
Smith in commercial societies 
the virtues which are founded upon humanity, are more cultivated than those which are 
founded upon self-denial and the command of the passions […] The general security and 
happiness which prevail in [commercial societies] afford little exercise to the contempt of 
danger, to patience in enduring labour, hunger and pain […] The abstinence from pleasure 
becomes less necessary, and the mind is more at liberty to unbend itself […] (TMS, 259). 
 
It may also be added that standing armies in commercial society make the martial virtues less 
common and less necessary among the general population. Compare this with pre-commercial 
societies where each individual 
undergoes a sort of Spartan discipline, and by the necessity of [her] situation is inured to 
every sort of hardship. [She] is in continual danger; [she] is often exposed to the greatest 
extremities of hunger, and frequently dies of pure want. [Her] circumstances not only 
habituate [her] to every sort of distress, but teach [her] to give way to none of the passions 
which that distress is apt to excite (TMS, 259-260).194 
By softening the virtues commercial society eliminates the (relatively) extreme qualities required 
for happiness. Subsequently, commercial society makes ease of body and peace of mind more 
attainable for a wider portion of the population. 
   Commercial society is far from perfect. It allows inequality to persist and, if poorly 
governed, can reduce the lower class to a state of perpetual misery and wretchedness. What 
ultimately vindicates commercial society is its ability to establish the conditions necessary to the 
pursuit of happiness. Commercial society can only fulfill this promise if it is guided by wise and 
impartial leadership. Such leadership can prevent partial influences on the market and help to 
ensure a proper redistribution of wealth. In such circumstances inequality would still persist yet 
it would not necessarily be morally significant. Individuals in commercial society may be less 
wealthy than others yet still capable of attaining ease of body and peace of mind. Also important 
is the fact that commercial society does not force anyone to become directly, and necessarily, 
                                                 
193 See Muller p.8 and Fleischacker p.78.  
194 Here Smith is clearly referring to a specific type of pre-commercial society. This description contains obvious 
exaggerations yet as an example of the difference between commercial and pre-commercial mores it suffices.  
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dependent on a master. Instead commercial society gives each person the opportunity to retain 
their dignity by participating in a complex web of mutual interdependence. Thus, commercial 
society not only shapes the virtues by softening them, removing their martial and austere edges, 
it also establishes the conditions necessary for each individual, regardless of social rank, to 
pursue their telos should they choose to. 
Conclusion  
 Imagination is capable of revealing the nature of the universe to us as well as our 
intended purpose in this universe. Subsequently, we can use our imagination to understand what 
the Author of Nature’s plan is for us and how we can attain it. Smith argues that humans have 
been designed by this Author to pursue and attain tranquility. This tranquility consists of both 
ease of body and peace of mind and subsequently requires several physical and psychological 
components. In order for us to pursue our telos we must live in a peaceful and ordered society 
with a modest amount of wealth. Additionally, we must be sure that we are good people while 
also cultivating meaningful relationships with others. When these pre-conditions are properly 
satisfied we will be capable of successfully pursuing tranquility.  
 The pursuit of our telos is shaped by two factors. According to Smith ability to 
understand the universe and our place within it is limited. The flawed nature of our moral 
faculties ensures that we will only ever attain approximate understandings of our telos. These 
approximations may improve over time as we gather more evidence and insight but we will 
never truly acquire a perfect understanding of the Author of Nature’s providential design. 
Additionally, Smith argues that the particular type of society will shape our understanding of our 
telos and how it is attained. This includes who is capable of attaining this telos. According to 
Smith, commercial society makes tranquility more attainable and accessible by softening the 
virtues, creating opulence, and liberating us from direct dependence. Consequently, everyone in 
commercial society has a reasonable opportunity to attain self-perfection and live a life of 
tranquility and enjoyment. Because Smith’s teleology is contingent it is possible for self-
perfection to vary across both time and space. Although there will likely be great similarities, 
different societies around the world and at different points in history will have different 
understandings of self-perfection. However, we can still make moral evaluations about these 
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understandings by judging how close they approximate the Author of Nature’s design (as we 
understand it).195 
We pursue our telos (i.e. happiness via self-perfection) when our authoritative conscience 
acts as a demigod and speaks to us with the voice of Nature. When our impartial spectator takes 
on this demigod role it directs us away from the flawed conventions of propriety and towards 
praiseworthiness. To accomplish this, our conscience compels us to obey the golden rule, which 
Smith claims represents the perfection of our nature.  The golden rule perfects our moral 
faculties by bringing our two first principles (self-interest and beneficence) into harmony with 
each other. When we love others and ourselves properly these principles become complimentary 
and we develop the qualities of characters that bring us ease of body and peace of mind. Thus, by 












                                                 
195 Smith seems to take for granted that the progress of knowledge will necessarily lead to better, more complete, 
understandings of Nature’s design.   
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Moral Corruption as False Teleology 
3.0 Introduction  
 A second major addition to the 1790 version of TMS is Smith’s theory of moral 
corruption. Smith laid the groundwork for this theory in prior editions, however, in the 6th edition 
he expands on the causes and consequences of moral corruption.196 I understand Smith’s theory 
of moral corruption as a false teleology. This creates a false belief about the nature and content of 
happiness which places us on a path leading to misery.  This mistaken belief about happiness is 
produced by our sympathy with the rich and great.197 This sympathy diverts us away from our 
intended natural pursuit of tranquility by convincing us that the rich and great are truly happy 
and that we would be happy as well if we were as rich and great as them. As a consequence of 
this conviction we admire and subsequently emulate them.198 Our admiration of the rich and 
great is ultimately what creates a false telos in our minds while our emulation puts us in pursuit 
of this telos. This pursuit distorts the voice of Nature by transforming our desire to be 
praiseworthy into a love of praise.199 Subsequently, our conscience is no longer guided by the 
golden rule. Instead, our now distorted conscience guides us towards whatever will satisfy our 
corrupt desire for praise. Our admiration of the rich and great and subsequent corruption is 
facilitated by both natural and social forces. The intersection of natural human frailty and 
economic inequality creates the false teleology and corrupts our moral sentiments.200 The most 
                                                 
196 The inclusion of a new chapter on corruption in TMS’ 6th edition may reaffirm the need to develop an 
authoritative, independent conscience. This addition reasserts propriety’s inability to direct us to our telos. See 
Forman-Barzilai (2010) p.106. Similarly, in “Smith, Rousseau, and the Republic of Needs” (1986) Ignatieff argues 
that Smith shared Rousseau’s fundamentally Stoic belief that conventions created corruption (p.201-202).  
197 Hereafter I refer to the “rich and great” as the “rich and famous”. Smith’s discussion of the great in TMS 
indicates he means the individuals who routinely attract our attention; the fact that they are also powerful is 
secondary to this concern. For a recent examination of Smith’s concerns with greatness and fortune see Roberts, 
How Adam Smith Can Change Your Life; An Unexpected Guide to Human Nature and Happiness, (London: 
Portfolio Publishing, 2014). See also Hanley (2009) p.51 for the ill effects of our admiration of the rich and 
indifference to the poor.  
198 Griswold (1999) argues that this corruption is circular; inevitably we admire the rich and famous because they 
are admired (p.127-128). 
199 Force (2003) stresses Smith’s argument that the love of praise is derived from the natural desire to be 
praiseworthy (p.66).  
200 The secondary literature tends to focus more on the imperfections in our nature than any societal causes of 
corruption. Griswold (1999) highlights the tension between our pursuit of happiness and our capacity for self-
delusion (p.16). Evensky (2005) argues that our natural frailty conflicts with our natural progress towards universal 
opulence (p.28). Fleischacker (2004) discusses the role our sentiments play in pushing us away from happiness 
(p.5). Similarly, Haakonssen (1981) refers to Smith’s “double-edged skepticism” and the unavoidable role the 
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immediate and significant consequence of corruption is the perversion of our natural sense of 
praiseworthiness. The desire to be rich and great so that we can attain praise makes us vain. This 
vanity conflicts with the conditions required for ease of body and peace of mind. Moreover, this 
vanity makes us both anxious and lonely and consequently makes us miserable.201  
 Analyses of Smith’s theory of moral corruption in the secondary literature can be 
separated into three different camps.202 The first of these is the republican readings which 
characterize Smith’s theory of corruption as political in nature and consequence.203 Marxist 
readings of Smith present a different analysis of corruption.204 A common component of these 
analyses is the belief that Smith provides a proto-Marxist theory of alienation that has both moral 
and political consequences.205 The third analyses of moral corruption are the psychological 
readings.206 This portion of the literature characterizes corruption as a problem that inflicts the 
human being qua human being.207 Accordingly, Hanley (2009) has argued that republican and 
Marxist readings of moral corruption focus on how it affects humans in certain specific roles. He 
argues that the republican literature focuses on the role of individuals as citizen-soldiers while 
the Marxist readings focus on their role as laborers.208 Such an approach would ignore the other 
important roles and capacities affected by corruption (e.g. friends, relatives, and private 
individuals). I agree with Hanley and other psychological readings of Smith’s theory of 
                                                 
sentiments play in diverting us away from happiness. There is no disputing the role our imperfect nature plays in 
corrupting our morals; however, all of this only occurs within the context of an imperfect society.  
201 For the connection between moral corruption and vanity see Hanley (2009) p.37-38. Hanley links the vain desire 
for attention and praise to anxiety and misery.  
202 In “Adam Smith and the Theme of Corruption,” Review of Politics 68 (2006): 636-62 Lisa Hill provides a useful 
breakdown of the literature’s treatment of Smith’s theory of corruption. Hill considers this theory to be an eclectic or 
hybrid of both classical theories and more modern (i.e. proto-Marxist) theories (p.646). Hill inevitably relies on a 
political understanding of Smith’s theory. 
203 These readings focus on the decline of civic duties and institutions. See Justman, The Autonomous Male of Adam 
Smith (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); Winch (1978) in Adam Smith’s Politics; Montes (2004), 
Smith in Context esp. 57-69’ Phillipson, “Smith as Civic Moralist” in Wealth and Virtue p.179-181; and Berry, 
“Adam Smith and the Virtues of Commerce,” in NOMOS XXXIV: Virtue, 75, 82-84. A particular focal point of these 
authors is the decline of the so-called “martial virtues” in commercial society, 
204 For a detailed comparison between Smith and Marx see Meek, “Smith and Marx,” in Smith, Marx, and After 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1977) p.3-17.  
205 Lamb discusses the topic of alienation and the effects of the division of labor in Smith’s writings in “Adam 
Smith’s Concept of Alienation,” Oxford Economic Papers 25, (1973): p.275-285. 
206 See Hanley (2009) p.24-36.  Griswold’s (1999) interpretation of moral corruption is psychological, focusing on 
how beauty deceives our imagination and causes us to purse the wrong things. 
207See Hanley’s (2009) argument that Smith is concerned with the “mental mutilation” caused by corruption (p.33-
34). 
208See Hanley p.32. 
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corruption. Additionally, I believe that both the republican and Marxist interpretations suffer 
from a similar flaw; trying to fit Smith’s theory of corruption into their pre-existing ideological 
frameworks.209 As a consequence the actual contours of Smith’s theory are distorted so that it 
may more accurately reflect the given ideology. Although there are identifiable political 
consequences to corruption, these are secondary to its psychological causes and consequences. It 
is only after corruption becomes a part of propriety that it becomes a political problem worthy of 
the legislator’s attention.210 
All three of the approaches to understanding Smith’s theory or corruption share a similar 
weakness. They pay insufficient attention to its causes, instead opting to focus on its 
consequences (i.e. symptoms).211 By neglecting the potential causes of corruption we run the risk 
misdiagnosing its symptoms and wrongly attributing moral ills to our undue admiration of the 
rich and great. Simultaneously, ignoring the cause(s) of corruption may obscure significant 
symptoms that are definitively linked to it. Additionally, insufficient attention to corruption’s 
causes may have serious consequences for our understanding of its potential remedies. Though 
an essential contribution to the literature on Smith, Hanley’s approach in Adam Smith and the 
Character of Virtue provides a litany of symptoms he associates with corruption without 
thoroughly connecting them to their potential cause.212 This amounts to a list of moral failings 
that may or may not be sourced to the pursuit of greatness and fortune. Hanley provides no 
convincing explanation for how these symptoms are generated by our corruption. Furthermore, 
this perfunctory treatment of corruption’s causes is reflected in his proposed solution. According 
to Hanley Smith’s solution to corruption was a re-education of self-love that begins with 
directing vanity towards proper (i.e. more natural) things.213 Ultimately Hanley outlines a 
                                                 
209While the Marxist readings clearly try to label Smith as a proto-Marxist the republican readings aim to fit Smith 
neatly within Pocock’s republican views.  
210 The inevitability of propriety’s corruption makes the distortion of our moral sentiments an even greater problem 
than Smith may have recognized.  
211The republican readings of moral corruption tend to focus on the decay of civic duty and institutions with a 
particular focus on how it impacts the martial virtues. See, Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).  For their part, 
Marxists focus on the negative impact the acute division of labor has on the individual. Although I agree with 
Hanley’s interpretation of corruption as psychological he is too often focused on its symptoms. For example, Hanley 
lists so many negative consequences to corruption it is difficult to imagine we could go on living together (or with 
ourselves) once we have been corrupted.  
212 See p.52 for the long list of symptoms Hanley links to our admiration and emulation of the rich and great. 
213 See p.92-99. 
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solution to corruption that would rid the individual of various moral ills without properly treating 
the underlying vanity, leaving them to continue a life of misery. To avoid these problems I 
believe it is essential to begin any discussion on moral corruption with a thorough examination 
of its causes. By doing so I hope to provide a more convincing account of how it makes us 
miserable and, later, how it might be remedied.  
There are specific conditions that facilitate our admiration of the rich and great. 
Understanding these conditions reveals some potential means for overcoming corruption. 
Similarly, these help to explain why the rich and great are such enticing subjects for our 
sympathy and subsequent admiration and emulation. Some of these conditions are natural. 
Paradoxically, though the Author of Nature has constructed us to pursue and attain tranquility it 
has also implanted within us certain imperfections that work against this design.214 Often these 
imperfections have beneficial unintended consequences that, in the grand scheme, contribute 
more to happiness than misery. However, some of these imperfections are in direct conflict with 
our pursuit of happiness and help to explain why it is we admire and emulate the rich. It is also 
possible that human frailty only contributes to our corruption and misery under certain social 
conditions. One of these conditions is economic inequality. The often drastic differences in 
material wealth found in commercial society may play a significant role in directing our attention 
and admiration towards the rich and great. However, despite its potential role in making us 
miserable, inequality is an essential feature of commercial society.215 Consequently, inequality 
cannot be eliminated without also abandoning commercial society and all of its benefits. 
Vanity is the primary symptom of moral corruption. In TMS Smith characterizes vanity 
as a desire for, and pursuit of, undeserved praise. This desire is a product of our belief that the 
rich and great are happy because of the attention and praise they receive. Our transformation into 
vain, praise seeking, individuals comes at the expense of our natural praiseworthiness. This 
redirects us away from the golden rule and the perfection of our moral faculties. Rather than 
having our impartial spectator speak to us with the voice of Nature, corruption compels us to 
                                                 
214 Griswold (1999) argues that our natural (and intense) desire for approval contributes to corruption. Similarly, 
Alvey (2003) argues that “Nature seems to provide a disposition which drives [us] away from the just sentiments of 
the impartial spectator (p.180).  
215 On the necessity of inequality see Hanley, p. 16-17; Rasmussen (2005) p.103; and Muller, “The Portrait and the 
Painter,” Adam Smith Review 2 (2006): 229-230.  
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seek out what we believe will be praised. Smith believes that this vain pursuit of praise makes us 
anxious.216 Additionally, our vain pursuit of greatness and fortune sacrifices our benevolent 
tendencies. Greatness and fortune are entirely self-interested goods that are compatible with the 
pursuit of praiseworthiness. However, when greatness and fortune are pursued for the purpose of 
attaining praise we run the risk of becoming selfish.217 This selfishness conflicts with the 
development of meaningful relationships with other people which inevitably leads to loneliness. 
It is the anxiety and loneliness created by vanity that makes us (and potentially those around us) 
miserable. 
The greatest threat posed by moral corruption is the possibility that it may infect 
propriety and make vanity an inescapable part of everyday life. Given the flaws inherent in 
propriety there is no reason to believe its standards would be immune to the detrimental effects 
of corruption. Like the acceptance of infanticide in ancient Greece as a social norm, vanity 
would become a part of propriety as soon as a certain portion of the population began pursuing 
greatness and fortune rather than ease of body and peace of mind. Such an infection would 
expose an entire population to anxiety, loneliness, and misery. However, the danger posed by 
widespread vanity goes beyond the misery of a population. Making the admiration and emulation 
of the rich and great a part of propriety may also make us vicious.218 Corruption may accomplish 
these by perpetuating and validating the vices of avarice, vain-glory, and ambition. 
Smith’s willingness to blame corruption and subsequent misery on the conventions of 
commercial society is essential to understanding the importance and purpose of an authoritative 
conscience and subsequent pursuit of self-perfection. Smith’s critique of the false teleology that 
distorts our natural desire to be praiseworthy is his diagnosis of the ills that can be escaped by 
following the golden rule and perfecting our moral faculties and character. Furthermore, 
understanding corruption’s causes and symptoms contextualizes the virtues outlined later in 
                                                 
216 As Hanley points out, Smith’s understanding of vanity is indebted to Rousseau’s theory of amour-propre (p.36). 
Both are dependent on attaining the praise of others in order to be satisfied.  
217 Griswold argues that this selfishness is “key to the conflicted and dissolving nature of human life” (p.81). In 
other words, the advent of selfishness puts as odds with others and with ourselves.  
218 For some insights into the possible connection between corruption and vice see Hanley p.39-44.  
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TMS. These cardinal virtues (i.e. prudence, benevolence, self-command) provide a remedy for 
corruption.  
3.1 The Genesis of Corruption 
 Smith lays the groundwork for the genesis of corruption prior to the 6th edition.219 
However, he goes into more specific and critical detail in I.III.3 of TMS, an addition to the 6th 
edition of the book. As the title of this chapter makes clear our propensity to admire the wealthy 
and powerful (a propensity made stronger by our aversion to the poor and weak) leads to vanity 
and the plethora of subsequent moral ills. There are a few plausible explanations for why Smith 
was motivated to add this chapter.220  The content certainly makes it appear as though Smith had 
grown increasingly dissatisfied with commercial society and its influence on morals. I.III.3 of 
TMS stands as his ultimate diagnosis of these moral ills. Accordingly he argues the “disposition 
to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect 
[…] persons of poor and mean condition […] is […] the great and most universal cause of the 
corruption of our moral sentiments” (TMS, 73). Smith adds to this diagnosis later in the chapter 
by contending that “it is scarce agreeable to good morals […] to say that mere wealth and 
greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserves our respect” (TMS, 75). This final point 
makes it clear that we do not admire the rich and powerful because of their moral superiority but, 
rather, merely because of their wealth.221 Furthermore, while something about the lives of the 
rich and powerful pulls us towards them in the form of admiration our aversion to poverty and 
weakness simultaneously pushes us in that direction. 
 It is our admiration of the rich and great that generates the false telos and diverts us from 
our pursuit of virtue and tranquility. Smith defines admiration as “approbation, mixed and 
                                                 
219 In Part I Section III Smith outlines the potential dangers associated with idolizing our superiors (i.e. the rich and 
great). In the two chapters that predate the 6th edition Smith seems more concerned with the servility and 
obsequiousness. Thus, Smith’s concerns over misdirected admiration and emulation began forming before the 6 th 
edition of TMS. However, in the additions to this final edition Smith provides a more focused and specific theory of 
corruption that targets our love of the rich and great. This appears to be a reflection of his growing dissatisfaction 
with the coarse and development of commercial society. 
220 Fleischaker (2004) argues that Smith may have been directly responding to the impact commercial development 
was having on Glasgow at the time. Hill (2006) argues that Smith’s “main purpose in writing about corruption was 
to confront and criticize the corrupt yet legal norms of the elite class” (p.651). 
221 Griswold argues that are attracted to the “intrinsic fineness” of the “trinkets” the rich and famous possess (p.222). 
Subsequently, he characterizes corruption as an aesthetic deception (p.220-223).  
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animated by wonder and surprise” (TMS, 39). We admire the rich and great because they appear 
to be happy.222 Conversely, we detest the poor because they appear to be miserable.223 The 
admiration of the rich and great and indifference to the poor holds true across all levels of 
society. The former may admire themselves while the latter feel ashamed and hate themselves. 
Furthermore, our love for the rich and shame for the poor unavoidably compound each other. 
Our admiration of the rich and great is magnified by our indifference to the poor and vice versa. 
The reason we believe the rich and great are happy, and thus worthy of our admiration, is 
because their wealth makes them the focus of attention.224 Accordingly, we believe the poor are 
miserable, and despise them, because of their poverty and consequent anonymity. Whether or not 
the rich and great are actually happy is unimportant; all that matters is that their wealth gives 
them the appearance of happiness. The same holds true for our detestation of the poor; so long 
as they appear to be miserable we will think of them as such. According to Smith the rich and 
great are not, in general, necessarily any happier than their poor counterparts.225 Moreover, if 
they are happy it is not because of their wealth (and the attention this draws upon them) but for 
other reasons, i.e., because they happen to be virtuous. Indeed, it may be the case that any rich 
and powerful individual who has attained tranquility may have done so in spite of their wealth 
rather than because of it. Similarly, though their lack of wealth certainly does not help, the poor 
are not necessarily miserable and though it may take considerable effort they are capable of 
attaining tranquility. Regardless of whether or not the rich and great are happy, what gives them 
the appearance of happiness, their wealth, is what invokes our admiration. This appearance of 
happiness is so strong that, in the minds of the masses, wealth and happiness become 
synonymous. Consequently, our admiration of the rich replaces our intended telos of tranquility 
with the false telos of wealth and greatness. 
 Although Smith does not conflate wealth with happiness, it seems clear that the rich and 
great enjoy at least half of what constitutes tranquility. The wealth these individuals possess 
                                                 
222 This relates to our natural flaws discussed in chapter two. Our inability to properly distinguish between 
appearance and reality tricks us into believing the rich and great are truly happy. Smith argues that the rich are not 
actually happier than other members of society, but, they do “possess more means of happiness” (TMS, 213).  
223 We believe the poor are miserable largely because of their anonymity. This anonymity, Hanley argues, is as 
“painful as any material injustice” (p.51).  
224 These individuals are also powerful; however, they are typically powerful because of their wealth. 
225 Smith describes the belief that the rich and great are necessarily happy because of their wealth as a “prejudice of 
the imagination” (TMS, 65). 
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ensures they will never go without necessities or luxuries while simultaneously granting them a 
great deal of leisure time. In addition to enjoying obvious material advantages over the poor, the 
rich and great also appear to have attained peace of mind. The constant attention the rich and 
great receive is what gives us the erroneous impression that these individuals are tranquil. This 
attention typically comes in the form of praise, which indicates the rich and great are loved by a 
large portion of society. 226 A significant portion of happiness is our desire to be approved of and, 
more importantly, to believe that we are worthy of this approval.227 Believing that we are worthy 
of approbation and love contributes to our tranquility of mind by giving us a clear conscience. 
However, although we lavish the rich and great with attention and love Smith argues that they 
are not truly worthy of these. Smith’s belief that the rich and great are unworthy of our 
approbation is established by his critique of their lifestyle.228 Smith criticizes the lifestyle of the 
rich in both WN and TMS. In WN Smith highlights the greed of the rich and powerful by 
arguing “all for ourselves and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have 
been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind” (WN, III.4.10). Within TMS Smith refers to the 
rich and great in a contemptuous tone, often characterizing them as vain and effeminate. For 
instance, Smith condemns the fashion setting ways of the rich as empty vanity divorced from all 
merit and respect (TMS, 76). Moreover, it also appears as though the rich do not receive the clear 
conscience that praise should afford them. Smith characterizes much of the love and attention the 
rich and great receive as empty flattery. Thus, although they may be consistently praised the rich 
and great may be intuitively aware that this praise is meaningless.229 Even the most 
accomplished vain and flattered individual is aware, within their own conscience, they are 
                                                 
226 See Griswold p.36. Accordingly, Alvey (2003) argues that we love riches because of the attention and love they 
bring us (p.59). 
227 This desire for approval is part of our natural need for mutual sympathy. This need for mutual sympathy often 
takes the form of a desire to be loved and to be worthy of love. These are linked to our desire for praise and 
praiseworthiness. The desire for love and the desire to be worthy of it directly correspond to our desire for praise and 
our desire to be worthy of this praise. However, Griswold argues that the need for mutual sympathy plays a 
substantial role in our corruption, claiming that “the intensity of our desire for attention and approbation” may cause 
us to “take the short-cut to riches and power” (p.127-128).  
228 Smith routinely criticizes the “vulgarity” of the rich. See Hanley, p.16-17.  
229 This calls in to question why the rich and great would continue to pursue empty praise. There are two potential 
answers to this question. First, because the mere existence of their wealth ensures they will be loved and admired the 
rich and great have little incentive to change their behaviors and pursue praiseworthiness. This seems especially 
important when we consider that, according to Smith, the “vices and follies” of the these individuals are frequently 
downplayed or ignored (TMS, 74). Additionally, Smith argues that it is easier to receive attention for being rich and 
great than it is for being wise and virtuous (Ibid).  
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undeserving of the love and attention society bestows upon them (TMS, 77-78).230 Such 
awareness is clearly antithetical to our peace of mind. Similarly, the great are often undeserving 
of any praise because they are frequently guilty of great and horrible crimes. At several points in 
TMS Smith references an individual perceived as great while also noting their frequently violent 
accomplishments.231 The effect of these references is to convince the reader that the great often 
achieve their status through unworthy means. Finally, Smith uses examples of individuals who 
have built their esteem and reputation on hollow ground. Smith routinely mocks individuals such 
as the “man of fashion” who uses empty flattery and “frivolous accomplishments” to attract the 
attention and praise of others (TMS, 76). Similarly, Smith uses the derisive term “coxcomb” to 
describe individuals who employ vain and empty means to increase their public perception 
(TMS, 68; 138).  These individuals achieve their greatness through empty frivolities rather than 
virtue and wisdom. Ultimately the unworthiness of those we hold in high regard is a recurrent 
theme in TMS.232 If we were better equipped to properly determine who was worthy of 
admiration corruption might not exist. 
 Finally, if we were merely compelled to admire the rich and great then such admiration 
would not necessarily be corruptive. It is possible that we could admire these individuals while 
pursuing virtue and tranquility ourselves. What ultimately makes our admiration of the rich and 
great corruptive is our capacity for emulation. When given the opportunity to emulate the rich 
and great or the wise and virtuous, Smith claims we would chose the former. Accordingly, he 
argues that,  
Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and 
ostentatious avidity; the other of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two different 
models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we fashion our own 
character and behavior; the one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more 
correct and more exquisite in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every 
wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious 
and careful observer. They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a select, though, I am 
afraid, a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great 
mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more 
                                                 
230 This principle works both ways. Thus, Griswold argues that “no one can completely ignore unmerited reproach 
or the absence of merited praise” (p.133). This helps to explain why following potentially corrupted propriety may 
be enticing to certain individuals.  
231 Smith’s harshest criticism occurs when he accuses the rich and great of frequently resorting to “fraud and 
falsehood” and other “enormous crimes” to establish and secure their station in life (p.77). 
232 This is embodied in Smith’s derision of both “Lewis XIV” and “Lewis the Thirteenth (TMS, 67;76). 
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extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and 
greatness (TMS, 74).  
 
These diverging paths of emulation appear in the 6th edition and help to explain why propriety is 
not sufficient to promote or sustain happiness. Propriety provides no direction on which 
character we should emulate and thus which path to follow. All propriety can do is tell us what 
type of character has been admired and emulated in the past. Additionally, this statement bolsters 
Smith’s belief that it is the appearance of happiness that distracts us away from our natural path. 
The lives of the rich and great are “gaudy and glittering” and from a superficial perspective 
appear to satisfy all the requirements of happiness. Our admiration of the rich is what places the 
false impression of happiness into our imagination and our emulation puts us on the path in 
pursuit of this false telos. 
 The material and psychological disparities between the rich and poor is a recurring theme 
in TMS that predates the 6th edition. Though he retained his support for a class system, Smith 
evidently held some sympathy for the poor. This sympathy is coupled with a disdain for the rich 
and great’s lifestyle. Prior to the 6th edition of TMS Smith’s judgments on these disparities were 
rather benign; he laments the condition of the poor and chastises the rich and great but he does 
not describe it as a serious moral problem nor does he offer a serious solution. However, within 
the context of TMS’ final edition this gap between the poor and anonymous and the rich and 
great becomes the primary source for commercial society’s moral problems. Furthermore, the 
disparities between these two stations present major obstacles to both the poor and the rich. 
Regardless of which class one is born into, the opportunity and temptation to follow a false telos 
will present itself. In commercial society, neither the poor nor the rich are likely to successfully 
attain ease of body and peace of mind. Instead both are likely to be deluded by the appearance of 
happiness and make themselves miserable in the vain pursuit of wealth, power, and greatness. It 
follows from all of this that virtue and happiness are most attainable within the so-called 
“middling classes” of society.233 Individuals within the middle class are fortunate enough to be 
capable of avoiding both the distractions of wealth and the desperation of poverty. This middling 
class is, in effect, the moderate class; their modest wealth ensures they can satisfy the 
requirements for ease of body without the distractions or inflammations of desire that plague the 
                                                 
233 Smith claims that for the middling class the “road to virtue and that to fortune […] are, happily, in most cases, 
very nearly the same” (TMS, 75).  
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rich and great. Similarly, the middling class is not forced into anonymity; their moderate station 
in life should afford them some attention and esteem yet not so much as to spoil them into a state 
of obscene vanity.234 It should also follow from all of this that the best, happiest, and possibly 
least corrupt society is one with a large and thriving middle class.  
 
3.2 Frailty and Inequality 
 Moral corruption is essentially a product of choosing bad role models.235 Instead of 
modeling our character after the wise and virtuous we choose the rich and great because of a 
delusion in our imagination that tricks us into believing this will make us happy (TMS, 65). 
Smith contends that this poor choice in role models is a product of our deluded imaginations.236 
This pursuit does not occur in complete isolation. There are both natural and social factors that 
contribute to the delusion of our imagination and subsequent corruption of our sentiments. Smith 
makes the case in TMS that we are especially bad at distinguishing appearance from reality.237 
This appears to be especially true with regards to who we believe deserves admiration and 
emulation. There are several components of our nature that would seem to contribute to this 
confusion over appearance and reality. For instance, our capacity for self-delusion may cause us 
to be mistaken about the quality of our own character and lifestyle. Similarly, the envy we are 
apt to feel when someone close to us had a drastic change in fortune prevents us from making 
proper judgments about the nature of happiness.238  
The most important part of our nature that contributes to our confusion on the reality of 
happiness is our aversion to pain and attraction to pleasure. It is this that causes us to associate 
happiness with the rich and great and misery with the poor. Ironically, Smith argues that the 
                                                 
234 Respectable behavior and moderate virtue appear to be enough for the middle class to garner sufficient attention 
from others. According to Smith the middling class knows that they cannot attain success or the “good opinion of 
their neighbours” without “tolerably regular conduct” (Ibid.).  
235 According to Muller (1993) having the rich as role models would be “disastrous” for commercial society (p.138). 
236 Griswold argues that in some way a product of self-deception; claiming that this deception causes us to 
erroneously associate happiness with greatness and fortune (p.16). Later he suggests that this deception continues 
because our deluded imagination convinces us we will be happy if only we can actually become rich and famous 
(p.262). Alvey argues that this delusion is a product of wanting the wrong types of things (p.180). He adds that this 
is a problem most people suffer from, not just one particular class. 
237 According to Griswold this is a problem associated with our sentiments being incapable of distinguishing reality 
from appearance (p.128).  
238 Smith claims that great changes in fortune often generate the selfish passion of envy (TMS, 51). Later he adds 
that “sudden changes in fortune seldom contribute much to happiness” (TMS, 52).  
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Author of Nature gave us these impulses to ensure our happiness.239 However, in commercial 
society these tendencies push us away from our intended telos and towards a false one which 
warps our natural desire to be praiseworthy into a desire for praise. The specific quality of 
commercial society that does this is its often extreme—and necessary—inequality. Although 
commercial society can—and should—eliminate the worst forms of poverty it cannot eliminate 
inequality altogether. Consequently, some people will live a life of luxury and ease while many 
more will toil away in complete obscurity. This drastic distinction in the qualities of life 
inevitably contributes to the delusion of our imagination and begins the process of corruption.  
 
Smith highlights our inability to distinguish appearance from reality in his discussion on 
our natural deference to superiors.240 According to Smith this deference helps to promote the 
internal peace and order of society. Consequently, our propensity to defer (and ultimately 
respect) our superiors ought to help our pursuit of tranquility rather than hinder it. The peace and 
order of society is dependent on a distinction of ranks and a subsequent respect for these 
distinctions.241 We were designed by Nature to live—and achieve happiness—in societies free 
from conflict and turmoil. If individuals refuse to respect and defer to the position and authority 
of civil magistrates, judges, and legislators then the peace and order required for the cultivation 
of virtue and attainment of tranquility would be impossible. Additionally, our natural respect and 
deference to superiors aids in our pursuit of happiness by inspiring us to emulate these superiors. 
Without this natural respect for our superiors and deference we may never aspire to be anything 
more than what we already are. In other words, the respect of, and deference to, our superiors 
may be a motivating force in the pursuit of our telos. However, our inability to properly identify 
our true superiors often brings this deference into conflict with our pursuit of happiness. 
 
Our desire to be superior, like those who we respect and defer to, may ultimately put us 
on the path to virtue. However, as Smith eventually points out in the 6th edition of TMS, this 
                                                 
239 “It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow”, Smith 
argues, “that we parade our riches and conceal our poverty” (TMS, 62). Furthermore, due to this imbalance in 
sympathy with joy and sorrow we ambitiously pursue riches so we need not experience the displeasures of the latter. 
240 What constitutes “superior” depends on context. In the context of the “distinction of ranks” and the order of 
society superiority seems to refer to wealth, greatness and (by extension) authority.  
241 Accordingly, Alvey claims that Nature gave us a respect for hierarchy so we can be happy. (p.31). Paradoxically, 
this respectful quality also leads to corruption.  
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respect and deference may also put us on the path to misery and vice. First, the degree to which 
this deference may manifest can be harmful to our pursuit of happiness. According to Smith our 
natural propensity to defer to our (supposed) superiors often manifests as obsequiousness. Smith 
argues that this obsequiousness can be so severe that 
[a] stranger to human nature, who saw the indifference of men about the misery of their 
inferiors, and the regret and indignation which they feel for the misfortunes and suffering 
of those above them, would be apt to imagine, that pain must be more agonizing, and the 
convulsions of death more terrible to persons of higher rank, than those of meaner stations 
(TMS, 65). 
 
Smith adds to this by pointing out that “[all] the innocent blood that was shed in the civil wars, 
provoked less indignation than the death of Charles I” (Ibid). This servility is incompatible with 
happiness because it is undignified. Treating our superiors with unrestrained deference 
diminishes our own rank and station and communicates to others, and ourselves, that we do not 
appropriately value and esteem ourselves. Thus, obsequiousness to superiors conflicts with our 
desire for peace of mind by diminishing our self-worth. Additionally, our excessive deference 
may also have political consequences. According to Smith, obsequiousness may convince our 
rulers that we serve them when in reality they ought to serve us.242 Excessive deference to 
superiors may be one of the cornerstones of tyranny. 
 Our misdirected and excessive deference might not occur if it were not for our confusion 
about the true nature of happiness. The root of this confusion is our aversion to pain and 
attraction to pleasure. When sympathizing with other individuals these appear as an aversion to 
sorrow (a type of mental pain) and an attraction to joy (mental pleasure).243 Subsequently, we try 
to avoid sympathizing with anyone experiencing any kind of pain or sorrow, while we actively 
sympathize with pleasure and joy (unless we are envious of the other person). This ensures we 
will not needlessly make ourselves miserable by absorbing every bit of pain we encounter 
throughout our lives. Without this natural limitation our tranquility—especially peace of mind—
                                                 
242 Paradoxically, Smith agues that “kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or 
punished, as the public conveniency may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine 
of Nature” (TMS, 65-66). 
243 Griswold has highlighted the joy we are apt to feel when we sympathize with the rich and famous and how this 
pleasure contributes to corruption (p.127). Conversely, Hanley discusses the pain we may feel when sympathizing 
with the poor, going so far as to argue that the “blessings of tranquility pale in comparison to the ignominy suffered 
by those the world has forgotten” (p.37). Consequently, we become indifferent to the poor so we do not share in 
their anguish.  
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would be impossible. Our attraction to joy helps us to more readily sympathize with other 
people’s joy which enlivens both their pleasure and our own. The joy we share with a person 
helps to partly explain why we may act benevolently. We contribute to the well-being of another 
in part because we get to share in any joy that follows. This pleasure/pain principle is 
fundamental to Smith’s moral theory. It helps explain why we desire mutual sympathy and, in 
part, why we adhere to the standards of propriety. However, in the context of the 6th edition this 
pleasure/pain principle becomes significant to Smith’s theory of moral corruption.244 Our 
attraction to joy/pleasure inspires us to sympathize and subsequently admire the rich and great 
while simultaneously our aversion to pain causes us to become apathetic towards the poor.    
Our aversion to sorrow not only restricts our sympathy with those who are suffering it 
can also cause us to ignore them. In commercial society the group that tends to suffer most 
routinely is the poor and thus, we imagine, do not suffer at all. Our indifference to the poor 
motivates us to more eagerly sympathize and identify with the rich and great and the joys they 
experience—or at least the joys we imagine they experience. Thus, we admire the rich and 
emulate them in large part because they are not poor. We subsequently come to associate 
everything good and worthy with the rich and become blind to any possible benefits attached to 
the condition of the poor. We erroneously associate everything the poor experience with misery. 
Simultaneously we not only exaggerate the benefits of wealth, we also ignore any potential 
disadvantages attached to it. Though our aversion to sorrow and attraction to joy are necessary to 
our happiness they also play a role in deceiving us about its true nature. By giving us the illusion 
that happiness and wealth are synonymous our attraction to pleasure (and aversion to pain) 
contributes to our adoption of a false telos. With a more balanced sympathy we may not imagine 
that the rich and only the rich were truly happy and we may not be so repulsed by the condition 
of the poor. Our attraction to joy and aversion to sorrow also carries significance for any possible 
resolution to corruption. To restore our authoritative conscience and redirect it back towards the 
Author of Nature’s plan we see and appreciate the pleasure in living a life of virtue and the 
potential pain inherent to a life of vanity.  
                                                 
244 In the 6th edition of TMS Smith argues that our hatred and neglect of the poor is necessary to the distinction of 
ranks and order of society but that it also contributes to the corruption of our sentiments (TMS, 73).  
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 In TMS Smith represents humans as conflicted creatures. On the one hand, we were 
designed purposefully by Nature so that we could live together peacefully in societies where we 
can generate prosperity and happiness. It is within these societies that we build families, cultivate 
friendships and develop into citizens. In short, in society we are able to identify, pursue, and 
attain our telos and become truly happy. Conversely, our natural attraction to pleasure, aversion 
to pain, and deference to superiors make moral corruption possible. This corruption diverts us 
away from our intended telos and consequently makes us miserable and potentially vicious. 
Smith provides no substantial or convincing argument as to why Nature created such imperfect 
and conflicted creatures.. Regardless, what seems to be apparent is that Smith was not a 
determinist. Though we were created with a purpose—and the means to fulfill this purpose—we 
must play an active role in its fulfillment. To attain our telos we must actively overcome our 
imperfections and consciously pursue tranquility via praiseworthiness and the golden rule. The 
imperfections of our nature that potentially contribute to our corruption listed here is not 
exhaustive. For example, the desire to better our condition—largely discussed by Smith in 
WN—may also, when misdirected, contribute to our corruption. However, the components 
discussed here are the ones that are most directly relevant to the specific changes Smith made to 
TMS’ final edition and the particular theory of moral corruption found therein. The 
imperfections Smith assigned to humans can be found in the first five editions of TMS. 
However, how these combine to direct us away from the happiness Nature has designed us to 
attain, and how we might overcome these flaws, only becomes clear in the 6th edition. Moreover, 
none of these components of our nature necessarily contribute to corruption on their own. More 
often than not there are social forces that push us in the direction of corruption. Thus, in order to 
understand what causes individuals to adopt and pursue a false telos we need to examine exactly 
what it is about commercial society that makes admiring and emulating the rich so inviting.  
 The specific element of commercial society that contributes to corruption is inequality. 
Without an unequal distribution of wealth our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain would 
not be divided along the lines of rich v poor. The inequality in wealth found within commercial 
societies is what leads us into temptation and facilitates our admiration of the rich and 
indifference to the poor. Inequality contributes to our corruption by pushing certain aspects of 
our nature (i.e. the ones outlined above) in the direction of a false telos. By separating society 
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into economic classes inequality makes it possible to distinguish one class, and corresponding 
lifestyle, as superior to another. In doing so, inequality helps us misidentify the rich as 
necessarily happy and the poor as necessarily miserable. If the ultimate benefit of commerce is, 
as Smith suggests in WN, the creation and distribution of wealth (i.e. universal opulence) then it 
would seem plausible that the people who have successfully attained the most wealth are, 
somehow, superior to others.245 In other words, if commerce were a game it would certainly 
seem that the rich were its winners. Unlike the kings of past societies who could boast great 
conquests or wise legislation, what places the rich atop commercial society’s social hierarchy is 
the mere possession of wealth. In reality this possession of wealth may be as trite an 
accomplishment as any of the frivolous accomplishments of Louis XIV. If our imagination were 
perhaps less limited we might see wealth as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Smith 
characterizes wealth as a tool useful for attaining our natural telos (TMS, 213).246 However, 
because of our difficulty distinguishing appearance from reality it is easy for us to imagine that 
being wealthy and being happy is the same thing. Having society divided into haves and have-
nots explains why the rich make such inviting targets for our admiration and emulation.  
 Commercial society’s inequality directs our natural aversion to pain and attraction to 
pleasure away from the poor and towards the rich respectively. This inequality explains why we 
would consider the rich happy and the poor miserable. In a society of equal wealth distribution it 
would be difficult for individuals to imagine that being rich would bring them the happiness 
nature designed them to pursue. Additionally, in an equal society we would have to admire and 
emulate others for entirely different reasons. Likewise, our superiors would no longer be 
individuals who merely possessed wealth. However, Smith argues that inequality is a necessary 
feature of commercial society.247 Consequently, abolishing inequality would simultaneously 
mean abandoning all of the moral and material benefits of commercial society. The costs of 
engineering economic equality would outweigh the benefits. The freedom, dignity and relative 
wealth commercial society provides make it superior to all other societies. Moreover, abolishing 
                                                 
245 See WN I.I.10. 
246 More critically, Smith describes mere “wealth and greatness” as “trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for 
procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind than […] tweezer-cases” (TMS, 212). 
247 In WN Smith argues that the universal equality of other societies is premised upon their “universal poverty” 




inequality would only eliminate one particular form of corruption; given our imperfections there 
is no guarantee that another form of corruption would not surface and similarly obstruct our 
pursuit of happiness. Regardless of its flaws commercial society may provide the best 
opportunity for everyone to pursue and attain tranquility. The opulence commercial society is 
capable of creating—combined with the freedom from dependency and the softening of the 
virtues—makes happiness more attainable and accessible. However, given flaws in both our 
nature and society itself, commercial society cannot guarantee this happiness. While commercial 
society may make the path to tranquility available to individuals they must actively choose to 
pursue it rather than riches and greatness. Smith does not consider equality as a precondition for 
happiness, but the creation and distribution of wealth (via the invisible hand) is.248 Abolishing 
commercial society’s fundamental flaw (i.e. inequality) might mean trading away our chance at 
happiness for the sake of equality However, though our pursuit of tranquility is ultimately better 
served in commercial society this does not mean we should not take steps to soften the effects of 
inequality.249  
3.3 Vanity 
  The most immediate effect of corruption is vanity. Smith characterizes vanity as a love 
of undeserved praise, arguing that “what is properly called vanity” is “to be pleased with […] 
groundless applause is a proof of the most superficial levity and weakness” (TMS, 138).250 This 
love of praise is a derivative of our natural desire to be praiseworthy. Recall that we admire and 
emulate the rich and great largely because of the attention and recognition they receive. The 
desire for similar attention and recognition (i.e. praise) is what inspires us to pursue greatness 
and fortune for ourselves. Additionally, emulating the rich and great may cause us to adopt 
specific vain behaviors and characteristics such as the love of luxury, fashion, and pettiness.251 
By distorting our desire to be praiseworthy into a love of praise corruption impairs our moral 
                                                 
248 Recall that Smith believes the “wages of the meanest labourer” can provide the necessities of life and happiness 
(TMS, 62). 
249 For a detailed discussion on Smith and distributive justice see Fleischacker (2004) p.203-228. See also 
Fleischacker (2004) A Short History of Distributive Justice  
250 Hanley characterizes vanity as an “unregulated” desire for praise partially caused by our “untutored self-love” 
(100-102). 
251 Macfie (1967) notes that Smith always describes vanity as the “basest” motivation (p.54-56). Consequently, it is 
not hard to see how vanity would lead us down a path of pettiness and frivolity.  
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judgment and makes us incapable of recognizing—and appreciating—the differences between 
these two desires. This transformation is not necessarily a conscious change. Corruption does not 
force us to choose one (praise) over the other (praiseworthiness). Rather, our admiration and 
emulation of the rich and great impairs our judgment by replacing our intended telos with a false 
telos. This change in telos effectively alters the judgment of our conscience. Consequently, our 
conscience (i.e. our impartial spectator) values whatever is praised, as if it were truly 
praiseworthy, because we believe the former will make us happy.  
The conflation of praise and praiseworthiness is what makes us vain; we develop vain 
behaviors not out of malice but out of ignorance and confusion.252 It is a deception or delusion in 
our imagination that makes us vain, not an inherent dislike for truly good things. Because it blurs 
the distinction between praise and praiseworthiness corrupted people may not truly recognize 
they have strayed from their intended teleological path. This moral impairment may make 
corruption a difficult problem to overcome. This may be especially problematic if corruption 
becomes widespread. If corruption were to become commonplace—as Smith seems to suggest it 
might—the vain desire for praise and any subsequent behaviors may become a part of propriety. 
This further distances corrupted individuals from virtue and true happiness while simultaneously 
erasing any appreciation they might have for praiseworthiness, the golden rule, and tranquility. 
Because of their vanity, morally corrupted individuals may be unaware that they have been 
diverted away from tranquility and, over time, may come to believe that they are actually 
happy.253 Any potential remedy for moral corruption must somehow account for the possibility 
that corrupted individuals do not—or cannot—understand and appreciate how miserable they 
may be or how happy they could be.254 
 To understand why emulating the rich and great makes us vain it is useful to examine 
Smith’s criticism of these people. Throughout TMS and WN Smith treats the rich and great with 
a combination of mockery and contempt. Smith’s disdain for these elites not only explains why 
                                                 
252 Smith makes it clear that, despite any resemblance, our love of praiseworthiness is not a derivative of a love of 
praise (TMS, 139). Additionally, Smith adds that “to desire, or even to accept praise, where no praise is due, can be 
the effect only of the most contemptible vanity” (TMS, 141). 
253 This is a product of being confused about what actually constitutes happiness. Simply because we believe our 
current state is a happy oen does not make it so, especially if it is antithetical to actual happiness (i.e. tranquility). 
254 Griswold notes that there is a difference in TMS between feeling happy and actually being happy (p.219). 
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they are such poor targets for our admiration and emulation but also what our ensuing behaviors 
and character might be. For instance, Smith’s discussion and criticism of the so-called “men of 
fashion” characterizes commercial society’s elites as frivolous and vain individuals preoccupied 
with empty pursuits (TMS, 76-77). By emulating these individuals we too become concerned 
with hollow pursuits. Rather than focusing on developing the behaviors and character that bring 
us ease of body and peace of mind, we focus on our appearance and we dress becomes more 
important than how we act. Similarly, instead of developing the relations that provide us with 
mutual sympathy we rely on the exchange of empty flatteries. These are only two of the various 
vain behaviors we might adopt after emulating the rich and great. These adopted behaviors are 
antithetical to the pursuit of tranquility. This is largely, though not entirely, because vanity may 
be inherently undignified. Whereas the pursuit of praiseworthiness relies only on the approval of 
our own conscience (i.e. our impartial spectator) speaking to us with the voice of Nature, the 
vain desire for undeserved praise is completely reliant on the approval of others.255 Thus, by 
making us vain moral corruption makes us dependent on the opinions of other people. This 
dependence is not in accordance with a truly dignified life nor is it capable of directing us 
towards our natural, intended, telos.  
 Moral corruption alters our moral judgment by tempting us with a more enticing, more 
glamorous, version of happiness. Though this happiness is only a delusion of our imagination it 
is enough to direct our conscience away from praiseworthiness and towards a love of praise. 
Consequently, our impartial spectator stops telling us how to attain tranquility and instead tells 
us how to attain other peoples’ praise. The latter occurs without any proper consideration of 
merit. Consequently, moral corruption causes us to seek praise without properly considering 
whether or not we actually deserve it. The path we take towards this false telos may include 
whatever behaviors and characteristics are necessary for the attainment of riches and greatness 
including viciousness. The three vices linked to Smith’s theory of moral corruption are avarice, 
vain-glory, and ambition (TMS, 172).256 All three of these vices are rooted in corrupt and selfish 
desire for praise and all are based upon confusion about the true nature of happiness. Avarice, 
                                                 
255 This highlights the similarity between Smith’s theory of vanity and Rousseau’s amour-propre. 
256 Smith describes vain-glory as a type of pride based on a misunderstanding of the difference between “obscurity 
and extensive reputation” (TMS, 172), 
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vain-glory, and ambition can thus all be understood as inevitable consequences of vanity. 
Furthermore, because corruption impairs our judgment all three of these vices will be approved 
by our conscience insofar as they help us attain greatness and fortune.  
 By impairing our moral judgment and making us vain, moral corruption transforms our 
conscience from a semi-divine guide responsible for directing us towards tranquility and into a 
mere means for satisfying our selfish desire for praise at the expense of merit. As a result of this 
transformation we risk becoming vicious. Additionally, the pursuit of greatness and fortune may 
make us miserable by diverting us away from the true sources of happiness. I believe the most 
serious consequence of vanity is that it denies us the ease of body and peace of mind required for 
happiness and replaces them with anxiety and loneliness. Consequently, moral corruption not 
only makes us vain and potentially vicious, it also makes us anxious, lonely, and miserable. 
3.4 Anxiety, Loneliness, and Misery 
 Commercial society provides the best possible conditions for the pursuit of tranquility. 
Similarly, it provides us with the opportunity to cultivate meaningful bonds of affection with 
family, friends, and other citizens. Paradoxically, by enabling vanity and vice, commercial 
society also facilitates anxiety and loneliness. This anxiety and loneliness is how moral 
corruption makes us miserable. The vain pursuit of greatness and fortune engineered by this 
corruption ends in either failure or disappointment which in turn makes us anxious.257 Likewise, 
the selfishness inherent in this corruption prevents us from cultivating the relationships required 
for mutual sympathy and happiness. The anxiety and loneliness created by corruption prevents us 
from attaining the ease of body and peace of mind we were designed by Nature to pursue. 
Moreover, even when we successfully attain greatness and fortune the anxiety and loneliness we 
develop along the way makes us miserable even in success. More likely we will continually fail 
to attain our false telos and in the process live a miserable life of anxious solitude. 
 The anxiety created by pursuing greatness and fortune is best captured in Smith’s parable 
of the poor man’s son (TMS, 211-212). In this parable Smith describes a young man who 
sacrifices all present goals in order to attain wealth and greatness. However, Smith claims that in 
                                                 
257 Forman-Barzilai argues that emulating the rich and famous leads to “perpetual disappointment at best, failure and 
poverty at worst” (p.33).  
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his pursuit of riches the poor man’s son “sacrifices a real tranquility that is at all times in his 
power” (TMS, 211-212). This parable concisely captures the moral and psychological costs of 
emulating the rich and great. Clearly the son would have been better off pursuing a set of 
completely different goals (i.e. ease of body and peace of mind). However, because the desire to 
be rich and great has impaired his moral judgment the poor man’s son is doomed to a life of 
anxiety. Even if the son were someday successful and became a rich and great individual it 
would not make up for the time spent toiling away in anxious pursuit of this goal. Additionally, 
this hypothetical young man may find that mere greatness and fortune are insufficient for 
providing him with happiness. The perpetual anxiety the poor man’s son feels in his pursuit of 
greatness and fortune—both in success and failure—captures what all corrupted individuals feel. 
However, the vanity that impairs our judgment prevents us from seeing this false telos for what it 
is and pursuing tranquility as the Author of Nature intended.  
 Anxiety is the direct opposite of peace of mind and is thus contradictory to the tranquility 
we naturally desire. Smith offers a few different potential cures to an anxious mind.258 The first 
is a clear conscience.259 Attaining the approval and/or praise of our impartial spectators and 
knowing we truly deserve it rids us of anxiety and puts our mind at ease. For most people most 
of the time, a clear conscience is attained by consistently adhering to the standards of propriety. 
Most individuals, Smith suggests, pay no attention to whether or not these standards are truly 
worthy of praise and/or approval.260 However, given the potential problems with these standards 
and the possibility of them becoming corrupted adhering to them may not sufficiently clear 
everyone’s conscience. In fact, should corruption become widespread (and thus a part of 
propriety) it is possible that an entire society may become vain, anxious, and miserable. The 
deserved approval of our impartial spectators is a salve capable of restoring almost any trouble 
mind to a peaceful state. However, vanity prevents us from ever truly and properly clearing our 
                                                 
258 The only direct reference Smith makes to curing vanity is through an education that aims to “direct vanity to 
proper objects” (TMS, 304). However, his virtue ethics (also an addition to TMS’ 6th edition) provide a more 
comprehensive remedy for moral corruption.  
259 “Society and conversation” Smith claims are effective ways to restore our peace of mind and clear our conscience 
(TMS, 30).   
260 Smith refers to two standards for judging our own character. The first is “the idea of exact propriety and 
perfection” which is utilized solely by the wise and virtuous few (TMS, 291). The second, relied on by the vast bulk 
of humanity is “the degree of approximation” of perfection “which is commonly attained in the world” (Ibid.) 
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conscience because in inhibits proper mutual sympathy, especially from our own impartial 
spectators.  
In TMS Smith argues that our sense of merit can be warped but never completely 
annihilated. Although corruption makes the praise of others essential to us it does not erase our 
natural sense of worthiness and as a result we will always know that the approval we receive 
from other people, and our impartial spectators, is truly undeserved. Accordingly, Smith argues 
that our natural judgments on right and wrong, approbation and disapprobation, may be 
“somewhat warpt” but they “cannot be entirely perverted” (TMS, 234). Furthermore, he suggests 
that the pleasure we feel when we are praised by others is weaker in comparison to the pleasure 
associated with praiseworthiness arguing that:  
it often gives us real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be bestowed 
upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it, and has been in every respect 
suitable to those measures and rules by which praise and approbation are naturally and 
commonly bestowed […] We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the 
natural objects of approbation, though no approbation should ever actually be bestowed 
upon us (TMS, 138).  
It appears as though the pleasure we feel when our impartial spectators acknowledge our 
praiseworthiness is enough to bring peace of mind regardless of whether or not we receive any 
praise. Smith may be guilty of ignoring the degree to which we can deceive ourselves about our 
own behavior. However, his point here is that we always have some connection to the voice of 
Nature, even if we choose to ignore it, and that the praise from this voice surpasses all other 
approval. The pleasure we feel when we maintain our praiseworthiness is capable of holding up 
against almost any adversity. The love of praise, on the other hand, is only capable of providing 
us with momentary, fleeting, pleasure. In order to satisfy our vanity we must perpetually pursue 
the praise of others.261 This perpetual pursuit is the path to narcissism, not tranquility. The 
narcissistic need for praise robs us of our liberty and dignity by making us dependent on the 
opinions of others. This loss of liberty perpetuates and deepens our anxiety and contributes to our 
miserable.  
                                                 
261 In Smith’s estimation all individuals are born with a conscience capable of hearing the voice of Nature. Though 
he was a firm believer in class structure he gave no indication whatsoever that one class had better access to moral 
truths than another. Indeed, should they be aware of the merits of their station in life the poor would live as happily 
as the rich. The idea that all individuals have access to praiseworthiness is essential to Smith’s understanding of 
conscience; without this sense, praiseworthiness becomes indistinguishable from praise.  
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 The anxiety brought on by our vanity may also contribute to our misery by potentially 
making us reckless. In our vain desire to become rich and great we may opt to take shortcuts. 
This recklessness is detrimental to both our ease of body and peace of mind. Our potentially 
reckless desire to be rich and great—to the exclusion of other goods—poses a significant threat 
to our existing material well-being. Thus, in our reckless and anxious state we may gamble with 
everything we have for the chance to attain greatness and fortune. However, should we fail—
which is the most likely outcome—we run the risk of becoming worse off than we were before 
and possibly impoverished. The disappointment we would feel in either case would certainly 
increase our level of anxiety. Moreover, if our recklessness actually does impoverish us we 
would end up in a condition more detrimental to our pursuit of happiness than any other 
condition, namely, poverty. In this condition it is impossible to attain tranquility unless we 
possessed some heroic characteristics. It is possible that our pursuit of greatness and fortune will 
be successful and we will avoid the miserable detriments of poverty. However, what is more 
likely is that our anxious desire to be praised by others will make us reckless and poor. Either 
way, so long as we remain corrupted and vain we will remain anxious which cannot coexist with 
tranquility. However, even if corruption did not make us reckless, we would still anxiously toil 
away under the false impression that being happy means being rich and great, ignoring the true 
sources and conditions for happiness. 
 In addition to making us anxious moral corruption contributes to our misery by making 
us lonely. The disproportionately self-interested nature of the vain pursuit of greatness and 
fortune prevents us from properly exercising our natural benevolence and developing the bonds 
of affection necessary for tranquility.262 The love of praise developed as a result of corruption 
transforms our natural (and potentially virtuous) self-interest into selfishness. Ideally, our self-
interest is balanced out by our natural benevolence via the golden rule and our conscience. 
However, under the influence of corruption we become disproportionately self-interested to the 
                                                 
262 The connection between self-interest and corruption is made throughout the secondary literature. Griswold argues 
that it is the self-interested desire to better our condition that deceives us and leads to our corruption (p.262). Hanley 
adds to this characterization, claiming that our self-interested desire to be recognized (i.e. approved of) by improving 
our condition leads us to corruption (p.33).  
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point of becoming selfish.263 This is a result of the inherently selfish goals corruption directs us 
towards. We pursue greatness and fortune so that others will pay attention to us and lavish us 
with (undeserved) praise; any acts of benevolence perpetrated by the corrupted individual are 
merely a pretense for acquiring more praise rather than a genuine interest in contributing to the 
happiness of other.. The selfishness produced by corruption distances us from our telos as well as 
other people. Our pursuit of tranquility requires us to cultivate strong relationships with family, 
friends, and society as a whole. These relationships are essential to both our ease of body and 
peace of mind. Clearing and easing our conscience requires mutual sympathy and the most 
potent source of this is those people with whom we share affection (i.e. family, friends, and 
fellow citizens). In order to develop this affection we must be capable of consistently placing the 
needs and well-being of others ahead of our own. Failing to do so not only affects our own 
happiness it also affects the happiness of other people. Using other people so we may attain 
greatness and fortune for the sake of praise may jeopardize their pursuit of tranquility. By 
pushing us towards selfish goals, vanity inevitably makes us bad family members, friends, and 
citizens and in doing so may help to create a culture of loneliness and misery. Without bonds of 
affection our benevolence diminishes and all of the “ornaments” that make society desirable 
begin to disappear (TMS, 104). What we may be left with is a society that merely functions and 
fails to deliver anything more to us than mere survival. 
 It is possible for our vain pursuit of greatness and fortune to end in success. However, 
even if the poor man’s son were to become rich and great this would only bring them 
disappointment. Smith is adamant that wealth and greatness are not synonymous with happiness. 
Moreover, merely attaining these things does not alleviate a person’s anxiety or loneliness. When 
a vain person acquires both greatness and fortune their anxiety is likely to persist—and perhaps 
increase—when they discover that this does not end their misery and bring them happiness. 
However, instead of abandoning the pursuit of a false telos the vain person is likely to continue 
their quest by acquiring more riches and more greatness and receiving nothing but perpetual 
dissatisfaction. Additionally, wealth and greatness do nothing to cure a person of loneliness. 
                                                 
263 Self-interest refers to the goals and pursuits that concern our well-being. Selfishness refers to a quality of 
character characterized by an excessive (i.e. lacking benevolence) and exclusive focus on oneself. After a certain 
degree, we might expect self-interest to transform into selfishness. 
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Without the bonds of affection attained through benevolence corrupted individuals such as the 
poor man’s son will be alone and miserable even when they are successful. Worse yet, this vain 
person’s lack of benevolence may make other, uncorrupted, individuals similarly miserable. 
 By directing our conscience away from Nature’s providential plan moral corruption 
prevents us from developing a truly authoritative conscience and living a tranquil life. According 
to Smith the vanity created by this corruption impairs our judgment and warps our moral 
sentiments. This not only prevents us from pursuing tranquility he believes Nature has prescribed 
for us, it may also make us miserable. I believe the two main symptoms associated with moral 
corruption are anxiety and loneliness.264 The belief that only wealth and greatness can make us 
happy (and their lack will make us miserable) makes us anxious while the disproportionately 
selfish nature of this pursuit distances us from others and makes us lonely. Consequently, 
because these are incompatible with tranquility, vanity and happiness cannot coexist. 
Unfortunately, because corruption impairs our judgment we may not see or appreciate its 
miserable effects. By transforming our desire to be praiseworthy into a desire for praise 
corruption blinds us to the true source of happiness and may lead us down a path of misery. 
Conclusion 
 The temptations of greatness and fortune distract us from our natural teleological path 
and lead us to anxiety, loneliness, and misery. These temptations alter our conscience by quieting 
the voice of Nature and diverting us away from the golden rule. This diversion transforms our 
authoritative conscience from a tool meant to guide us to self-perfection and into a means for 
satisfying our vanity. Subsequently, our natural desire to be worthy of praise is replaced with a 
vain love of praise. We attempt to satisfy this desire by becoming rich and great. The vain 
pursuit of greatness and wealth is done without regard for the actual merit of these goals, or the 
means by which we acquire them. Consequently, vanity also threatens to transform us into 
vicious individuals. This corruption—and subsequent misery—affects all members of society 
regardless of class. However, Smith indicates that the middle class is the least likely to be 
                                                 
264 Though the literature discusses a variety of symptoms, loneliness is neglected. My claim is that disproportionate 
selfishness places a necessary distance between individuals. Close relationships—and happiness—require the 
benevolent side of our nature. 
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infected by corruption and thus potentially more likely to successfully pursue tranquility. 
Furthermore, corruption would be impossible if not for our natural frailty and the inequality 
inherent in commercial society. It is the intersection of these two variables which makes the life 
of greatness and fortune so tempting and ultimately what confuses us about the true nature of 
happiness. However, because inequality is essential to commercial society, and since frailty 
cannot be overcome, moral corruption may be an inescapable part of human existence. The path 
to tranquility thus becomes more challenging than Smith may have initially suspected.  
 Smith’s theory of moral corruption begins as a psychological problem. Although 
commercial society’s inequality plays a crucial role in tempting us away from our intended telos 
the initial effects of corruption occur in the individual’s conscience. Over time these effects are 
likely to spread. The flaws in propriety make it likely that, given enough time, the vain pursuit of 
greatness and fortune would become a normal and necessary part of everyday life. Eventually 
everyone in commercial society may be expected to pursue these goals rather than pursuing ease 
of body and peace of mind via praiseworthiness. Individuals who fail to acquire wealth and 
greatness may even be looked at as failures by the rest of society. However, corrupted propriety 
poses a more serious threat to society than the misery of its members. Widespread corruption 
may have political consequences which jeopardize the health of society itself. Any potential 
solution to moral corruption ought to account for these possible political consequences and not 
just the misery of individuals.  
Smith’s theory of moral corruption highlights a potential tension within both TMS and 
his philosophy as a whole. The belief that commercial society can so readily transform our 
natural desire to be praiseworthy into a love of praise calls Smith’s appraisal of it into question. 
The inclusion of this theory of corruption in TMS’ final edition changes Smith’s cautiously 
optimistic appraisal of commercial society into something more critical and pessimistic. Whereas 
prior to the 6th edition Smith was seemingly confident that commercial society made happiness 
more attainable and accessible his diagnosis of corruption in this edition shows that it may 
actively work against its pursuit. This would suggest Smith changed his opinion about 
commercial society at some point between the 5th and 6th editions of TMS. This pessimistic 
change in attitude plays a vital role in transforming TMS into a discourse on the link between 
virtue and happiness and the pursuit of self-perfection. The view that society itself is the source 
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of our moral ills plays a fundamental role in shaping the content of this perfection Smith 






















Nature’s Conflicting Ends 
4.0 Introduction  
Smith’s view of commercial society’s impact on morality and the pursuit of happiness is 
a largely optimistic one. Specifically, Smith praises commercial society because the opulence, 
security, order, and liberty generated in it render happiness more accessible and attainable.265 
However, his faith in the benefits of commercial society was never naïve; he recognized its 
potential flaws while still championing its benefits.266 Despite acknowledging its flaws, Smith 
saw commercial society as the teleological endpoint of history.267 Prior to the final edition of 
TMS, commercial society was represented as the perfect environment for the pursuit of our 
telos.268 Commercial society provides individuals with the opportunity to use their authoritative 
conscience to discover and pursue what is truly praiseworthy.269 However, the theory of moral 
corruption added to final edition of TMS reveals a softening of Smith’s enthusiasm towards 
commerce. Underpinning his theory of corruption is the belief that pursuing wealth and greatness 
can be hazardous to one’s moral well-being. This introduces a more pessimistic outlook on 
commercial society and creates a potential conflict between Nature’s two final causes. This 
bifurcation of final causes demonstrates that commercial society is more deeply flawed than 
Smith initially supposed. Rather than seeing commercial society solely as an ideal condition for 
                                                 
265 This is accomplished largely through the abolishment of abject poverty. According to Smith, this reduces the 
misery of the masses and puts true happiness (i.e. tranquility) within their reach (WN I.viii.36). See Hanley (2009) 
p.18. Muller (1993) adds that commercial society makes happiness more attainable and accessible by abolishing the 
undignified direct dependence of past societies (p.72). 
266 Smith’s reservations about the moral consequences of commerce anticipates contemporary studies on the subject. 
See Benjamin Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (New York: Knopf, 2005); John C, Bogle, 
The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005); and Richard Sennett, The 
Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism (New York: Norton, 1998). 
267 For analyses of Smith’s historical teleology see Kleer, R.A.  (2000)  ‘The  Role  of  Teleology  in  Adam  Smith’s   
Wealth  of  Nations’, History of Economics Review 31: 14-29; Justman, S. (1993) The Autonomous Male of Adam 
Smith. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press; and Shapiro, M.J. (1993) Reading ‘Adam Smith’. Newbury Park: 
Sage. 
268 Muller (1995) goes a step further and argues that “For Smith, the greatest benefit of commercial society was that 
it created incentives for people to develop what he called the ‘imperfect, but attainable virtues’” (p.8). 
269 This is largely a product of the liberty established by commercial society. No longer directly dependent on 
anyone else, individuals can follow the demands of their conscience. They can (and should) take advantage of this 
liberty by identifying the Author of Nature’s plan and discerning the standards of praiseworthiness we were 
designed to follow. This makes the conscience truly authoritative, capable of evaluating the merits of existing 
propriety and guiding us towards our telos.  
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the pursuit of happiness, Smith now also sees it as a potential source of misery.270 The vanity 
created and perpetuated by commercial society actively diverts individuals away from the Author 
of Nature’s providential plan and the golden rule. This diversion may jeopardize the fabric of 
society itself. However, Smith argues that vanity is an essential component of commercial 
society.271 By encouraging vanity commercial society increases the tension between our self-
interested and benevolent desires and may make the desire to act on the latter less common. 
Without the vain pursuit of wealth and greatness commercial society might not exist and 
certainly could not function properly.272 To generate opulence (and by extension liberty) 
commercial society requires the vain pursuit of wealth and greatness.273 In other words, not only 
does commercial society create anxiety, loneliness, and misery it may also depend on these. 
Without these moral ills commercial society could not create the opulence required for the 
pursuit of happiness. Thus, paradoxically, commercial society creates the ideal conditions for 
pursuing and attaining happiness, while simultaneously undermining this pursuit by encouraging 
vanity. However, it is possible for the middle class to avoid the conflict between Nature’s two 
ends and become praiseworthy individuals.   
 In the second chapter I argued Smith’s endorsement of commercial society was 
predicated on his belief that it made the successful pursuit of our telos more attainable and more 
accessible. It is in the context of commercial society where most people have the legitimate 
option of developing and following their authoritative conscience and becoming truly 
praiseworthy. However, Smith’s identification of commercial society as the source of our misery 
                                                 
270 Hanley (2009) claims that the “commercial passions are more likely to bring misery and anxiety than happiness 
and tranquility” (p.39). Hanley refers to Smith’s repeated allusions to the “tumult and bustle” and/or “scramble” that 
seems inherent in commercial life. Similarly, Alvey claims that the vice of ambition—which leads us away from 
happiness—is necessary for the creation of opulence (p.198). In TMS Smith argues that the pursuit of greatness 
necessarily involves toil and anxiety and comes at the expense of “all that leisure, all that ease, all that careless 
security, which are forfeited forever by the acquisition” of society’s admiration (TMS, 62). 
271 Because of this Alvey (2003) argues that commercial is a necessary but not sufficient condition for happiness 
(p.207). 
272 Fleischacker (2004) disputes the necessary role vanity plays in commercial society. He argues that “economics 
would not collapse if people came to their moral senses, and began to seek praiseworthiness rather than mere praise” 
(p.115). However, he does admit that the more opulent society becomes the more people demand luxuries and 
vanities,  
273 According to Winch (1978), industry is created by the corrupt desire to be rich and great (p.91). Alvey (2003) 
adds that without the delusion about happiness (i.e. corruption) human beings would be “indolent” and unable to 
“enoble human life” (p.199). Alvey adds that the deluded pursuit of wealth and greatness “[rules] out personal 
happiness, which requires leisure” (Ibid.).  
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alters this relationship. The inclusion of his theory of moral corruption in the 6th edition of TMS 
indicates an apparent conflict between our natural end and commercial society.274 Attempts to 
reconcile the optimistic reading with the pessimistic have given way to what might be called a 
“new” or “second” Adam Smith Problem.275 Although Smith did not change his mind about the 
benefits of commercial society he may have changed his attitude towards it. Though pessimistic 
about commercial society’s moral impact Smith remains cautiously optimistic about its material 
benefits. Consequently, though Smith may be guilty of ignoring the potentially serious political 
symptoms of corruption he cannot be accused of Pollyannaism in his defense of commercial 
society.276 He appropriately recognizes the “dark side” of commercial society without giving into 
despair.277 This measured pessimism has implications for Smith’s approach to treating corruption 
and therefore is a crucial point in understanding how the changes to the 6th edition fit together as 
a whole.   
 Smith’s enthusiasm is necessarily blunted by the pessimistic acceptance of what this 
society does to our potential pursuit of tranquility.278 However, despite its propensity to make us 
vain and miserable he still endorses commercial society. There are several reasons for this 
enduring endorsement. Smith believes that the material gains offered by commercial society 
outweigh its moral shortcomings. In other words, commercial society will continue to generate 
opulence even if it makes some individuals unhappy in the process. Smith is not being overly 
cynical here; he is prioritizing the relief of the single greatest source of misery in history (i.e. 
poverty) over the pursuit of self-perfection. In addition to its more obvious material benefits, 
Smith believes commercial society will continue to offer its members the conditions that make 
tranquility more attainable and accessible. In short, despite the perpetuation of vanity and misery, 
commercial society should continue to create the conditions necessary for the pursuit of 
                                                 
274 Hill (2006) argues that corruption is caused by a lack of progress (p.647). This assessment ignores both the 
specific cause of corruption and the role it plays in founding and improving society.  
275 Alvey (2003) draws attention to this problem and attempts to resolve it in his influential work. My own approach 
focuses on Smith’s virtue ethics as a partial solution to the moral ills of commercial society.  
276 See Hanley (2009) p.31. 
277 Literature focusing on Smith’s more nuanced assessment of commercial society includes Hanley (2009), Evensky 
(2005), Pack (1991), Rasmussen (2008), and Muller (1993). All agree that Smith held deep and serious reservations 
about commercial society’s influence on human well-being but that its benefits outweighed its problems.  
278 Ignatieff argues that, similar to Rousseau, Smith agreed with the Stoic claim that corruption (which diverts us 
away from happiness) was created by conventional morality. See “Smith, Rousseau, and the Republic of Needs,” in 
Scotland and Europe 1200-1850, ed. T.C.Smout (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986) p.201-202. 
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happiness should people choose to exercise their authoritative (i.e. natural) consciences. 
Additionally, the 6th edition of TMS is skeptical about how commercial society can be 
replaced.279 Commercial society is entrenched enough, in Smith’s mind, that it could not be 
abandoned without causing more harm than good.280 Despite requiring vanity and misery in 
order to function properly, commercial society is still the best possible society for the successful 
pursuit of our telos. Commercial society is the only society capable of fully satisfying the 
necessary preconditions for ease of body and peace of mind. Consequently, though it may direct 
us away from tranquility, commercial society still provides the opulence, peace, order, and 
security required for happiness.  
The political wisdom within both TMS and WN is at times overlooked in the literature.281 
Treating these as pure works on morality and economics respectively neglects the important role 
politics and, more specifically, the legislator plays in promoting the successful pursuit of 
tranquility.282 However, though political intervention plays a crucial role in facilitating our 
pursuit of happiness it would be extreme to extrapolate from this and characterize Smith as a 
republican.283 Regardless of where he is placed along the political spectrum, focusing on Smith’s 
political arguments highlights the important role the legislator serves in ensuring the peace, 
security, order, liberty, and opulence of commercial society. The two primary means by which 
                                                 
279 Smith’s warnings about the “man of system” highlight the dangers associated with reorganizing society in the 
hope of repairing all of its problems (TMS, 275-276). 
280 See Hanley (2009) p.15. 
281 Obvious and important exceptions to this include Haakonssen (1981), Skinner (1979), Winch (1978) and Muller 
(1995).  
282 Muller (1995) argues that commercial society can only thrive with institutions that cultivates “prudence, self-
control, respect for life and property and, among some at least, concern for the common good” (p.6). Evensky 
(2005) stresses the legislator’s role in protecting private property rights as a means of ensuring that the poor pursue 
wealth the same way the rich did (p.64). In doing so, the legislator helps to ensure the continued growth and 
distribution of wealth, a prerequisite for tranquility.  
283 Characterizing Smith as a republican obscures the psychological effects of corruption and the need for a 
psychological solution. Hill, in “Smith and Corruption” provides an analysis of Smith’s theory of moral corruption 
that distinguishes it from both republican and Marxist readings. Hill characterizes Smith’s theory of corruption as 
both “eccentric” and a “hybrid” that cannot (p.646). However, Hill concludes that Smith’s primary concern in 
discussing corruption was its effect on politics (p.636.). Harpham, in “Liberalism, Civic Humanism, and the Case of 
Adam Smith,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 764-74 emphasizes the psychological causes and 
consequences of corruption. Hanley (2009) also provides a through psychological analysis of corruption and its 
potential solution. Finally, though he offers a republican reading of Smith, Winch (1978) admits that the 
productivity commercial society requires is based on a psychological deception about the ends of Nature (p.91). 
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political intervention can support and promote happiness is through the proper administration of 
justice and the preservation of free markets. 
 There is a substantial amount of secondary literature that focuses on Smith’s 
understanding of justice and his natural jurisprudence.284 Smith outlines his conception of justice 
within TMS, arguing it is an individual virtue while simultaneously claiming it is responsible for 
holding society together. Smith’s theory of natural jurisprudence is implicit in both TMS and 
WN. However, works concerned with this theory have typically chosen to focus on Smith’s LJ. 
Smith had initially promised to complete and publish a work on the history and application of 
natural jurisprudence yet, for whatever reason, failed to complete this intended project.285 Within 
TMS Smith provides a clear enough picture of justice to determine how it serves the pursuit of 
Nature’s ends.   
The pessimistic tone in TMS’ 6th edition redefines who is most likely to successfully 
pursue praiseworthiness and tranquility. Although commercial society still provides the ideal 
conditions for the pursuit of these, the individuals who are most likely to engage in this pursuit 
are from the so-called “middling” class. The rich and poor members of society appear to be the 
most affected by the temptations of greatness and fortune. The vulgarity of the rich—frequently 
commented on by Smith—makes it clear that their morals are unlikely to deliver lasting 
tranquility. On the other hand, the poor are forced to suffer through both anonymity and the 
contempt of society. Additionally, the parable of the poor man’s son helps to illustrate how 
difficult it might be for the poor to see the true path to happiness. Consequently, it is the rich and 
poor who are the least likely to listen to the voice of Nature and the golden rule. However, 
Smith’s optimism persists in his belief that there can be some immunity to these temptations. 
                                                 
284 Jurisprudential readings of Smith typically cast him as a natural law theorist. The most influential of these is 
Haakonssen’s Science of a Legislator. See also Forbes (1975), Stein (1979, 1980), and Evensky (1992).  
285 As a collection of posthumously published lectures given to his students, LJ may contain much of Smith’s more 
developed understandings of natural jurisprudence. However, given his failure to complete the intended Science of 
Jurisprudence we may surmise that Smith never arrived at any mature theory. This conclusion may be further 
supported by Smith’s deathbed wish to have his unfinished works burned. This creates a specific problem for 
authors who choose to focus on LJ in order to arrive at solid conclusions about his theories of justice and natural 
jurisprudence. Ultimately, jurisprudential readings attempt to complete a philosophical project on Smith’s behalf, 
and by doing they might reimagine Smith would have said if he had had the time and inclination to say it. 
Accordingly, in this chapter I do not focus on LJ, even for points of clarification. Instead, I focus entirely on the 
theory of justice articulated by Smith in TMS. Doing so should yield enough information to determine what justice 
is, why it is necessary, and how it can be properly maintained. 
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Spared both the undeserved praise lavished upon the rich, and the anonymity of the poor, the 
middling class should be better positioned to listen to the voice of Nature and thus more likely to 
pursue their telos. Consequently, the middling classes of commercial society are the inevitable 
target of Smith’s proposed solution to corruption. Though the rich and poor may be fortunate 
enough to avoid the temptations of wealth and greatness it may be difficult to coax them back to 
the life of Nature once they have become vain. The middling class, on the other hand, may never 
stray too far from the golden rule and thus should be more likely to listen to the voice of Nature.  
4.1 The Teleological View of Commercial Society  
 According to Smith, commercial society is more than merely the best possible society 
humans have thus far established. Instead, commercial society is more properly understood by 
Smith to be the teleological endpoint of history.286 Our natural motivations, moral faculties, and 
even imperfections all contribute to guide the species through different stages of history until we 
finally establish a commercial society. Moreover, by making tranquility more easily attainable 
and widely accessible commercial society can establish the ideal conditions for the pursuit of our 
individual telos. However, Smith’s pessimistic turn in the 6th edition of TMS suggests a potential 
conflict between Nature’s two ends.287 Thus, Griswold (1999) argues “Smith is recommending a 
society devoted to the improvement of the human lot but governed by a systemic self-deception 
about its own ends. Such a society is therefore inclined to private, though not necessarily public, 
unhappiness” (p.263). The widespread vanity created by moral corruption (and subsequent 
misery) impedes the pursuit of tranquility. Likewise, our individual telos may be incompatible 
with the ends of history; the life of tranquility is anathema to the constant production of wealth 
required to maintain commercial society.288 Consequently, it is possible to have a commercial 
                                                 
286 Alvey (2003) and Evensky (2005) both agree that the opulence created by commercial society indicates it is 
history’s telos. Accordingly, Alvey argues that opulence facilitates the reproduction and preservation of the species 
(p.84). Similarly, Evensky argues that opulence increases the well-being of even “the least among the working 
class” (p.11).   
287 Despite this conflict in ends Smith’s teleological understanding of commercial society endures. Commercial 
society remains the best possible society and it is still brought about through the harmonious design of Nature.  
288 Fleischacker (2004) disputes the necessary role vanity plays in generating opulence, claiming that “economics 
would not collapse if people came to their senses, and began to seek praiseworthiness rather than mere praise” (p.115). 
However, he does admit that an increase in wealth leads to an increase in the demand for vanities. Fleischacker appears 
to be guilty of ignoring much of what Smith had to say about the role of vanity, especially within the parable of the 
poor man’s son.  
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society without any tranquility whatsoever. This conflict in ends suggests the possibility that 
Smith changed his mind about the ends of either history or human nature. However, Smith 
maintains his support for commercial society and other changes made to the 6th edition of TMS 
indicate he still firmly believes that humans ought to live a tranquil and praiseworthy life. 
However, because the conflict between the two ends of Nature is unavoidable some people must 
be vain and miserable in order for others to be happy. 
 The teleological nature of history is encapsulated in Smith’s “conjectural history”.289 
Smith presents this conjectural history in its basic form in WN.290 In WN Smith presents the 
bookend stages of history, focusing on the hunter/gatherer stage and the commercial stage. Smith 
labels these as the “savage” and “civilised” (WN, intro.4).291 Later in Book V of WN Smith 
mentions the other intervening stages of history. The progression from the barbaric stage to the 
civilized is facilitated by the teleological pursuit of general opulence (made possible via the 
division of labor).292 Additionally, the efficient cause that pushes us towards this historical telos 
is our self-interested first principle.293 Similarly, the imperfections of our species help to create 
the conditions required to pass from one stage to the next. However, it is the self-interested 
desire to continuously better our condition that transforms one stage of society into another and 
eventually into commercial society. Smith not only outlines this in specific and precise detail in 
WN, he reaffirms it in TMS when he argues that our condition is improved by our selfish desire 
to “be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and 
approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not 
the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us” (TMS, 63). As Smith’s theory of corruption 
                                                 
289 Some authors, such as Shapiro (1993) and Rashid (1992), have argued that Smith has misrepresented history. 
Such an argument mistakes the intent of Smith’s Four Stages theory of history which claims that “human history can 
be seen as comprising four epochs through which all societies eventually pass” (Alvey, 2003, p.82). These epochs 
are broad generalizations of different economic stages, rather than comprehensive analyses of history. For a similar 
argument see Muller (1995, p.112).  
290 Smith formulates this theory in WN (see V.I.a). This theory appears again in the posthumously published LJ (see 
LJ(A) i.27 and LJ(B) 25, 27, 149, 233). 
291 Alvey provides a useful distinction between “savage” and “civilised” societies. According to Alvey the former 
requires “fierce discipline”, and most individuals are anxious and unhappy while the latter allows us to develop and 
indulge our faculties and desires (p.85).  
292 Alvey (2003) argues that it is commerce (i.e. our “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”) that drives history 
forward (p.79). See WN I.i.9. 
293 More specifically, it is the self-interest desire to improve our condition that forwards history. See Pack (1991) 
p.96. This argument is encapsulated within Smith’s famous claim about the butcher, brewer, and baker (WN I.ii.2). 
We improve our condition, and the condition of everyone else, by pursuing and satisfying self-interest.  
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illustrates, we pursue wealth largely to satisfy these vain desires. The pursuit of self-interest is an 
essential component of the Author of Nature’s harmonious design and, when pursued properly, 
ensures and promotes the generation of opulence. 
 Although the continuous pursuit of self-interest leads us to commercial society, Smith 
does not characterize the progress of history as linear or inevitable.294 The progression from one 
stage to the next can be delayed or diverted.295 More importantly, society may regress from one 
“higher” stage to a lower one. This regression is outlined by Smith in his analysis of ancient 
Greece and Rome. Although they differ greatly from 18th century Europe, Smith considers both 
Greece and Rome to be commercial societies. This poses an essential question about how and 
why these societies failed to endure. The cause(s) of these collapses indicates what is required to 
not only create, but sustain, commercial society. Although the natural pursuit of self-interest 
necessarily leads to commercial society, certain conditions must be met for this pursuit to occur 
unimpeded. According to Smith, it was the lack of external security that caused the Greek and 
Roman commercial societies to collapse.296 Subsequently, we can expect the most enduring and 
successful commercial societies to be exceptionally secure against external threats. One of the 
advantages modern commercial societies have over their ancient counterparts, Smith argues, is 
the invention of gunpowder. 297 With gunpowder commercial societies are capable of repelling 
much larger barbarian armies.298 This, combined with a standing army, ought to make modern 
commercial societies less susceptible to regression via conquest. External security is only one 
example of the conditions required for the achievement of history’s telos. As noted in Chapter 
Two, internal security, order, and liberty are also prerequisites to the generation of opulence. It is 
the entire species’ pursuit of self-interest—aided by the harmonic order of the universe—that 
                                                 
294 Evensky (2005) claims that human frailty interferes with this progress thus making it neither linear nor fluid 
(p.28).  
295 In WN Smith focuses on the distorting effect mercantile interests can have on commercial society, claiming they 
are “unnatural”. See (WN IV.ii.11-5; IV.iii.c.9; IV.vii.b.44). Additionally, Smith admits that there may be 
circumstances in which commercial society will not emerge. According to Smith, much of Africa, Asia, and Russia 
have remained “savage” or “barbaric” because of their climate and geography (WN I.iii.8).  
296 Smith argues that Greek republics collapsed because their militias could not resist the power of Alexander’s 
standing army (WN V.i.a.29). Rome, though it had a standing army, was unable to resist the might and numbers of 
the Germanic tribes. Additionally, Alvey (2003) argues that “inappropriate human institutions” also interfere with 
the teleological progress towards commercial society (p.89).  
297 See Alvey (2003) p.106-107 and Haakonssen (1981) p.179. 
298 What Smith fails to note is the possibility that gunpowder may have contributed to greater wars between 
commercial societies and thus a continued threat to security.  
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produces and sustains these conditions. Unfortunately, it is also the pursuit of self-interest which 
jeopardizes this harmonic order and these essential conditions. 
 For the vast majority of people the conflict between Nature’s final causes is likely 
irreconcilable. For the majority of individuals to be happy they require the security, order, 
liberty, and opulence of society. Thus, any pursuit of happiness outside of commercial society is 
likely to fail for all but the very elite (or perhaps the very fortunate). On the other hand, because 
of the anxiety it produces (and depends upon) the generation of opulence and the pursuit of 
tranquility may be mutually exclusive. Commercial society requires individuals to pursue their 
self-interest at the expense of benevolence, praiseworthiness, and ultimately tranquility.  Smith 
sees the greatest source of production and wealth in society as the “anxious” desire to improve 
our condition. It is our vain desire to “be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and 
approbation” that drives us to better our condition through the pursuit of riches (TMS, 
63).Without this restlessness it is possible commercial society’s production—and subsequent 
opulence—could potentially grind to a halt.299 Consequently, all of the benefits associated with 
this opulence would disappear and humanity’s chances of successfully pursuing tranquility 
would diminish. Paradoxically, to create the opulence necessary to the pursuit of tranquility, 
vanity simultaneously contributes to the creation of misery. The anxiety (and loneliness) created 
by our vanity may serve a larger social purpose but at the individual level it diverts us away from 
our teleological path. This paradox reveals the tragedy underpinning Smith’s endorsement of 
commercial society; though it is by far the best society and capable of satisfying the conditions 
required for tranquility, it can only accomplish this by making people vain and miserable.  
4.2 The Necessity of Vanity 
 The necessary connection between vanity and opulence is most provocatively made by  
Smith in his parable of the poor man’s son; 
The poor man's son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he begins 
to look around him, admires the condition of the rich. He finds the cottage of his father too 
small for his accommodation, and fancies he should be lodged more at his ease in a palace. 
He is displeased with being obliged to walk a-foot, or to endure the fatigue of riding on 
                                                 
299 Accordingly, Alvey (2003) argues that “Without nature’s deception people would be indolent and would not 
ennoble human life. The delusion produces constant striving and industry, ruling out personal happiness, which 
requires leisure” p.199. 
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horseback. He sees his superiors carried about in machines, and imagines that in one of 
these he could travel with less inconveniency. He feels himself naturally indolent, and 
willing to serve himself with his own hands as little as possible; and judges, that a numerous 
retinue of servants would save him from a great deal of trouble. He thinks if he had attained 
all these, he would sit still contentedly, and be quiet, enjoying himself in the thought of the 
happiness and tranquility of his situation (TMS, 211). 
 This parable begins with an explanation for how the desire to be rich corrupts our sentiments. 
This poor man’s son, Smith claims, ultimately ends up dissatisfied and miserable by the pursuit 
of wealth and greatness. However, at the end of this parable Smith makes a darker, more 
surprising, statement about this unfortunate son’s misery, arguing that; 
it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and 
keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which first prompted them to 
cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent 
and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embellish human life (Ibid). 
 According to Smith, this pursuit of greatness and fortune is not only necessary to commercial 
society’s generation of wealth, it is also a part of The Author of Nature’s design. However, 
reading this parable makes it clear that the poor man’s son would have been much happier if he 
had not been “visited with ambition” and had chosen instead to see the merits of his condition 
and pursue the true sources of tranquility. In other words, Nature seems to have designed humans 
to pursue and attain happiness while simultaneously promoting a regime that actively 
undermines this pursuit. This conflict between the teleological ends of human nature and the best 
(possible) society affects both the poor and the rich, albeit in different ways. However, though 
they are affected in different ways by the corruption imposed by commercial society the end 
result (i.e. misery) is the same.  
 Commercial society is not utopian; throughout TMS Smith makes it a point to highlight 
this society’s various imperfections. One of these imperfections is the persistence of poverty.300 
Smith’s lament for the condition of the poor is a recurring theme throughout TMS’ six editions. 
The poor suffer from more than a lack of resources. Accordingly, Smith claims that;  
The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him 
out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, 
scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is mortified 
upon both accounts. For though to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, are things 
                                                 
300 Hanley (2009) provides an insightful analysis of Smith’s concern over the affects of poverty and his interests in 
alleviating it (p.15-24). See also; Muller (1993), Evensky (2005), and Pack (1991). All these authors seem to agree 
that Smith’s advocacy of commercial society focuses on what opulence can do for the disadvantaged.  
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entirely different, yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, 
to feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and 
disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature. The poor man goes out and comes in 
unheeded, and when in the midst of a crowd is in the same obscurity as if shut up in his 
own hovel. Those humble cares and painful attentions which occupy those in his situation, 
afford no amusement to the dissipated and the gay. They turn away their eyes from him, or 
if the extremity of his distress forces them to look at him, it is only to spurn so disagreeable 
an object from among them. The fortunate and the proud wonder at the insolence of human 
wretchedness, that it should dare to present itself before them, and with the loathsome 
aspect of its misery presume to disturb the serenity of their happiness (TMS, 63). 
 
This obscurity reinforces moral corruption which in turn worsens the condition of the poor who 
will be despised and neglected by other members of society (TMS, 73). Ultimately, in 
commercial society the poor are treated with contempt which, Smith claims, is more difficult to 
bare than “all other external evils” (TMS, 73).301 Even if they are lucky enough to avoid being 
corrupted, the obscurity and shame the poor experience may prevent them from ever attaining 
tranquility.. In addition to all of this the poor are given the illusion that they will be happy if they 
work their way out of this condition and become rich and famous. The only means the poor have 
to attain this false telos is by working jobs that make them stupid, useless, and—above all else—
miserable.302 In order to improve their condition and live what they believe to be a happy life the 
poor are forced to create and perpetuate their own misery. If they were not made vain by the 
illusion of happiness the poor might be spared this misery and they might see the moral benefits 
of a humble, modest, station in life and spend their lives pursuing the types of things that bring 
about real ease of body and peace of mind. However, as Smith points out in the aforementioned 
parable, it is better for commercial society that the poor become vain and anxious to be rich and 
famous. This vanity is what spurs them to produce more and more wealth for society as a whole 
and is what ultimately ennobles and embellishes human life (TMS, 211). Without this there 
would be little chance of anyone in society being happy, least of all the poor.303  
                                                 
301 It thus seems impossible for the anonymous poor to ever attain happiness.  Hanley (2009) argues that “the 
blessings of tranquility pale in comparison to the ignominy suffered by those the world has forgotten” p.37. 
302 As a result of the division of labor, which forces them to concentrate on one small task, workers become “as 
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become” (WN, V.II.2).  
303 Though concerned with the alleviation of abject poverty, Smith never committed to economic equality. In 
reference to the equality found in earlier historical stages Smith reminds the reader that what established this 
“universal equality” was their “universal poverty” (WN, V.1.2). See Hanley (2009) p.17.  
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 The production of luxury goods, which Smith calls “trinkets and baubles”, is what 
appears to drive the generation of opulence of commercial society. Due to the distribution of the 
invisible hand, the rich’s perpetual need for luxuries and “gratification of […] vain and insatiable 
desires” inevitably provides the poor with some wealth (TMS, 215).304 Luxuries are produced by 
the poor for the consumption of the rich. While the anxious laboring to produce these contributes 
the poor’s misery, it is the anxious desire to own them that makes the rich unhappy. The 
covetousness of the rich and great, who desperately seek the praise from all of society, inspires 
them to consume as many luxury items as they possibly can. Owning the trinkets and baubles 
produced by their laboring counterparts is the primary way the rich and great display their wealth 
and draw the attention of society. It is the enjoyment of these luxury goods that helps convince 
everyone (themselves included) that the rich and great are truly happy. In short, the luxury goods 
so anxiously produced by the poor give the rich and great the appearance of happiness. As I have 
maintained in earlier chapters, mere fortune and greatness is not synonymous with happiness, nor 
is the consumption of trinkets and baubles. However, it is good and necessary that the rich 
believe this to be true because the desire to own and consume luxuries drives production and 
creates opulence. Consequently, the misery of the rich is as essential to the proper functioning of 
commercial society as the misery of their impoverished counterparts.  
 Although commercial society depends on the anxious misery of both the poor and rich it 
should not be assumed that every single person in each condition is necessarily miserable. Smith 
admits that they can choose to live lives of tranquility. By abolishing direct dependence, 
commercial society provides individuals with the liberty and opportunity to discover the 
standards pf praiseworthiness and exercise their authoritative conscience. Thus, individuals can 
abandon the corrupted standards of propriety and—if they choose to—pursue ease of body and 
peace of mind. The path to tranquility will be different for the poor than it will be for the rich. 
Aside from the specter of corruption, the main obstacle to the poor’s pursuit of happiness is their 
state of deprivation and anonymity. The internalization of anonymity is by far the most difficult 
obstacle for the poor to overcome. While the meanest laborer has access to the material needs 
required for happiness this does not necessarily help them overcome any psychological problems 
                                                 
304 This distribution of wealth (though not equal) also liberates workers from the dependency they would have 
endured within a feudal system. See Hanley (2009), p.19-22.  
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linked to anonymity. The most serious psychological effect is shame, which threatens our dignity 
and may lead to self-loathing. Smith does believe the poor can overcome their oppressive 
anonymity, without abandoning the pursuit of wealth and greatness; however, this typically 
requires opportunities for greatness such as war (TMS, 68-69). Additionally, Smith suggests that, 
in their impatient desire to capture the “attention and admiration of mankind” anonymous 
individuals may become vicious (TMS, 69).305 On the other hand, the rich only have to parade 
their wealth to capture the favorable attention of society (TMS, 69). For the poor it will always 
appear easier to overcome their anonymity by pursuing riches and greatness. Subsequently, 
though it will always fail to bring them happiness, the pursuit of a false telos will always seem 
like the path of least resistance. On the other hand, the rich are confronted with both the 
distractions of their wealth and the fleeting pleasure of the praise and attention they receive. 
These superficial obstacles reaffirm the advantages the rich have over the poor and though they 
are as susceptible to corruption as the poor, the rich get to experience this much differently. 
Nevertheless, both rich and poor individuals in commercial society may be more likely to 
become vain, anxious, and miserable even when the path to ease of body and peace of mind 
remains open to them. 
Vanity cannot be extricated from commercial society because it creates the motivation for 
continuous production and consumption of goods and is thus essential to the generation of 
opulence. Furthermore, Smith views this tension as a part of the Author of Nature’s providential 
plan. This calls into question the compatibility between humanity’s natural ends and the best 
possible society for attaining these ends. On the surface it would seem plausible to suggest that 
we abandon a society that relies on our misery in order to operate and thrive. However, despite 
developing a more pessimistic attitude towards commercial society Smith continues to endorse 
it. Although he still envisions commercial society as a Natural end, Smith no longer considers it 
to be perfect. Discouraged by this society’s influence on morality he reimagines it as the best 
possible society. Despite being antagonistic to the pursuit of tranquility commercial society still 
provides the best conditions for this pursuit. Smith’s waning enthusiasm for commercial society 
may provide a better means to evaluate its successes and failures. Commercial society can (and 
                                                 
305 Smith claims that individuals who are anxious to capture the attention of others may ignore the “confusion and 
bloodshed” caused by war and civil strife in the hopes of achieving greatness (TMS, 69). 
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should) be praised for its ability to solve practical problems like poverty and direct dependence, 
and not as a utopian society capable of making everyone happy.  
4.3 Smith’s Pessimistic Defense  
 Smith’s enthusiasm for commercial society had waned by TMS’ 6th edition. Though 
Smith still considers it to be history’s telos, commercial society is no longer perfectly compatible 
with the tranquility we were intended to pursue. Subsequently, the nature of Smith’s 
endorsement of commercial society changes in this final edition. His pessimistic shift in attitude 
(facilitated by his theory of corruption) changes the criteria by which he praises commercial 
society and although he recognizes the negative influence it has on our morality Smith still 
champions its merits. Smith believes that even though it requires and encourages misery, 
commercial society is still capable of satisfying the necessary preconditions for happiness. 
Additionally, any attempt to replace commercial society would only do more harm than good. 
Thus, we should maintain commercial society because it is less imperfect than all of the other 
possible societies.306  
According to Smith, previous, “barbaric”, stages of history are mere steps towards this 
ideal society which (when ordered and governed properly) would bring about the greatest wealth 
and greatest happiness.307 The imperfections of both human nature and society were, prior to the 
6th edition of TMS, natural mechanisms for creating the greatest good for the entire species. 
However, the substantial changes made to the 6th edition of TMS indicate a shift in this belief. 
Given the inclusion of moral corruption, commercial society no longer necessarily produces the 
best possible results for everyone. Many people will have to become vain and miserable so some 
can pursue tranquility.  
With the changes to TMS’ final edition Smith’s support becomes more conditional and 
relative. Commercial society is still ideal, but only in relation to all other existing types of 
society and only so long as it continues to provide us with wealth, liberty, security, and order. 
                                                 
306 See Hanley (2009) p.15. 
307 According to Alvey (2003) the majority of individuals in past societies were miserable (p.85). Additionally, 
Griswold (1999) argues that even if most people in commercial society will never be perfectly happy they can still 
live a decent life (p.225).  
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Though the corruption essential to commercial society may leave us morally impoverished this is 
preferable to the abject material poverty common to all other types of societies. This is largely a 
consequence of commercial society’s capacity for abolishing poverty. However, the other 
benefits provided should not be dismissed. The liberty, security, order etc. offered by 
commercial society all make even a miserable life within it superior to other “barbaric” societies 
which are characterized by poverty, dependency, and a lack of security. For instance, unlike past 
iterations of society, commercial societies should not have to live in perpetual fear of their 
neighbors. Thus, despite being vain and subsequently miserable the people of a commercial 
society at least get to experience this in (relative) peace. Additionally, liberty (i.e. mutual 
interdependence) allows us to live a more dignified life, even if it is spent in pursuit of a false 
telos, because it does not require dependency upon the benevolence of masters.308 Ultimately, 
though commercial society may require a divergence from our telos it at least provides us with 
the illusion of happiness, which is preferable to the palpable misery of all other societies. 
Smith’s second defense of commercial society is contained within his criticism of the 
spirit of system.309 Recognizing the imperfections of commercial society, Smith cautions us 
against attempting to replace it with a new type of society intended to repair each and every flaw. 
Smith’s criticism of the spirit of system is itself an addition to the 6th edition of TMS. Smith 
argues that, in response to the sufferings of their fellows, people of system offer a “plan of 
reformation which, they pretend, will not only remove the inconveniences and relieve the 
distresses immediately complained of, but will prevent, in all time coming, any return of the like 
inconveniences and distresses” (TMS, 274). Accordingly, the individuals inspired by the spirit of 
system offer radical new changes to the constitution and existing order. Smith has harsh words 
for such individuals and claims that they are “intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of [their] 
ideal system, of which they have no experience, but which has been represented to them in all 
the most dazzling colours” (Ibid). Smith goes on to call these individuals “the dupes of their own 
sophistry” (Ibid). Here the influence of the French Revolution and subsequent Reign of Terror on 
                                                 
308 Smith’s concern over the detrimental influence of dependence is captured in his criticism of feudalism, (WN 
II.iii.9; WN III.ii.9). The dependency present in feudal society is so absolute, Smith likens it to slavery. See also, 
Hanley (2009) p.19-20.  
309 Alvey (2003) claims that public ambition (i.e. political ambition) may also be an important part of commercial 
society. However, I believe he has ignored the dangers of this vice, especially where it concerns the spirit of system.  
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Smith’s thought is clear. People inspired by the spirit of system inevitably use violence and 
extremism to fix the problems of society.310 However, not only do these problems continue to 
endure but they are “left altogether without remedy” (TMS, 275). In other words, by imposing an 
abstract system upon society (often with violence) the people of system make the distresses and 
inconveniences of society intractable. Additionally, Smith argues that had these same people 
acted with moderation they could have “removed or relieved” the bulk of society’s ills (Ibid).311 
A second, potentially more serious, danger associated with the spirit of system is tyranny. Smith 
argues that the person of system “insist[s] upon establishing, and establishing all at once, and in 
spite of all opposition, everything which that idea may seem to require” and in the process 
“erect[s] [their] own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong” (TMS, 276). Thus, 
by having individuals impose their view of perfection upon society, often violently, the spirit of 
system turns a genuine and benevolent love of humanity into a desire to tyrannize. Smith’s 
warnings about the dangerous desire to establish a perfect society reaffirm his commitment to 
commercial society. Although it may be irredeemably flawed, it would create more misery than 
happiness to try and replace commercial society with something brand new. It would be far 
superior to direct the same benevolence that gives rise to the spirit of system towards actually 
improving the conditions of the poor than trying to replace society with an ill-conceived utopia.  
Smith’s belief that the material benefits of commercial society outweigh any of its moral 
shortcomings reframes his support for it in a more pessimistic light.  Although the flaws inherent 
in commercial society do not prevent it from creating the opulence, liberty, security, and order 
necessary to living a happy, dignified life it generates these at the expense of people’s ease of 
body and peace of mind by making them vain, anxious, lonely, and miserable. However, 
although these material conditions necessitate the perpetuation of misery, people are able to live 
a superior life than their counterparts in any preexisting “barbaric” society and are free to pursue 
praiseworthiness and tranquility rather than wealth and greatness. Additionally, any attempts to 
repair its flaws or replace commercial society with a new one will only end up making people 
                                                 
310 Smith criticizes men of system for imposing their extreme idealism on people with violence claiming that “the 
violence of the party, refusing all palliatives, all temperaments, all reasonable accommodations, by requiring too 
much frequently obtains nothing” (TMS, 275).  
311 Hanley (2008) points out that Smith’s legislator “must temper his commitment to idealism with an appreciation 
of the specific contexts in which he serves” in order to avoid succumbing to the spirit of system (p.222).   
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more miserable than they already are. Consequently, though we might say that the majority of 
people within commercial society are unhappy we should still consider them to be better off than 
if they lived in any other possible society. Smith’s more pessimistic defense of commercial 
society presumes that individuals would (and perhaps should) opt for survival and misery at the 
expense of any pursuit of self-perfection and tranquility. Opting for the best possible society 
rather than the perfect will not guarantee or even promote self-perfection and tranquility. 
However, this will help to avoid the real, most tangible, sources of human misery (i.e. poverty 
and civil war).   
4.4 Hope for the Middle Class 
 Rather than giving into despair, TMS’ 6th edition offers hope that some individuals will 
have a degree of immunity to corruption and thus remain capable of self-perfecting and attaining 
ease of body and peace of mind. The people most likely to accomplish this are those in the 
middle class. Because they do not experience the sufferings of the poor or the vulgarity of the 
rich, the middle class is best positioned to successfully pursue a life of praiseworthiness and 
tranquility. Furthermore, these middle class individuals can pursue tranquility without 
jeopardizing the production of opulence. In short, commercial society does not appear to depend 
on the vanity of the middle class. Thus, if they can avoid corruption and choose to self-perfect, 
members of the middle class can attain both ease of body and peace of mind. There is, however, 
no guarantee that they will accomplish this; being in the middle class does not mean you 
necessarily listen to the voice of Nature and become tranquil. However, due to their station in 
life, away from the extremes of poverty and riches, the people within the middle class are most 
likely to successfully follow the golden rule and become happy.  
With regards to their pursuit of tranquility, the middle class holds several distinct 
advantages over the poor. Obviously the middle class holds an economic advantage over the 
poor that allows them to avoid the material obstacles associated with poverty. Individuals within 
this class need not struggle to acquire and maintain the basic necessities of life. However, this 
advantage is not purely materialistic. Individuals in the middle class are also immune to the 
psychological problems the poor endure because of their condition. Unlike the poor, members of 
the middle class will not experience the anonymity, shame, and impatience that the poor do. The 
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inequality fundamental to commercial society is largely responsible for psychological problems. 
Economic inequality directs people’s aversion to pain and attraction to pleasure towards wealth 
and greatness. Accordingly, Smith argues that “[it] is because mankind are disposed to 
sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make a parade of our riches, 
and conceal our poverty” (TMS, 62).312 Because it is painful to be pitied we seek to attain wealth 
and the sympathetic joy attached with this. This, Smith argues, is the origin of ambition (TMS, 
62-63). Simultaneously, Smith argues that it is painful to feel pity for others and, for our own 
happiness, it is best if we ignored sympathizing with the sorrows of other people (TMS, 59). 
Consequently, we ignore the sufferings of the poor and their miserable condition while they hide 
themselves from our sight out of shame. The aversion to pain and sorrow also leads the poor’s 
impatient desire to capture the attention of society (TMS, 68-69). This might inevitably lead to 
moral corruption as the poor become convinced that the only way to attain happiness is to 
become rich and great.   
 Members of the middle class are not necessarily immune to the delusions of the 
imagination that cause moral corruption. However, because of their relative wealth these 
individuals may be less likely to erroneously associate happiness with riches and greatness. The 
middle class’ material condition does not elicit any pity and as a result they do not have to 
experience the same psychological effects the poor do. Though they may never be as beloved as 
the rich and great are, the middle class is in a position to garner enough attention and approval to 
satisfy their need for mutual sympathy. The mere fact that they are not the objects of society’s 
contempt or apathy means that the middle class is better situated to pursue ease of body and 
peace of mind. Similarly, it is possible for the people in this class to be loved and admired 
without giving into the impatience that the anonymous and despised poor do. As a result, the 
middle class may have less reason to give into the vain desire for riches and greatness and more 
likely than the poor to see them as the delusions that they really are. Though being a member of 
the middle class cannot guarantee our happiness it is far easier to identify and pursue our telos 
from this position than it would be if we were poor.  
                                                 
312 Recall that Smith characterizes sorrow and joy as types of pain and pleasure (TMS, 56). 
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 By avoiding the anonymity that plagues the poor the middle class is already more likely 
to avoid vanity and acquire tranquility. However, the middle class is also uniquely positioned to 
avoid the things which divert the rich away from the voice of Nature. Smith’s repeated ridicule 
of the rich and great provides insight into their lifestyle and reveals why they may be as anxious 
and miserable as the poor. When referencing the rich and great Smith frequently characterizes 
them as vulgar and vain and uses denigrating terms such as selfish, rapacious, and insatiable 
(TMS, 215).313 Additionally, Smith mocks the rich and great’s foppish ways and preference for 
appearance and affectation over substance and virtue (TMS, 66-68). The rich and great, Smith 
argues, are ignorant of the “easy price at which they may acquire […] public admiration” and 
believe that they have accomplished something worthy of recognition (TMS, 66). By merely 
having wealth and displaying it the rich and great are able to attain the admiration of society and 
satisfy their need for attention and recognition. However, this attention and recognition do little 
to provide the rich and great with ease of mind.  In the 6th edition of TMS’ chapter on moral 
corruption, Smith argues that the vain and vulgar rich and great “desire to be praised for what 
they themselves do not think praise-worthy” and that theses “hypocrites of wealth and greatness” 
are often “ashamed of the unfashionable virtues which they sometimes practice in secret, and for 
which they have secretly some degree of real veneration” (TMS, 76-77). Finally, in his harshest 
condemnation of the rich and great, Smith claims that, to enjoy their attention and admiration, 
they “[invoke] in vain the dark and dismal powers of forgetfulness and oblivion” but, even in the 
midst of the “gaudy pomp of the most ostentatious greatness”, these individuals are “pursued by 
the avenging furies of shame and remorse” (TMS, 78). Smith’s criticism of the rich and great—
especially in the final edition—leaves us with a singular picture; these individuals are not as 
happy as they appear to be. The happiness the rich and great appear to enjoy is in actuality a 
dependence on the attention and admiration of others, which comes with a heavy price.314 
 The middle class’ modest station in life is not attached to any vulgar or vain attention 
seeking behaviors. Unlike the foppish dilettantes mocked by Smith, members of the middle class 
are not bound to fashionable displays of wealth or peculiar affectations. Consequently, 
                                                 
313 See Hanley (2009) p.16. 
314 Smith does admit that the rich and great have a greater means to happiness. However, this appears to be wasted 
on their perpetual satisfaction of vanity (TMS, 213).  
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individuals in the middle class are not necessarily exposed to constant shame or remorse. This 
may leave the middle class in an economic condition Smith terms as the “natural and ordinary 
state of mankind” that consists of being healthy, debt-free, and having a clear conscience (TMS, 
57). From this condition an individual may be better suited to attaining the attention and 
admiration of others by pursuing the path of “wisdom and virtue” referenced by Smith in his 
chapter on moral corruption (TMS, 74). Such a path may include the development of the 
“important virtues”: 
He must cultivate these therefore: he must acquire superior knowledge in his profession, 
and superior industry in the exercise of it. He must be patient in labour, resolute in danger, 
and firm in distress. These talents he must bring into public view, by the difficulty, 
importance, and, at the same time, good judgment of his undertakings, and by the severe 
and unrelenting application with which he pursues them. Probity and prudence, generosity 
and frankness, must characterize his behaviour upon all ordinary occasions; and he must, 
at the same time, be forward to engage in all those situations, in which it requires the 
greatest talents and virtues to act with propriety, but in which the greatest applause is to be 
acquired by those who can acquit themselves with honour (TMS, 68).315 
 
These virtues allow an individual to distinguish themselves and attain admiration without 
succumbing to either the impatience the poor experience or the vulgarity and vanity of the rich. 
Hanley (2009) argues that, in outlining this path, Smith is “recommending the prudent path as a 
surer means to distinction than either aristocratic dilettantism or unrestrained political 
ambition”.316 Though the rich and poor are both capable of developing these virtues, it is the 
members of the middle class who are most likely to become virtuous and attain tranquility.  
 Although they may be more susceptible to corruption, the rich and poor are still capable 
of becoming praiseworthy and attaining ease of body and peace of mind. However, given the 
trappings of their economic condition, both the rich and poor are more likely to be corrupted and 
pursue the false telos of riches and greatness. Because of their position between these two 
extremes, the middle class may be capable of avoiding the obstacles that divert the rich and poor 
away from praiseworthiness and tranquility. Though they are still capable of being corrupted, 
individuals in the middle class will have a greater chance of properly following the golden rule 
and achieving self-perfection. Furthermore, the middle class can become praiseworthy without 
                                                 
315 In TMS’ 6th edition these virtues are all subsumed under the cardinal virtue of prudence (TMS, 250-256). 
316 See Hanley (2009) p.111. Hanley also adds that Smith’s students may have been the target of this list of virtues.  
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affecting the opulence of society. However, accomplishing this depends upon political conditions 
that may lie outside of the middle class’ control.   
4.5 The Limits of Political Intervention 
Although the two ends of Nature are at odds with each other politics can play a necessary 
and vital role in ameliorating this tension.317 However, commercial society’s reliance on vanity 
poses a problem for any potential remedy to moral corruption. Because it relies on the anxiety 
(and thus misery) of the rich and poor any solution to corruption in commercial society must 
allow vanity to persist in some way. Accordingly, any political attempt to resolve the problems 
of corruption will be necessarily limited. However, Smith does argue that politics plays a 
fundamental, albeit partial, role in guiding people back towards the voice of Nature and the life 
of praiseworthiness. It is the responsibility of the legislator to protect and preserve commercial 
society and all of its benefits.318 This involves protecting commercial society from the potentially 
harmful influence of moral corruption and its symptoms. In doing so, the legislator can ensure 
that self-perfection will remain both widely accessible and attainable should individuals choose 
to pursue praiseworthiness rather than mere praise. However, because praiseworthiness requires 
benevolence it cannot be imposed on anyone without becoming inconsistent. Thus, a legislator 
may encourage the pursuit of praiseworthiness and development of virtue through policy and 
legislation, but it cannot be enforced.319 
Commercial society is largely preserved through the maintenance of the rules of justice 
and the liberty of markets. This maintenance helps to guarantee the liberty, security, and 
opulence of society and as a result sustains the conditions required for the successful pursuit of 
tranquility. This may be especially important if the vain pursuit of wealth and greatness were to 
become a part of propriety and an intractable feature of everyday life. If it were to become a part 
of propriety the disproportionately self-interested pursuit of fame and greatness, combined with 
                                                 
317 For the role positive law plays in inculcating values see Muller (1995) p.112, Alvey (2003) p.156. Evensky 
(2005) contends that, for Smith, “positive law serves as an active tool for the inculcation of values” p.62.  
318 Smith tasks legislators with abolishing mercantilism and instituting a “natural system of perfect liberty” (WN 
 IV.vii.c.44). In TMS Smith claims that legislators are responsible for “preserving the public peace by restraining 
injustice [and] promoting the prosperity of the commonwealth” (TMS, 96). 
319 Attempting to mandate and enforce benevolence and praiseworthiness would be giving in to the spirit of system 
that breeds tyranny.  
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the love and admiration of the rich and great, may threaten to undermine the rules of justice and 
liberty of markets by disproportionately favoring one group (the rich) over another (the poor).320 
Consequently, the legislator must preserve these, without eradicating the vanity that jeopardizes 
them in the first place. The legislator is thus burdened with protecting a society which appears 
determined to destroy itself.  
In addition to requiring a laissez-faire type of approach to vanity the legislator is 
confronted with another major obstacle. An essential means for remedying corruption, and 
directing individuals back towards praiseworthiness, would be to develop the benevolence of 
individuals so they would be better able to perceive, appreciate, and pursue the golden mean. 
This benevolence would, ideally, counteract the selfishness of the corrupted individual and help 
push them away from vanity and towards praiseworthiness and tranquility. However, according 
to Smith “benevolence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force” (TMS, 95). Consequently, 
the legislator is severely limited in how they might encourage corrupted individuals to develop 
and act upon their more benevolent nature. Smith’s pessimistic attitude towards commercial 
society limits the legislator’s ability to intervene and redirect individuals back towards Nature’s 
providential plan. However, any political intervention will be limited by the need to maintain 
some level of vanity and the inability to compel benevolence. The legislator’s most important 
role in commercial society is the fair and proper administration of the rules of justice. 321   
The most effective means the legislator has in ensuring the proper administration of (and 
respect for) the rules of justice is through the fair and balanced execution of punishment. 
Punishment is essential to justice because it satisfies the sentiments of individuals who have 
experienced injustice and confirms that we live in a fair, secure, society.322 Without punishment 
it is doubtful that the laws of justice would be “tolerably observed” and thus society would cease 
                                                 
320 Though he advocates legislative intervention to maintain the benefits of commercial society, Smith does not 
adequately acknowledge the risks corruption may pose for justice and commerce.  
321 Griswold (1999) points out that trying to generate more benevolence may place too much of a burden on 
individuals. Consequently, the legislator should focus their efforts on the maintenance of justice (p.235). Otteson 
(2002) highlights the essential role justice plays in supporting society, reminding us that other things (i.e. acts of 
benevolence) are ornaments that make society agreeable (p.228).  
322 Punishment resolves the resentment felt over injustice by making violators of justice feel a pain similar to what 
they inflicted on others (TMS, 115). I agree with Haakonssen (1981) argues that justice and punishment focuses on 
the individual but has a distinct social utility (p.88-89). Similarly, Fleischacker (2004) claims that this utility is an 
unintended, albeit beneficial, outcome of treating individuals justly (p.9).  
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to exist (TMS, 106). Smith goes so far as to argue that “mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the 
innocent” (TMS, 107). However, preserving justice means punishing people properly. Properly 
punishing individuals, Smith claims, is the most difficult task assigned to a legislator and 
neglecting this task “exposes the commonwealth to many gross disorders and shocking 
enormities” while “too push it too far is destructive of all liberty, security, and justice” (TMS, 
98-99).  Properly punishing individuals for violating justice presumes some level of equitable 
treatment. Individuals ought to be punished for what they do rather than who they are and what 
class they belong to. More importantly, to treat people justly we must “humble the arrogance of 
[our] self-love” (TMS, 101).323 It is when we pursue our happiness over the happiness of others 
that we are most likely to act unjustly. The selfish and vain desire to be rich and great may 
interfere with the necessary humbling of our self-love and blind us to the potential injuries we 
inflict on others.  Additionally, in a corrupt society it is possible that punishment may reflect our 
love and admiration of the rich and great and our apathy and contempt towards the poor. 
Punishing the poor too severely because we loathe them and the rich to leniently because we love 
them may fail to satisfy the sentiments of victims (and observers) of injustice which could lead to 
factionalism, instability, and even civil war. Consequently, it is essential that the legislator 
protects the sacred rules of justice by properly and equitably punishing its violators and thus 
ensuring that both the political and moral purposes of this “largely negative” virtue are satisfied 
and fulfilled. 
A second, similarly important, task Smith assigns to the legislator is the preservation of 
markets. The legislator must keep the markets free from interference from corporations (e.g. 
guilds) and mercantile interests to ensure they operate in a way that creates general opulence.324 
In doing so the legislator promotes guaranteeing distribution of wealth that guarantees everyone 
has some access to the material wealth required to attain tranquility. Moreover, this distribution 
helps to preserve the liberty required for ease of body and peace of mind. In essence, the 
legislator is tasked with ensuring the proper (i.e. natural) functioning of the invisible hand which 
                                                 
323 Smith does not represent self-love as either vicious or immoral. When it is proportional to our benevolence and 
directed by the golden rule self-love can be praiseworthy and virtuous. However, self-love can become excessive 
and dangerous, especially when we are corrupted or self-deluded.  
324 See WN X.ii for Smith’s criticism of how corporations have reduced competition in employment and thus 
interfered with the freedom of markets.  
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ensures the proper distribution of society’s wealth (TMS, 215).325 Although the invisible hand 
does not work towards creating economic equality it will necessarily ensure that the production 
of opulence in commercial society raises all boats and eradicates the abject poverty endemic to 
all non-commercial societies. However, although the legislator is important to the distribution of 
wealth they are necessarily limited in how they can promote this by the need to preserve some 
level of vanity, anxiety, loneliness, and misery. Finally, to ensure the continued generation of 
opulence, the legislator has to resist the influence of powerful particular interests. Evensky 
(2005) argues that the “powerful self-serving and distorting influences” of particular interests can 
influence government and the necessary distribution of wealth (p.128).326 
 The legislator is largely responsible for preserving the conditions required for the pursuit 
of tranquility and not for promoting tranquility itself. If justice is properly administrated with fair 
punishment and the liberty of markets is preserved, then everyone in society should be capable of 
attaining their telos if they choose to, even if only a few every do. The vast majority of 
individuals may likely continue to live vain lives in pursuit of fame and greatness; however, 
Smith believes this is both good and necessary. The anxious and lonely pursuit of fame and 
greatness will inevitably contribute to the opulence tranquility requires. Additionally, the 
legislator’s ability to overcome corruption is limited by the difficulty of legislating and enforcing 
acts of benevolence.327 If moral corruption indeed makes us disproportionately self-interested to 
the point of selfishness then encouraging the growth of benevolence may be one way of 
remedying it. However, though Smith admits that a legislator can enact rules that entice people 
to behave benevolently this cannot be mandated (TMS, 98). Requiring benevolence, through 
legislation, would transform the desire to contribute to the well-being and happiness of others 
into a self-interested need to obey the government. Legislators can, at best, influence people to 
act benevolently by promoting its benefits but this will have limited effect on people who have 
been thoroughly corrupted. 
                                                 
325 For the role the invisible hand plays in Smith’s historical teleology see Alvey (2003) p.22. See also no.40 
326 See WN I.iix.13 for an example of how the “clamour” of a particular interest can influence legislation.  
327 It can be added that Smith always prioritized the order and security of society over individual happiness and acts 
of benevolence. See Alvey (2003) p.186. 
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 Although political intervention cannot (and should not) eradicate moral corruption it is a 
necessary step in creating the conditions where it is at least possible. Without justice and 
opulence commercial society cannot endure and it is unlikely that many people could 
successfully pursue tranquility. Moreover, without some political guidance commercial society 
may be incapable of providing even the limited benefits that make it superior to every other 
society, real or imagined. Consequently, the legislator plays a vital role in balancing Nature’s 
two conflicting ends. Punishing the unjust, preserving the freedom of the markets, and promoting 
acts of benevolence helps to ensure some people will attain ease of body and peace of mind even 
while most do not. Thus, while the conflict between ends may never disappear it can be softened 
in order to ensure some individuals (i.e. the middle class) are capable of using their consciences 
to identify and pursue praiseworthiness rather than adhering to mere propriety and live a life of 
tranquility. 
Conclusion  
Smith’s theory of moral corruption adds an unavoidable pessimistic component to his 
characterization of commercial society. Misery is no longer understood as an unfortunate, 
potentially avoidable, side effect but as a necessary force. This creates a conflict between 
Nature’s two ends. The people most likely to suffer the consequences of this conflict are the rich 
and poor. Commercial society can only exist and operate if the majority of these people are vain, 
anxious, and miserable. It is worth noting that this rich and poor will experience this misery 
differently. However, the miserable condition of the poor might be more worthy of our sympathy 
than the rich. Nevertheless, Smith continues to support commercial society, albeit on different 
grounds. No longer convinced that it is entirely compatible with the pursuit of tranquility, Smith 
supports commercial society on the grounds that it is far superior to any other existing society or 
any we might construct in our imagination. Smith invariably concludes that it is better to stick 
with commercial society, despite its flaws, than it would be to try and erect a completely novel, 
perfect, society. Finally, Smith retains the hope that at least one part of the population will have a 
clear path to their telos despite society’s need for the vain pursuit of wealth and greatness. The 
middle class, Smith argues, are ideally positioned to continue pursuing praiseworthiness even 
when those around them are necessarily diverted away from this. The middle class’ can continue 
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listening to the voice of Nature without jeopardizing the operation of commercial society and its 
beneficial consequences.  
 This pessimism has implications that reach beyond Smith’s support for commercial 
society. Smith’s eventual prescription for curing moral corruption and redirecting individuals 
back towards their natural telos reflects the conflict between Nature’s two ends. Commercial 
society is—and should be—too entrenched to replace. Moreover, commercial society depends on 
the vanity of the rich and poor and thus any solution to corruption cannot be entirely 
comprehensive. Thus, any potential political attempt to eliminate corruption would be 
necessarily limited. A more targeted solution to the false teleology created by the gaudy and 
glittering lifestyle of the rich and great is required. This solution would leave at least some vanity 
in place so that everyone can continue to enjoy the benefits of commercial society. Smith 
provides a solution, primarily aimed at the middle class, which seeks to redirect the reader’s 
conscience away from a corrupt love of praise and back towards praiseworthiness. This solution 














The Therapy of Nature 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 The most substantial addition to TMS’ final edition is Smith’s inclusion of Part VI Of the 
Character of Virtue.  Within this addition Smith explains how an individual can live a life of 
praiseworthiness and tranquility in a society that perpetuates and profits from vanity and misery. 
The virtues outlined by Smith in Part VI provide the teleological content to praiseworthiness that 
allows our consciences to become authoritative and independent of propriety. The three virtues 
that make up these standards of praiseworthiness are prudence, benevolence, and self-command. 
These three virtues are the qualities of character we develop when we consistently follow the 
golden rule and which—when properly developed—bring us lasting tranquility. When an 
individual successfully develops all three of these qualities of character they will attain the 
wealth and security required for ease of body and the mutual sympathy that brings peace of 
mind. Consequently, these virtues represent the completion of Smith’s teleology. It is our pursuit 
of praiseworthiness (i.e. self-perfection) that directs us towards these virtues and ultimately 
makes us truly happy. Additionally, these virtues are recommended to us by Nature and thus our 
impartial spectator will direct us to these when it speaks to us with the voice of Nature rather 
than conventional propriety. Smith’s theory of virtue (i.e. his conception of eudaimonia) 
represents a life lived in accordance with Nature. Part VI of TMS contains Smith’s attempt to 
cure the reader of any potential corruption and redirect our consciences back towards the 
providential plan of the Author of Nature by persuading us to soften our self-interest, develop 
gratitude, and control our passions. Rather than transforming commercial society, Smith attempts 
to overcome the problem of corruption by encouraging us to develop the personal virtues that 
will make us happy while also contributing to the happiness of others. The development of 
prudence, benevolence, and self-command should soften the effects of vanity without eradicating 
it, thus allowing commercial society to continue to provide the conditions required for 
tranquility.   
 Part VI of TMS completes the 6th edition’s theory of self-perfection. The virtues outlined 
by Smith in this part simultaneously provide our conscience with the standards of 
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praiseworthiness required to attain tranquility while also providing a remedy for moral 
corruption. To accomplish these the virtues of prudence, benevolence, and self-command need to 
be distinct from (and superior to) the flawed and potentially corrupt standards of conventional 
propriety. Several authors have linked Smith’s virtues to propriety. For instance, Griswold 
connects the virtues present in Part VI to propriety and argues that Smith saw virtue as the 
“proper government and direction of all our affections”.328 Later Griswold reasserts the 
connection between virtue and propriety by arguing that the former is based on the 
“reasonableness” of a sentiment or action.329 Otteson echoes Griswold’s claims, arguing that the 
virtues in TMS are a part of propriety.330 The conflation of virtue with propriety ignores the 
distinctions made by Smith in TMS. Smith first distinguishes virtue from propriety by arguing 
the former is “uncommonly great and beautiful” while characterizing the latter as “vulgar and 
ordinary” (TMS, 32). Smith goes further by adding that the virtues deserve to be “admired and 
celebrated” while propriety merely deserves “to be approved of” (Ibid). Later, in Part VI, Smith 
reaffirms this distinction by outlining two standards of judgment. The standards of judgment that 
lead to virtue are defined as the “perfection”, while the second (i.e. propriety) is defined as “that 
degree of approximation to [perfection] which is commonly attained in the world” (TMS, 
291).331 Forman-Barzilai has provided a useful definition of virtue which I believe is more true to 
Smith’s distinction, claiming that it is “an imaginary perfection that [stands] somehow beyond 
sociology for Smith, outside of history, serving as a transcendent model” for shaping our own 
character.332 This definition is consistent with the differences between virtue and propriety as 
well as the contingent teleology I have outlined in previous chapters.  
 Prudence, benevolence, and self-command are all essential to our praiseworthy pursuit of 
tranquility. Outlining what these virtues are and how they contribute to our ease of body and 
peace of mind is an important step in connecting them to the potential standards of 
                                                 
328 See Griswold (1999) p.181.  
329 Ibid. p.183. 
330 See Otteson (2002) p.246. 
331 Smith attaches the term “exact propriety” to his first standard of perfection and in doing so contributes to the 
conflation of virtue and propriety. However, the language used here and the context of the argument, I believe, make 
it clear that Smith is referring to something different than the standards of “mere propriety”. Montes (2004) has 
pointed out the different ways Smith defines propriety in TMS (p.12). Likewise, Macfie (1967) accuses Smith of a 
“spread of meaning”, often changing the meaning of words, or vaguely defining terms to the point of self-
contradiction (p.58).   
332 See Forman-Barzilai (2010) p.108. 
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praiseworthiness. Montes offers a civic humanist reading that emphasizes the virtue of self-
command by linking it directly to Machiavellian virtù.333 According to Montes self-command is 
the only character trait that is inherently virtuous and is entirely responsible for making prudence 
and benevolence truly virtuous.  However, Montes’ interpretation is based upon a 
misunderstanding of self-command. Although this self-command is always admirable, Smith is 
clear that it is not always virtuous. Some of the “greatest criminals” are capable of great self-
command, but Smith argues that this does not make their horrible accomplishments worthy of 
the term “virtuous” (TMS, 282).334 Furthermore, although there are definitive political 
components to Smith’s virtues I do not believe he should be understood as a civic republican. 
Instead I agree with Hanley that the virtues correspond to our role as human beings and not 
specifically as citizens.335 Such a reading is consistent with my argument from the previous 
chapter that the ends of society and the ends of humanity are not necessarily aligned. Brown 
echoes the apolitical nature of Smith’s virtue ethics, concluding that Smith’s virtues are derived 
“from the intensely private and internalized morality of the Stoics”.336 Brown subsequently 
divides the virtues into the “truly moral virtues” of self-command and benevolence and the 
“lower-order virtues” of prudence and justice.337 Although the latter have an identifiable political 
dimension to them Brown argues that benevolence and self-command lack a “participatory 
dimension” and thus should not be considered political or civic.338 Brown characterizes 
benevolence and self-command as “truly virtuous” because of their reliance the dialogic 
conscience.339 Other readings of TMS’ Part VI focus on the other cardinal virtues. For instance, 
McCloskey labels Smith’s virtues as “bourgeois” because of their specific economic elements, 
especially those contained within prudence.340 It is possible to have one (or even two) of the 
virtues without the others. A prudent, benevolent, or self-commanding person may be worthy of 
                                                 
333 See Montes (2004) p.111. 
334 Montes also divorces Machiavellian virtù from its role in providing security and glory for the patria. 
335 See Hanley (2009) p.25. 
336 See Brown (1994) p.184. 
337 Brown p.4. 
338 Brown p.184. 
339 Brown, p.29. 




respect and some level of admiration. However, to be praiseworthy and attain tranquility all three 
virtues should coexist and complement each other.  
 Unlike propriety, the main impetus for pursuing virtue is not to attain the approval of 
others but to satisfy the conditions of tranquility. Smith establishes this in the Introduction to Part 
VI when he states that that “When we consider the character of any individual, we naturally view 
it under two aspects; first, as it may affect his own happiness; and secondly, as it may affect that 
of other people” (TMS, Part VI, Intro). This reflects our self-interested and benevolent first 
principles, discussed at length in Chapter Two. Later in the Conclusion, Smith reinforces 
introductory claim by arguing that “concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue 
of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and benevolence; of which, 
the one restrains us from hurting, the other prompts us to promote that happiness [of others]” 
(TMS, 308). Thus, the goal of the virtues outlined by Smith is to help individuals reach their 
natural telos (i.e. tranquility). Accordingly, prudence, benevolence, and self-command are 
recommended to us by the Author of Nature. We discover and develop these virtues when we 
adhere to the golden rule, spoken to us by the voice of Nature.  
 In addition to being a means for attaining our telos, Part VI of TMS’ 6th edition is also a 
remedy for the moral corruption created by our admiration and emulation of the rich and great. 
Accordingly, in addition to outlining what prudence, benevolence, and self-command are, Smith 
also attempts to persuade us to develop them. Accordingly, Griswold argues that Smith’s use of 
the “protreptic ‘we’” is his attempt to convince the reader to adopt the virtues of prudence, 
benevolence, and self-command.341 Similarly, Hanley argues that Smith utilizes an “ennobling 
rhetoric” to relieve the reader of corruption and redirect them towards virtue and happiness.342 
Throughout his discussion of the virtues Smith emphasizes the material and psychological 
rewards of a virtuous life. However, to successfully develop the virtues (and thus to become truly 
praiseworthy and tranquil) we must first be cured of our vanity and subsequent love of praise. 
Smith spends a significant portion of Part VI criticizing vanity, at one point accusing vain 
                                                 
341 Griswold himself is critical of dialogic readings of TMS, arguing that they rely on too many assumptions about 
authorial intent (p.27-28). However, his reliance on the “protreptic ‘we’” presupposes Smith is speaking directly 
with the reader in an effort to change their moral attitudes and understandings. Consequently, Griswold accepts 
some form of dialogue between Smith and the reader.  
342 See esp p.86-99 for Hanley’s analysis of how rhetoric can ennoble self-love.  
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individuals of being incapable of sincerity (TMS, 300). Smith later reminds us that vain people 
are perpetually dissatisfied due to their “continual dread of shame” (TMS, 307). The criticism of 
vanity found in Part VI may potentially be a part of Smith’s attempt to cure the reader of their 
love of praise. Whether or not this is an effective tactic at discouraging vanity is disputable. 
However, that Smith saw fit to include his most detailed criticism of vanity alongside his 
discussion of virtue may suggest that Smith recognized the conflict between corruption and 
virtue and saw a need to redirect our conscience back towards praiseworthiness.  
 The purpose of the golden rule is to perfect our moral faculties by softening and 
moderating our self-interest while simultaneously increasing our benevolence.343 When we 
adhere to the demands of the golden rule we follow the Author of Nature’s providential plan and 
become praiseworthy individuals. Smith’s treatment of the three virtues in Part VI of TMS’ 6th 
edition reflects the approach to self-perfection. Prudence moderates our self-interested 
sentiments and by doing so helps us pursue and attain the wealth required for what Smith refers 
to as “secure tranquility” (TMS, 254). Unlike the poor man’s son, who anxiously pursues great 
wealth, the prudent individual is capable of pursuing and attaining wealth, and the attention that 
comes with this, without sacrificing any present ease, enjoyment, or happiness (TMS, 253-254). 
Consequently, prudence is a viable alternative to the anxious desire to be rich and great. 
Cultivating prudence is the necessary first step in redirecting individuals away from corrupted 
propriety and towards their natural telos. Only after our self-interest has been reconditioned to 
appreciate what truly makes us happy can we begin to conform to the Author of Nature’s 
providential plan.  
 The next necessary step in redirecting our conscience back to praiseworthiness and the 
golden rule is the cultivation of our benevolent sentiments and the subsequent contribution to the 
happiness of other people. As expressed at the very beginning of TMS, benevolence requires us 
to contribute to the happiness of others with no necessary expectation of reward (TMS, 13). To 
encourage the proper cultivation of our benevolent sentiments Smith recommends developing 
bonds of affections with others so we can properly contribute to their well-being. By building 
strong bonds of affection with family, friends, and fellow citizens we can properly contribute to 
                                                 
343 See Muller (1993) p.111. 
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the happiness of others and to our own praiseworthy pursuit of tranquility (TMS, 258-273). To 
cultivate these benevolent relationships Smith encourages us to cultivate our sentiment of 
gratitude. A properly gracious person contributes to the happiness of others through acts of 
kindness (i.e. acts of benevolence) (TMS, 266). By promoting and perpetuating acts of kindness 
gratitude contributes to our own pursuit of tranquility while also eliminating any loneliness 
caused by corruption. Increasing our benevolent via gratitude brings our consciences back in line 
with the golden rule and the Author of Nature’s plan. Consequently, the development of 
gratitude (and the relationships it fosters) is essential to our pursuit of praiseworthiness and 
tranquility.  
 Self-command is the final virtue in Smith’s natural therapy. Self-command is the 
character trait responsible for controlling the passions and ensuring we consistently and 
continuously adhere to the golden rule. Unlike the other virtues self-command is not directly 
connected to our nature (i.e. our first principles). Instead, Smith represents self-command as an 
artificial virtue, difficult to learn yet essential to our pursuit of tranquility (TMS, 282). Self-
command contributes to our teleological pursuit by arming us against the temptations to veer 
away from the golden rule. An individual with self-command is capable of consistently 
controlling their passions and thus able to place long-term happiness and success ahead of short 
term pleasures. This helps to ensure the individual’s adherence to prudence. Similarly, self-
command helps us maintain our benevolence when we are tempted to indulge our self-interest. 
Moreover, self-command may act as a bulwark against corruption; helping us determine true 
happiness from its mere appearance and preventing our passions from leading us astray. 
Consequently, of self-command completes our teleological pursuit of praiseworthiness and 
tranquility therapy by helping our prudence and benevolence endure the many temptations 
inherent in (and necessary to) commercial society. 
 Part VI of TMS’ 6th edition contains Smith’s attempts to redirect our authoritative 
conscience away from the corruptive conventions of society and towards our natural telos. Smith 
encourages us to moderate our self-interest by developing prudence and increase our 
benevolence by becoming properly gracious. If commercial society is properly ordered and 
secure these virtues should provide individuals with ease of body and peace of mind that Nature 
designed us to pursue. Furthermore, when a person possesses self-command they should be able 
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to maintain their prudence and benevolence, and resist the temptations of a gaudy and glittering 
lifestyle. In commercial society everyone should be capable of pursuing and attaining 
tranquility.344 However, although everyone in commercial society is capable of attaining 
tranquility, it seems more likely that only a few exceptional individuals (i.e. the wise) ever 
will.345 The successful pursuit of tranquility may rely more on good fortune than Smith is willing 
to admit. The individuals Smith believes are most likely to become virtuous and happy are the 
so-called “inferior and middling stations” of commercial society (TMS, 75). Here Smith appears 
to be referring to the people within commercial society who are neither very poor nor very rich. 
These individuals have sufficient wealth and opportunity the poor are lacking while also 
avoiding the distractions and trappings that keep the rich from becoming virtuous (Ibid). The 
three cardinal virtues discussed by Smith all contribute to our tranquility in their own ways. Each 
of these virtues plays a necessary role in securing the pre-conditions for ease of body and peace 
of mind. Moreover, to properly attain and sustain tranquility we need to develop and exercise all 
three of these virtues. Though it is possible to be prudent without being benevolent (or vice 
versa) or to be self-commanding without being prudent none of these virtues, on their own, will 
bring us happiness (i.e. tranquility). Thus it is essential to demonstrate how these virtues bring 
about the conditions of tranquility but also how they work with—and in support of—each other. 
Consequently, giving priority to one virtue over the others will not adequately explain what 
happiness is or how it is properly attained. 
 
5.1 Proper Self-interest 
Prudence is the first virtue Smith discusses in Part VI of TMS. Prudence is the virtue 
developed when we cultivate proper self-interest through adherence to the golden rule.346 In 
defining this self-interested virtue Smith claims that 
                                                 
344 Fleischacker (2005) argues that everyone in commercial society is capable of attaining virtue but only very few 
will actually do so (p.78). 
345 Although it is only a special few may ever develop the virtues this is not predetermined by social class. Forman-
Barzilai (2010) argues that, like Cicero, Smith believed even the “vulgar” could “approximate” virtue and live a 
happy, tranquil, life (p.108). |Additionally, Otteson (2002) argues that most people can reach the very basics for 
human happiness without ever attaining virtue (p.235). This may be true in principle, but in practice the morally 
corrupt may find happiness more elusive.  
346 Fleischacker (2005) characterizes prudence as phronesis arguing that it is the “intellectual virtue by which one 
judges well of the appropriate means to action” (p.66). This is an exaggerated claim that neglects Smith’s 
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The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and reputation of the individual, the 
objects upon which his comfort and happiness in this life are supposed principally to 
depend, is considered as the proper business of that virtue which is commonly called 
Prudence (TMS, 251).347 
 
Prudence thus deals with both the material and psychological goods necessary for happiness.348 
However, the first principle of prudence is security which ensures that we properly avoid any 
unnecessary hazards while trying to acquire these goods (Ibid).  Smith demonstrates how 
prudence supplies these necessary material and psychological goods and avoids hazards by 
providing a sketch of the “prudent man”.349 Among other things the prudent man is primarily 
wise, honest, modest and respectful (TMS, 251-254). It is through qualities such as these that the 
prudent man is capable of bettering their condition and satisfying their self-interest. Finally, what 
ultimately directs us towards prudence is Nature. Nature has designed us so that we might 
recognize and pursue prudence from an early age. Consequently, we develop prudence when we 
consistently listen to the voice of Nature and adhere to the golden rule. 
In the opening passage of TMS’s section on prudence Smith argues that “[the] 
preservation and healthful state of the body seem to be the objects which Nature first 
recommends to the care of every individual” (TMS, 250). It is this first natural recommendation 
that drives us towards prudence. Accordingly, we have “appetites of hunger and thirst, the 
agreeable or disagreeable sensations of pleasure and pain, of heat and cold &c” (Ibid). Smith 
adds that these are “lessons delivered by the voice of Nature herself, directing him what he ought 
to chuse, and what he ought to avoid for this purpose” (Ibid). Nature has thus given us these 
fundamental appetites and sensations so that can perceive what will satisfy or dissatisfy this first 
recommended principle and ultimately so that we may know what is prudent. Our first 
experiences with the fundamentals of prudence are as children. During this stage of our lives we 
are held in the immediacy of the appetites and sensations and we preserve and maintain 
                                                 
introduction of prudence as a virtue. While prudence may obviously require phronesis Smith makes it clear that this 
virtue deals specifically with self-interest.  
347 Because it targets happiness prudence (i.e. self-love) is not incompatible with virtue. Thus, Fleischacker argues 
that “self-betterment and vanity are not the same thing” (p.113). Accordingly, Griswold (1999) argues that prudence 
is what bridges WN and TMS (p.203). 
348 Griswold splits prudence’s objectives into two. The first goal of prudence is security while the second aim is 
fortune and reputation (p.205).  
349 Griswold describes this prudent man as “cautious, frugal, parsimonious, polite, decent, capable of friendship, not 
particularly passionate, reliable” (Ibid).  
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ourselves and our health by reacting to them. Consequently, Smith argues that “The first lessons 
which he is taught by those whom his childhood is entrusted, tend, the greater part of them, to 
the same purpose. Their principal object is to teach him how to keep out of harm’s way” (Ibid).  
In other words, parents are tasked with properly directing their children’s initial, nascent 
prudence away from what is harmful and (perhaps indirectly) towards what is pleasurable. 
 As we grow older, Smith argues, our ability to act prudently changes. Eventually we 
mature and gain the ability of foresight and this foresight allows us to accomplish with prudence 
than merely avoiding harm from moment to moment. As young children we were locked into the 
immediacy of these appetites and sensations, capable of satisfying or avoiding them only as 
opportunities presented themselves. However, with the capacity of foresight we not only 
recognize what satisfies our appetite and sensations we can also make a plan for how to satisfy 
them over time. Moreover, foresight allows us to maximize the satisfaction of our appetites and 
sensations over time. Smith argues that foresight, combined with care, transforms prudence into 
“the art of preserving and increasing what is called […] external fortune” (TMS, 250). Foresight 
thus expands the goal of prudence and changes it from a concern with immediate satisfaction and 
into one of continuous and perpetual satisfaction. It is through this transition that prudence 
begins to take the shape of a virtue. However, before our prudence can become completely 
virtuous it needs to be applied to more specifically psychological needs. Even after being 
transformed by foresight Smith argues that prudence is still focused on supplying the “necessities 
and conveniences of the body” so that we might effectively satisfy our appetites and sensations 
(Ibid). However, we inevitably develop a desire to attain the respect and esteem of others. 
Accordingly, Smith argues that “[the] desire of becoming the proper objects of this respect, of 
deserving and obtaining this credit and rank among our equals” is the psychological desire 
ultimately animates our prudence and pushes us beyond merely acquiring the basic necessities 
and conveniences of life and towards acquiring fortune (TMS, 250-251).This fully transforms 
prudence into a virtue that secures our self-interested well-being in the present while also 
maximizing it over time.    
To act prudently an individual requires a specific type of wisdom. In his discussion of 
prudence, Smith engages with the reader in an attempt to cultivate this wisdom. The wisdom he 
persuades us to develop is a potential cure for the anxious—and potentially reckless—desire to 
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be rich and great. The prudent person is wise enough to live within their income, slowly 
accumulating more and more wealth without sacrificing ease of body (TMS, 253). As a result 
this individual has “no anxiety to change so comfortable a situation” and is actually capable of 
enjoying the “secure tranquility” that wealth affords us (TMS, 254). Smith’s discussion of 
prudence attempts guide us back to the things which will contribute to real and lasting happiness 
while also assuring them they will increase their fortune and reputation in the process, albeit 
gradually. Accordingly, the wisdom associated with prudence is economic in nature. Prudential 
wisdom focuses on providing and securing the materials necessary for ease of body and by doing 
so also contributes to the prudent person’s peace of mind by securing reputation, esteem, and 
respect.  
To successfully encourage the reader to develop the wisdom required of prudence Smith 
encourages us to be honest and sincere in their pursuit of knowledge. The “prudent man’, 
explains Smith, “always studies seriously and earnestly to understand whatever he professes to 
understand, and not merely to persuade other people that he understands it” (TMS, 251). The 
prudent individual thus seeks to truly know what they claim to know regardless of how 
unpersuasive and unspectacular this knowledge may be. Smith argues that the prudent individual 
“may not always appear very brilliant” but, because their approach to knowledge is genuine, they 
always avoid being an “artful imposter”, “assuming pedant”, or a “superficial and impudent 
pretender” (Ibid). This modesty and humility may act as a counterweight to the vain love of 
praise encouraged by commercial society, helping the prudent person recognize and pursue 
praiseworthiness. Although the prudent individual may have limited and modest knowledge and 
understanding, they are never a fraud and they never pretend to know something they do not 
understand. Instead a prudent person focuses wholeheartedly on what they do (and can) 
understand. As a consequence this individual is not easily led astray and into unfamiliar 
enterprises that could potentially jeopardize their security. Instead they focus their attention and 
understanding (however modest) on pursuits they are capable of truly grasping and in doing so 
are capable of properly securing (and increasing) their material well-being and reputation.  
The specific wisdom inherent in prudence thus helps to remedy corruption by giving the 
individual a means to determine what will contribute to their self-interested desire to improve 
their condition and what will be hazardous to it. This includes avoiding the political games the 
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rich and great frequently engage in. Smith stresses that the prudent individual wisely avoids any 
and all affairs and responsibilities that do not concern them by arguing that the prudent 
individual refuses to “subject [them]self to any responsibility which [their] duty does not impose 
on [them]” and adds that this person is “averse to enter into any party disputes, hates faction, and 
[are] not always very forward to listen to the voice even of noble and great ambition” (TMS, 
254). The prudent person is not tempted by greatness and does not seek to involve themselves in 
any affairs which do not immediately concern them or only serve to satisfy ambition. However, 
this does not mean that prudence is entirely apolitical; a prudent person readily accepts their 
political duties when called upon but, Smith argues, refuses to “force [them]self” into politics 
merely to satisfy the “vain splendour of successful ambition” (Ibid). The prudent person may 
thus be less likely to pursue greatness merely for the sake of gratifying a vain desire for 
groundless praise. Though praiseworthiness may demand some political engagement and 
obligation, these will not be pursued out of pure self-interest. 
By encouraging us to develop prudence, Smith aims to direct our conscience away from 
the anxious and vain pursuit of wealth and greatness. Simultaneously he attempts to direct us 
towards the real sources of secure tranquility. In doing so Smith does not try to ignore or erase 
our self-interested nature. Rather, his goal is to soften and moderate our self-interest so we can 
more successfully satisfy the requirements of tranquility. Furthermore, by redirecting and 
moderating our self-interest we may be more apt to obey the benevolent commands of our 
impartial spectator and thus more likely to adhere to the golden rule. However, mere wisdom 
may not be enough to rid us of the vain desire for wealth and greatness. Smith furthers his 
remedy for corruption by rounding out his sketch of the prudent individual. As well as being 
wise the prudent individual is also honest, frugal, respectful, modest, and disposed to 
contentment. The prudent individual, Smith argues, is “always sincere, and feels horror at the 
very thought of exposing himself to the disgrace which attends upon the detection of falsehood” 
(TMS, 252).350  
                                                 
350 However, although the prudent individual is always honest they are not always forthcoming. According to Smith 
prudence requires that we keep some things to ourselves unless we are called upon to offer the whole truth (TMS, 
252). What this conditional truth-telling implies about the relationship between commercial society and honesty may 
be worthy of discussion elsewhere. For the moment I would suggest that the prudent person is only honest and 
forthcoming insofar as these do not hinder the pursuit of tranquility. Should the full truth threaten either our ease of 
body or peace of mind then it is prudent to keep to ourselves unless we find ourselves in a situation which demands 
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The final piece of Smith’s sketch of the prudent individual is the ability to live within 
ones means. To accomplish this we develop and exercise frugality.   The goal of frugality is to 
ensure both our short term and long term happiness by ensuring we do not live outside our 
present means nor try to anxiously change our fortune. Accordingly, Smith argues that prudent 
individual should be “steadily sacrificing the ease and enjoyment of the present moment for the 
probable expectation of the still greater ease and enjoyment of a more distant but more lasting 
period of time” (TMS, 253). In other words, the prudent person is frugal so that they might 
acquire greater fortune in the future and improve their ease of body and peace of mind. However, 
in sacrificing present ease and enjoyment for future gains the prudent individual does not forego 
present happiness. The prudent person is still able to be happy in the present because, Smith 
claims, this person sees the present and the future through the same lens (Ibid.). The prudent 
individual secures increased ease and enjoyment in the future by making sacrifices in the present 
while simultaneously acquiring ease and enjoyment in the present from the knowledge of this 
(TMS, 253). Additionally, Smith believes frugality helps the prudent person live entirely within 
their means by giving them the “double satisfaction” of living at ease while also knowing that 
their situation is gradually improving over time (Ibid.). Due to this double satisfaction, the 
prudent person should not develop the anxiety attributed to the poor man’s son. Prudence and its 
associated characteristics all contribute to the moderation and proper direction of our desire to 
better our condition and thus all play a role in securing tranquility. By encouraging us to become 
prudent, Smith hopes to keep our desire to improve our condition from becoming anxious. 
Prudence, Smith contends, can more reliably satisfy our self-interested pursuits than vanity and 
is thus far more likely to lead us to happiness than the pursuit of riches and greatness.  
 
Self-interest is essential to the survival of the individual and the human species. 
Consequently, we cannot hope to attain tranquility without some measure of self-interest. The 
goal of prudence is not to eliminate self-interest but to soften it and direct it towards proper 
things. In the final edition of TMS Smith attempts to direct the reader’s conscience away from 
                                                 
full honest disclosure. Smith is not clear on what circumstances require full disclosure of the truth but we can easily 
speculate about this and ideally the prudent individual would know such situations when confronted with them. 
What is clear is that the prudent person should use the truth instrumentally to aid in their pursuit of happiness, even 
if they have to lie by omission. 
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the anxious desire to be rich and great and back towards the golden rule and the voice of Nature. 
Smith contends that the careful and consistent exercise of prudence will fulfill our self-interest in 
a safe and dignified way. Thus, the prudent individual avoids anxiety and the subsequent misery 
this creates. Furthermore, Smith characterizes prudence as a simple virtue anyone can develop. 
Prudence is both an accessible virtue and an attainable one. In commercial society even the 
“meanest labourers” should have access to enough wealth to develop the prudence required for 
tranquility. Consequently, the reader of TMS can be confident in their ability to develop 
prudence regardless of the status, class, or natural abilities. More importantly, prudence paves 
the way for the development of benevolence and the subsequent perfection of our nature. 
Whereas a corrupted individual may be consumed by the selfish pursuit of wealth and greatness 
a prudent person may be more willing and able to hear and obey the benevolent commands of 
their impartial spectator. A prudent person may be more likely to hear the voice of Nature clearly 
and thus more likely to know and adhere to the dictates of the golden rule.  
 
3.2 Circles of Benevolence 
 The second virtue included in TMS’ path of self-perfection is benevolence. Benevolence 
is produced (and defined) by our natural propensity to contribute to the well-being and happiness 
of others. The development of benevolence is essential to our adherence to the golden rule and 
pursuit of tranquility. The key to this development is gratitude. Gratitude allows us to develop 
the relationships of affection necessary to our exercise of benevolence. Thus, a properly gracious 
person will develop the benevolence required for recognizing and adhering to the golden rule and 
living a life of praiseworthiness and tranquility.351 Similarly, benevolence may also be a remedy 
for the loneliness caused by moral corruption. Whereas Smith’s discussion of prudence intends 
to moderate the reader’s self-interest his discussion of benevolence aims at increasing our second 
first principle.352 According to Smith, benevolence deals specifically with how the “character of 
every individual, so far as it can affect the happiness of other people” (TMS, 257). Put another 
way, the virtue of benevolence outlines when we are required to help someone else by 
                                                 
351 Muller (1993) argues that we perfect our nature and become morally superior when we promote our benevolence 
and use it to restrain our selfishness (p.111). Hanley (2009) makes a similar argument. It is important to note that 
benevolence does not eclipse our self-interest. Instead, the development of benevolence helps balance our self-
interest and directs it towards proper things. 
352 See TMS, 13 and Chapter Two of this work. 
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contributing to their happiness. The proper care for, and contribution to, the happiness and well-
being of others supports our pursuit of tranquility by promoting mutual sympathy and thus peace 
of mind.  
 
We develop proper benevolence when we cultivate and express our gratitude.353 The 
more gracious we are the more we will contribute to the happiness and well-being of other 
people. Smith divides his treatment of benevolence into three different parts, all of which depend 
on the gracious desire to improve the lives of others. Smith’s discussion focuses on different 
“spheres” of benevolence determined by degrees of appropriate affection for others. Smith 
defines affection as “nothing but habitual sympathy” and goes on to explain that “[our] concern 
for the happiness or misery of those who are the objects of our affections; our desire to promote 
the one, and prevent the other; are either the actual feeling of that habitual sympathy, or the 
necessary consequences of that feeling” (TMS, 260). Affection plays some role in determining 
who receives our gratitude and subsequently our benevolence, and is most commonly produced 
by proximity but also includes dependency and efficacy. Consequently, Smith outlines how our 
character affects the happiness of the people who are naturally closest to us (i.e. our family). 
After the members of our family our benevolence reaches our friends. Finally, Smith argues that 
our benevolence extends to “[our] state or sovereignty” (TMS, 268). These three spheres of 
benevolence encompass three different roles the virtuous individual ought to develop; family 
member, friend, and citizen.354 By encouraging the reader to adopt these roles Smith helps to 
relieve us of our loneliness and redirect our conscience back towards the voice of Nature. Similar 
to his analysis of prudence Smith demonstrates the natural origin, development, and progression 
of benevolence. The Author of Nature has made us benevolent so that we can successfully attain 
our telos.  
Cultivating our benevolence within the three spheres outlined by Smith is essential to 
overcoming the loneliness created by our pursuit of wealth and greatness and consequently to our 
                                                 
353 Muller (1993) argues that we perfect our nature and become morally superior when we promote our benevolence 
and use it to restrain our selfishness (p.111). Hanley (2009) makes a similar argument. It is important to note that 
benevolence does not eclipse our self-interest. Instead, the development of benevolence helps balance our self-
interest and directs it towards proper (i.e. praiseworthy) things. 
354 Forman-Barzilai (2010) associates the Stoic concept of oikeiôsis with Smith’s understanding of benevolence. 
Thus, she argues that, for Smith, “human affection is spatially oriented concentrically around the self” p.37.   
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successful pursuit of tranquility. Without benevolence we are unlikely to acknowledge and 
adhere to the golden rule and become praiseworthy individuals. Furthermore, contributing to the 
happiness of others is a necessary component of our own happiness and our own peace of mind 
requires mutual sympathy. Receiving gratitude when we have acted benevolently satisfies our 
desire for mutual sympathy, confirms we are worthy of praise, and contributes to our ease of 
mind. To receive gratitude we must develop the bonds of affection that allow us to act 
benevolently. According to Smith:  
to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue […]Virtue is not 
said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its 
own gratitude; but because it excites those sentiments in other men. The consciousness that 
it [i.e. virtue] is the object of such favourable regards, is the source of that inward 
tranquillity and self-satisfaction with which it is naturally attended, as the suspicion of the 
contrary gives occasion to the torments of vice. What so great happiness as to be beloved, 
and to know that we deserve to be beloved? (TMS, 136)   
 
Gratitude is thus essential to our development of virtue and successful pursuit of tranquility. To 
be a truly praiseworthy person one must earn and deserve the gratitude of others. Additionally, 
though gratitude is not necessary to the survival of the species, it does play a role in making our 
continued survival bearable and desirable. The “ornaments” of society are all products of 
gracious behavior.  
 
Gratitude is defined as the desire to reward actions that have contributed to the happiness 
and well-being of other people. Within the final edition of TMS Smith presents gratitude as 
necessary to our successful pursuit of our telos. Gratitude, Smith explains, is one of our most 
powerful and necessary sentiments and without it we could not hope to develop and exercise 
proper benevolence. He claims that “[of] all persons […] whom nature points out for our peculiar 
benevolence, there are none to whom it seems more properly directed than to those whose 
benevolence we have ourselves already experienced” (TMS, 266). Smith goes on to add that 
“Nature, which formed men for that mutual kindness, so necessary for their happiness, renders 
every man the peculiar object of kindness, to the persons to whom he himself has been kind” 
(Ibid). However, Smith also notes that people who have been kind to others also deserve our 
gratitude, stating that “[when] we see one man assisted, protected, relieved, by another, our 
sympathy with the joy of the persons who receives the benefit [animates] our fellow-feeling with 
his gratitude towards him who bestows it” (TMS, 85). We owe our gratitude to anyone who has 
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intentionally contributed to our happiness (TMS, 82). Smith further adds that, when someone has 
acted benevolently towards us, “it does not content our gratitude […] till we ourselves have been 
instrumental in promoting [their] happiness” and until we reciprocate we will “feel ourselves still 
loaded with the debt of past services laid upon us” (TMS, 82-83). Failing to return kindness with 
kindness—or benevolence with benevolence—thus conflicts with ease of mind by loading us 
with a perceived debt of gratitude. Even though the person who has been kind to us cannot 
demand that we return the favor our conscience (so long as it has not been entirely corrupted) 
will urge us to repay them with some form of benevolence. Smith adds that we owe a debt of 
gratitude our sovereignty since it has contributed the most to our happiness and well-being. 
Smith claims that “[all] constitutions of government […] are valued only in proportion as they 
tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them” (TMS, 216). We repay this debt of 
gratitude by promoting the public good and becoming a good citizen.  
 
Gratitude is also an important motivation for benevolence. Smith argues that “[k]indness 
is the parent of kindness; and if to be beloved by our brethren be the great object of our ambition, 
the surest way of obtaining it is, by our conduct to show that we really love them” (TMS, 266). 
The very expectation of receiving gratitude is enough to be kind without ever having received it. 
Smith goes so far as to claim that even if we do not expect gratitude from the particular person 
we have been kind to we can expect to receive it “with a tenfold increase” from all other 
spectators (Ibid). As an expression of benevolence gratitude is essential for producing acts of 
kindness. This kindness is essential for the family, friendships and society to flourish. 
Gratitude—and subsequent kindness—strengthens and improves the bonds of affection between 
families and friends, making these relationships more worthwhile and enduring. Additionally, 
gratitude can compel us to contribute to the public good through the “real improvements” of 
society such as “the cultivation of its lands, the advancements of its manufactures, the increase of 
its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, its proficiency in all the liberal 
arts and sciences” (TMS, 269). This “public benevolence” is an acknowledgment of how our 
society has helped our own pursuit of happiness TMS, 271). Similarly, Smith’s encourages the 
development of gratitude towards friends and family by assuring the reader that their kindness 
will be returned—in some form—with exponential praise. By being kind to our family, friends, 
strangers in need, and our society we can expect to be rewarded without having to bear the 
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burden of loneliness. Acts of kindness build the relationships of affection required for mutual 
sympathy and thus contribute directly to our peace of mind and tranquility. More importantly, 
this kindness allows us to love others as we love ourselves. 
 
Smith’s opening discussion of benevolence highlights this virtue’s natural origin. The 
title for this chapter makes it clear that Nature recommends certain individuals to “our care and 
attention” (TMS, 258).  However, Smith argues that other individuals come under our care and 
attention only after we have cared for ourselves. This is, in part, a practical concern for Smith. 
Little benevolence can be expected from people who lack the ability to care for themselves. 
Accordingly, Smith evokes a specific Stoic maxim at the beginning of this chapter, claiming that, 
“[e]very man […] is first principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, 
in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than any other person” (Ibid). However, 
Smith continues by explaining that after caring for ourselves, Nature recommends other 
individuals to our care and attention. Smith argues that “[a]fter himself, the member of his own 
family, those who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers 
and sisters, are naturally the objects of his warmest affections” (Ibid). Similar to prudence, 
benevolence has a familial origin. Smith goes on to explain exactly why Nature has placed 
family members under our attention and care. First, Smith argues that our family members are 
“naturally and usually the persons upon whose happiness or misery [our] conduct must have the 
greatest influence” (Ibid). This first argument is about efficacy. Members of our family, 
according to Smith, stand to benefit the most from our benevolence and suffer the most from its 
lack.355 Because we have the greatest possible influence over the happiness and misery of our 
family members we ought to extend our benevolence to them first. Similarly, Nature 
recommends family members to our care and attention because we know these individuals better 
than we know anyone else and thus know better how to affect their happiness. Smith argues that 
this is because of our “habitual sympathy” with our family members which is “more precise and 
determinate, than it can be with the greater part of other people” (Ibid). This stronger sympathy 
allows us to better understand “how everything is likely to affect” their happiness (Ibid). Nature 
                                                 
355 Because prudence necessarily precedes benevolence it is reasonable to argue that the happiness of our family also 
depends, in some measure, upon this first virtue as well. 
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thus recommends family members to our care and attention because we have the requisite 
expertise on how to best serve their well-being. 
 
  Smith argues that this benevolence within the family is ultimately “necessary for its 
tranquility and happiness” (TMS, 259). Furthermore, Smith argues that this is a product of “the 
wisdom of nature” (Ibid). Consequently we expect to see great bonds of affection within families 
and when we see a lack of benevolence, Smith claims, we are horrified (Ibid). Most familial 
affection is so natural as to require no specific attention from Smith. For example, he points to 
the near universal affection for children with which Nature has endowed us. This affection is so 
profound that it is even felt by “the most brutal and hard-hearted” (TMS, 259). An important 
cause of this near universal sympathy with children is their dependency. Smith argues “the 
existence of the child, for some time after it comes into the world, depends altogether upon the 
care of the parent”, however, Smith claims that “the parent does not naturally depend upon the 
care of the child” (Ibid.) Through this juxtaposition Smith concludes that “[i]n the eye of nature 
[…] a child is a more important object than an old man; and excites a much more lively, as well 
as a much more universal sympathy. It ought to do so” (Ibid). Smith goes on to add, somewhat 
coldly, that children have more to offer and look forward to over the long term, arguing that 
“[e]verything may be expected, or at least hoped, from the child […] very little can be either 
expected or hoped from the old man” (Ibid).356 This dependency, combined with habitual 
sympathy, ultimately makes the bond from parent to child the strongest bond of benevolence we 
are capable of forming. This, it would seem, is part of Nature’s plan and an essential part of our 
teleology. The entire present and future of children seems to depend upon the affection and 
benevolence of parents. It should be easy to see how difficult the pursuit of tranquility would be 
if this affection and benevolence did not exist and children were left to fend for themselves 
during their time of weakness and dependency.  
 
Smith appears to consider much of the affection and benevolence within families to be 
both inevitable and necessary. Because of the proximity and dependency of our family members 
                                                 
356 This appears problematic at first and seems to suggest we have no natural benevolence towards the elderly. 
However, Smith is outlining the powerful, instinctual, affection we have for all children. We certainly do 
sympathize with the elderly, and often owe them a great deal of gratitude but not merely for being old.  
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it may be safe to assume that even the vainest individual could feel the necessary affection for 
their children, siblings, and spouse. A corrupt love of praise does not necessarily make someone 
apathetic to the needs of their family. Gratitude, it would seem, plays a very limited role in 
sustaining most familial relationships. However, there is a familial bond which Smith believes 
gratitude is essential to and encourages the reader to develop this sentiment. The dependency and 
proximity that once bound parents and children disappears as children grow up. As adults it 
would be undignified for grown children to remain dependent on their parents. Such a 
dependency, though different than the “fawning puppy”, would indicate a lack of prudence, 
which Smith claims can evoke the “neglect or […] contempt” of others (TMS, 255). However, 
Smith argues that a bond of affection still exists between parents and their adult children. This 
bond is maintained through the children’s gratitude. Having their parents to thank for their 
survival and happiness children ought to pay this kindness back, especially as their parents 
become less and less independent.357 To be properly benevolent, and live a life of 
praiseworthiness, Smith encourages us to treat our parents with the love and kindness we 
expected and required as children. Although this may not bring us the praise and attention 
lavished upon the rich and great it will contribute to our pursuit of happiness and help us avoid 
the loneliness caused by corruption. 
Despite being an essential component of praiseworthiness and our pursuit of tranquility, 
familial relationships cannot be our only bonds of affection and benevolence. This is especially 
true in commercial society. In non-commercial societies the family was the primary source for 
protection. However, these familial bonds become weaker and less necessary in commercial 
society (TMS, 263). Consequently, to satisfy our need for mutual sympathy and the desire to 
contribute to the happiness of others we must establish benevolent relationships with people 
outside of our family. Friendships provide us with a necessary outlet for our benevolent first 
principle while also providing us with the mutual sympathy required for peace of mind. 
Gratitude may be what drives us to develop friendships with others; the continuous and gracious 
exchange of kindness builds the type of affection required for this relationship. By contributing 
                                                 
357 It may be worth noting that the reverse of this should also hold true. If parents made no attempt to contribute to 
the happiness of their children then they should expect no gratitude later in life. The children of abusive or 




to each other’s happiness two friends can fully and completely satisfy the requirements of the 
golden rule, which requires us to love others so that we might love ourselves proportionately. 
  
Smith admits to a plurality of friendship types but highlights one—virtue friendship—as 
the most essential. Though all friendships allow us to develop and foster our gratitude and 
benevolence, virtue friendship is deeper and more enduring than all others. Smith characterizes 
virtue friendship as:  
that which is founded altogether upon esteem and approbation of his good conduct and 
behavior, confirmed by experience and long acquaintance, is, by far, the most respectable. 
Such friendships, arising not from a constrained sympathy […] but from a natural 
sympathy, from an involuntary feeling that the persons whom we attach ourselves are the 
natural and proper objects of esteem and approbation; can only exist among men of virtue 
[…] The attachment which is founded upon the love of virtue, as it is certainly, of all 
attachments, the most virtuous; so it is likewise the happiest, as well as the most permanent 
and secure (TMS, 265) 
The affection we develop for virtuous people is ultimately based on a natural sympathy with the 
merits of virtue. It is a natural shared love and respect for virtue that brings virtue friends 
together and causes them to benevolently contribute to each other’s pursuit of happiness. 
Additionally, Smith claims that our affection for the virtuous need not be confined to a single 
person but “may safely embrace all the wise and virtuous” (Ibid). With the possible exceptions of 
parental bonds with children, the affection we develop for virtuous people is the strongest bond 
of benevolence we can develop. The same may be true for the significance of these bonds. 
According to Smith, virtue friendship plays an important role in helping us develop and maintain 
virtue. Smith claims that the company we keep has a direct impact on our own character. 
According to Smith our: 
natural disposition to accommodate and to assimilate, as much as we can, our own 
sentiments, principles, and feelings, to those which we see fixed and rooted in the persons 
whom we are obliged to live and converse a great deal with, is the cause of the contiguous 
effects of both good and bad company (TMS, 265). 
In other words, we are naturally inclined to develop the character of those people we spend the 
majority of our time with. It is this principle of emulation that makes virtue friendship so 
important to our pursuit and maintenance of virtue.358  
                                                 
358 Griswold (1999) argues that “Given the importance of […] emulation in the development of the agent’s love of 
virtue—that is, the love of what is praiseworthy as distinguished from praise---it will matter that the agent be 




Befriending the right types of people (i.e. the virtuous) is, on its own, likely not enough to 
cure us of vanity. However, it does play a positive role in relieving us of our loneliness and 
shaping our character. Smith claims that the person “who associates chiefly with the wise and 
virtuous, though he may not himself become either wise or virtuous, cannot help conceiving a 
certain respect at least for wisdom and virtue” (TMS, 265). Alternatively, Smith argues, people 
who keep company with the “profligate and dissolute” will either develop these same manners or 
at least lose the “abhorrence” they originally felt for them (Ibid). Consequently, virtue friendship 
plays a significant role in encouraging and sustaining the development of virtue. Though this 
type of friendship likely cannot produce virtue on its own it does help to produce the conditions 
necessary for virtue to develop and thrive.  
 
 In addition to family and friends Smith claims our gratitude and benevolence is drawn to 
strangers who are either “greatly fortunate” or who are “greatly unfortunate” (TMS, 266). The 
former are the “rich and powerful” and the latter the “poor and wretched”. What draws our 
benevolence to these individuals is their “extraordinary situation” (Ibid). However, these two 
situations arouse different sentiments and different obligations. Our sympathy with the rich, and 
their fortunate circumstances, produces our respect for the “distinction of ranks” and 
subsequently the “peace and order of society” (Ibid). The sympathy we have for the wretched 
condition of the poor, on the other hand, produces compassion and a subsequent desire for the 
“relief and consolation of human misery” (Ibid). The greatly fortunate and greatly unfortunate 
arouse our benevolent sentiments, despite the absence of gratitude. However, our obligation to 
act on these sentiments is limited, especially in the case of the unfortunate. Smith makes it clear 
that the “peace and order of society is of more important than even the relief of miserable” 
(TMS, 266-267). Thus, somewhat paradoxically, our benevolence causes us to forego 
compassion for those in need in favor of adulation for the rich and powerful. 
 
After outlining how our benevolence towards individuals is generated and how it operates 
Smith discusses the third—and perhaps most important—sphere of benevolence. Similar to our 
benevolence towards individuals our benevolence towards the sovereign is a product of the 
Author of Nature’s plan. Similarly, it is gratitude that determines and shapes this relationship. 
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Accordingly, Smith argues that “[t]he same principles that direct the order in which individuals 
are recommended to our benevolence, direct that likewise in which societies are recommended to 
it. Those to which it is, or may be of most importance, are first and principally recommended to 
it” (TMS, 268). It is our natural desire to contribute to the well-being and happiness of others 
that inspires our benevolent affection for our society. Our benevolence towards our own “state or 
sovereignty” over any foreign sovereignties appears to be somewhat similar to our benevolence 
towards children; both are partly determined by dependency and efficacy. The society that 
depends on and benefits most from our benevolence is our own. Smith argues that our “state or 
sovereignty in which we have been born and educated, and under the protection of which we 
continue to live, is […] the greatest society upon whose happiness or misery our good or bad 
conduct can have much influence” (Ibid). Here Smith provides the semblance of social contract 
theory; our own sovereignty is worthy of our benevolence because it has provided for us. In 
exchange for things like education and protection, we owe the sovereign a debt of gratitude and 
some measure of benevolence. However, Smith goes on to add that our society is also 
recommended to our care by Nature (TMS, 269). Because we and “all the objects of our kindest 
affections” are dependent on the sovereign Nature has seen fit to ensure that we will support our 
all of society with our benevolence (Ibid). Because society depends on our benevolence, what it 
means to be a good citizen is important. Consequently, much of Smith’s discussion on 
benevolence towards societies contains insight into proper citizenship. Citizenship is, according 
to Smith, a product of our gratitude and thus a necessary step in our pursuit of praiseworthiness 
and tranquility.  
 
First and foremost, Smith characterizes a good citizen as someone with “public spirit” 
who contributes to the happiness of other citizens by improving society (TMS, 272-275). This 
public spirit is caused by both a “a certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of 
government which is actually established” and “an earnest desire to render the condition of our 
fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can” (TMS, 273). Additionally, a good (i.e. 
a gracious) citizen sees the prosperity of their country as a reflection of their own honor and 
dignity and views all the great people their country has produced (poets, philosophers etc.) with 
“the most partial admiration” (Ibid.). This public spirit is what animates us to contribute to the 
tranquility of our fellow citizens. From this Smith concludes that “[he] is not a citizen who is not 
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disposed to respect the laws and obey the civil magistrate; and he is certainly not a good citizen 
who does not wish to promote, by every means in his power, the welfare of the whole society of 
his fellow-citizens” (Ibid). Public spirit thus compels us to respect and adhere to the existing 
social order while also promoting and improving the well-being of our fellows. Smith argues that 
during peaceful and quiet times, those two principles generally coincide and lead to the same 
conduct (TMS, 273, 275-276). However, Smith admits that respecting laws and the existing 
order can conflict with the well-being of society. In such instances he claims that we require 
 “the highest effort of political wisdom to determine when a real patriot ought to support and 
endeavour to re-establish the authority of the old system, and when [they] ought to give way to 
the more daring, but often dangerous spirit of innovation” (TMS, 273). Nevertheless, the support 
of the established government evidently seems to be the best expedient for maintaining the safe, 
respectable, and happy situation of our fellow-citizens (TMS, 273). The highest and noblest 
expression of public spirit—and thus of gratitude and benevolence—is wise and moderate 
legislation. According to Smith a wise legislator is capable of contributing to the “tranquility and 
happiness of his fellow citizens for many succeeding generations” (TMS, 274). In the process 
this leader becomes the “reformer and legislator of a great state” which Smith describes as “the 
greatest and noblest of all characters” (Ibid). However, for most people merely being a good 
citizen is enough to ensure their adherence to the golden rule and the subsequent standards of 
praiseworthiness.  
 
 Unlike his discussion of prudence—which seeks to decrease the reader’s self-interest—
Smith’s discussion of benevolence aims to increase our tendency and desire to contribute to the 
well-being and happiness of other people. The key to this—and ultimately to the perfection of 
our nature and subsequent praiseworthiness—is gratitude. Gratitude helps us build the 
relationships of affection that allow us to properly express our benevolent sentiments. 
Furthermore, the expectation of receiving the gratitude of others ought to help compel us to 
become good family members, good friends, and good citizens. The best way to accomplish this, 
Smith argues, is to be kind to others and to actively contribute to their pursuit of tranquility. 
Similarly, graciously rewarding people who have contributed to our happiness helps develop the 
praiseworthy sentiments of benevolence that inevitably contribute to our peace of mind. Though 
prudence is essential to our tranquility it is benevolence that allows our conscience to become 
163 
 
truly authoritative and conform to the golden rule. The surest way to become worthy of love and 
praise is to become a gracious family member, friend, and citizen. However, to ensure that this 
endures we must take steps to ensure our passions do not lead us astray. 
 
5.3 The Command of the Passions 
 Self-command is the final cardinal virtue in Smith’s vision of eudaimonia and the final 
component to praiseworthiness. Self-command is the strength of character required for 
controlling our passions.359 Self-command is a disposition to moderate our passions so that we 
can adhere to the golden rule and continue our pursuit of tranquility. Unlike prudence and 
benevolence, Smith characterizes self-command as an artificial, learned, virtue. Self-command is 
learned primarily through enduring hardships. Smith argues “[w]ar is the great school for 
acquiring and exercising” self-command (TMS, 282). In war, individuals learn to conquer their 
fear of death and this courage subsequently makes mastering the passions relatively simple. Once 
an individual has conquered their fear of death the passions that divert us away from virtue seem 
petty in comparison. Paradoxically, given his belief in the superiority of standing armies, only a 
very few would have access to the greatest means for acquiring self-command, limiting the 
development of this virtue to a fraction of the population (WN, V.1.a.29). However, Smith 
evidently believes that self-command can be developed without enduring incredible hardships 
like war. In his discussion of this virtue Smith attempts to persuade the reader to develop self-
command by championing its merits and rewards. Accordingly he argues that some of the most 
celebrated “heroes of ancient and modern history” are those who practiced self-command (TMS, 
281). Smith goes on to argue that even the “greatest criminals” are respected and admired when 
they show their ability to control their passions (TMS, 282). When self-command is combined 
with prudence and benevolence is becomes even more celebrated and worthy of praise. Thus, 
Smith assures the reader that exercising self-command—especially in combination with the other 
virtues—will satisfy their desire for admiration and recognition without forcing us into the vain 
and anxious pursuit of riches and greatness. Self-command completes Smith’s theory of self-
                                                 
359 Several authors have characterized self-command as a motivation. For example, Montes (2004) argues that self-
command is the motive that gives all the other virtues their value (p.109). Vivenza (2001) agrees, claiming that self-
command gives the other virtues their value. I believe this interpretation is misguided. Although self-command plays 
an essential role in adding value to the others the motivation for acting virtuously is the desire to be happy which is 
in turn brought on by our natural desire to be praiseworthy.  
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perfection by providing a means to avoid backsliding into the vanities of corruption and away 
from Nature’s plan. The purpose of self-command is to condition us against the temptations of 
fame (i.e. greatness) and fortune so that we can identify, and pursue, our natural telos. 
 
 Smith opens his discussion of self-command by acknowledging the gap between knowing 
what is virtuous and acting virtuously. According to Smith: 
[t]he [individual] who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and 
of proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect 
knowledge of those rules will not alone enable [them] to act in this manner: [their] own 
passions are apt to mislead [them]; sometimes to drive [them] and sometimes to seduce 
[them] to violate all the rules which [they] [themselves], in all [their] sober and cool hours, 
approves of (TMS, 280) 
 
By controlling our passions, which divert us away from virtue, self-command bridges the gap 
between knowledge and action and allows the individual to be truly and consistently virtuous. 
Thus, Smith argues that “[t]he most perfect knowledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect 
command, will not always enable [us] to do our duty” (Ibid). Self-command is thus essential to 
overcoming any weakness of will that may conflict with being praiseworthy. Similarly, by 
controlling the passions, self-command transform a few scattered acts of virtue into a lifetime of 
habitual virtue. In addition to helping us put our knowledge of virtue into action, self-command 
also helps us act virtuously when it truly counts. According to Smith, “[t]o act according to the 
dictates of prudence, of justice, and proper beneficence, seems to have no great merit where there 
is no temptation to do otherwise” (TMS, 284). Being prudent, benevolent or just is always 
respectable; however, they become truly praiseworthy and perfect when we resist the urge to act 
otherwise. This is how self-command combines with the other virtues to give them their “lustre 
and beauty” (Ibid). As noted above, the temptations that lead us away from the other virtues are, 
typically, our passions which “drive” and “seduce” us away from prudence and benevolence 
(Ibid.). Thus, when we control our passions we can maintain our adherence to the golden rule 
and continue our pursuit of tranquility.  
 
Smith divides the passions that tempt us away from virtue and praiseworthiness into two 
classes. The first are the passions that drive us away from virtue. Examples of such passions 
include anger and fear. Smith argues that these passions are extremely difficult to restrain even 
for a moment (TMS, 280). As an example, fear may divert us away from the demands of justice 
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if we are too afraid to punish people who violate it, perhaps out of fear of retribution. Likewise, 
if we are angry with a friend or family member we may fail to act appropriately benevolent 
towards them. A great deal of self-command involves properly controlling our anger or fear and, 
quite often, both of these passions simultaneously. When we successfully control these passions, 
through self-command and adherence to the golden rule, we develop and demonstrate the minor 
virtues of “fortitude, manhood, [and] strength of mind” (TMS, 281). However, how we should 
control our anger is different from how we ought to control our fear. Consequently, how self-
command restrains us in situations when we are angry differs from how it restrains us when we 
are afraid. When our anger and fear are properly controlled, we are more likely to attain our 
telos.  
 
Controlling our anger and fear is essential to our exercise of prudence and benevolence. 
However, independent of these virtues, our command of these passions remains essential to our 
pursuit of tranquility. This is especially true of anger. Smith argues that when our anger is 
“restrained and properly attempered” so that it is agreeable to our conscience it manifests as “just 
indignation” (TMS, 283). This controlled manifestation of anger is as necessary for the 
protection of our dignity and security. Accordingly, Smith claims that “to live comfortably in the 
world” we need to “defend our dignity and rank” (TMS, 287). Furthermore, Smith argues that to 
we need to be appropriately sensible to our own injuries and misfortunates so that we may 
respond to them accordingly (TMS, 288). If we are insensible to these we put our ease of body 
and peace of mind at risk. We must control our anger (and all our passions) with our 
authoritative conscience and according desire to be praiseworthy. A lack of anger when our 
station and rank are insulted would, according to Smith, make us cowards. Cowardice is 
antithetical to tranquility because there is “[n]o character is more contemptible than that of a 
coward” (TMS, 287). However, Smith also claims that forgiveness is also virtuous. According to 
Smith, the individual “who can cast away all animosity” towards someone who has “grievously 
offended” them always “seems justly to merit our highest admiration” (TMS, 283). This is 
especially true when individuals put aside their hostility towards each other to work for the 
greater good of society. Ultimately, the proper control of our anger and fear not only supports 
our own happiness, but contributes to the happiness of society as well and in doing so self-




The second class of passions self-command helps us guard against are more directly 
relevant to moral corruption and the according temptations of wealth and greatness. Smith labels 
these as the “selfish gratifications” (TMS, 280). According to Smith, these selfish gratifications 
include the “love of ease, of pleasure, of applause” and other associated indulgences (Ibid).360 
Unlike fear and anger, which drive us away from the virtue, the selfish gratifications “seduce” or 
tempt us away from prudence and benevolence and, most likely, towards the gaudy and glittering 
appearance of happiness enjoyed by the rich and great (Ibid). Additionally, contrary to our 
command of fear and anger it can be quite easy to restrain our indulgence in the selfish 
gratifications. However, these passions persist with us throughout our lives and, Smith argues, 
giving in to them can “mislead into great deviations” (Ibid). Consequently, though we have an 
easier time commanding these second passions for a moment, their constant presence in our lives 
and their potential to cause great deviations makes them as much a threat to our pursuit of virtue 
as fear and anger. Self-command is responsible for restraining these passions and when we 
successfully control them we develop “temperance, decency, modesty, and moderation” (TMS, 
281). Our command of the selfish gratifications is always for the good. Unlike our command of 
anger and fear, which can often be used for great and terrible crimes, Smith claims that it is 
difficult to use our self-command of the selfish gratifications to any ignoble or terrible end. Thus, 
our command of these passions is more straightforward than our command of anger and fear; 
restraining our desire for ease, pleasure and applause always contributes to our pursuit of virtue. 
Furthermore, self-command helps prevent us from veering away from the pursuit of tranquility 
and towards the empty vanities and luxuries the rich and great enjoy.  
 
By controlling our passions self-command helps us distinguish true happiness from its 
mere appearance. The passions that drive and seduce us away from our pursuit of tranquility 
“mislead” us about the true nature of happiness (TMS, 280). Rather than pursuing prudence or 
benevolence, our passions would convince us to give in to unrestrained anger, fear and 
perpetually gratify our desire for ease, pleasure and applause. Self-command prevents us from 
                                                 
360 Smith seems to be suggesting that a love of superficial pleasures is a passion. The connection between ease and 
the passions is only tenuously made. Regardless, self-command is charged with ensuring these gratifications do not 
divert us away from virtue.  
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being misled or tempted away from virtue by controlling the passions. Consequently, it helps us 
recognize the voice of Nature and thus how to properly and consistently follow the golden rule. 
Additionally, self-command helps to ensure we develop and exercise both prudence and 
benevolence; especially when there is significant temptation to behave otherwise. On its own 
self-command does little to alleviate the anxiety and loneliness a corrupted individual may 
experience. Its role is primarily supportive: preventing us from diverted away by our passions 
once we have adopted prudence and benevolence. Furthermore, Smith warns us against 
developing self-command without prudence or benevolence. Without these other virtues to guide 
it, self-command may make us more vicious than the vain love of praise ever could. However, 
despite its supportive role, self-command is no less essential to our pursuit of tranquility, 
especially in a morally corrupt commercial society that admires, celebrates, and promotes the 
vain and frivolous lifestyle of the rich and great.. The opportunity and desire to satisfy the selfish 
gratification may be constant and ever-present in a society built on the constant production of 
luxuries. Regardless of how prudent or benevolent a person becomes, the danger of being lured 
away by trinkets and baubles will always exist.  
 
Conclusion  
 The virtues presented in Part VI of TMS fully distinguish praiseworthiness from mere 
propriety and fully establishes the authority of conscience Smith outlines at the beginning of the 
book. The voice of Nature, spoken to us through the impartial spectator guides us to prudence, 
benevolence, and self-command. These three virtues provide an alternative to moral corruption 
and its symptoms. Prudence offers a means to satisfy our self-interested desire to better our 
condition and capture the attention of others without giving in to the anxious and potentially 
reckless desire to be rich and great. Through the gradual accumulation of wealth our self-
interested sentiments will be more reliably and stably satisfied. Benevolence aids in alleviating 
moral corruption by relieving us of our loneliness. The gratitude recommended by Smith ensures 
we develop bonds of affection with family, friends, and fellow citizens rather than selfishly 
pursuing a vain desire for praise. Finally, self-command helps this remedy to corruption endure. 
By controlling the passions, self-command prevents us from being diverted away from the 
virtues.  By curing us of the anxiety and loneliness, prudence, benevolence, and self-command 
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help to facilitate the exercise of our authoritative conscience and the successful pursuit of our 
telos.   
In addition to treating the symptoms of corruption, Smith’s virtue ethics provides the 
means for securing the material and psychological conditions for tranquility. When our self-
interest and benevolence are successfully balanced they cease to conflict with each other and 
become complimentary. This is what Smith refers to as the “perfection” of our nature (TMS, 31). 
This balance is reached through adherence to the golden rule which subsequently perfects our 
moral faculties and leads us to a life of tranquility. It is our authoritative conscience that directs 
us to the golden rule by compelling us to act in a praiseworthy way rather than merely 
conforming to propriety. Consequently, knowing what the virtuous life consists of provides 
additional content to our understanding of the standards of praiseworthiness. In effect Smith’s 
concept of praiseworthiness becomes synonymous with virtue and the praiseworthy person can 
be understood as the individual who is prudent, benevolent, and self-commanding. Added to 
these standards are the other various characteristics Smith associates with the cardinal virtues 
including: honesty, frugality, friendship, citizenship, strength of character, and just indignation. 
All of the virtuous characteristics discussed by Smith in TMS’ Part VI are consequences of 
Natural (i.e. proper) self-love and love of others.361When these two loves are properly guided by 
our authoritative conscience we will necessarily develop the characteristics that bring us ease of 
body and peace of mind. Smith connects his cardinal virtues to the Author of Nature’s 
providential plan and argues that their intended function is to provide the individual with all of 
the internal and external goods required for happiness. Accordingly, Smith’s theory of virtue is 
the culmination of his teleology and fully establishes the authority of conscience by supplying 





                                                 
361 Even self-command, though an artificial virtue, is tasked with controlling our passions for the purpose of 




 The 6th edition of TMS cannot be understood without a complete analysis and grasp of 
praiseworthiness. The significant changes Smith made to the final edition of TMS offer an 
alternative to the morality developed in the previous five editions. These earlier editions focused 
on a morality that prioritized social cohesion. This social cohesion is made possible by the 
standards of propriety, produced by the routine operation of our sympathy. However, in the 6th 
edition Smith supplements this social cohesion with a morality that aims at self-perfection. This 
self-perfection is facilitated by praiseworthiness. How praiseworthiness facilitates the pursuit 
self-perfection is outlined in three significant changes made to the final edition of TMS. The first 
of these changes is the development of an authoritative conscience. This authoritative conscience 
is represented by the transition of the impartial spectator from the practical “man within the 
breast” and into the “demigod”. This transition makes it possible for our conscience to evaluate 
the standards of propriety and depart from them if necessary. The second significant change is 
the inclusion of the theory of moral corruption. In the 6th edition Smith argues that moral 
corruption is created by our undue admiration and emulation of the rich and great. This causes us 
to become vain and potentially miserable. This addition reveals a possible reason for the 
inclusion of self-perfection in the 6th edition of TMS. As the sole standard for moral judgment, 
propriety may be insufficient in ensuring proper moral development. Moreover, the standards of 
propriety may be an obstacle in our pursuit of happiness. The final addition relevant to the theory 
of self-perfection is the virtue ethics outlined by Smith in Part VI of TMS. The virtues discussed 
by Smith in this addition detail the characteristics of a person who has successfully perfected 
themselves. All three of these changes should be understood in relation to the concept of 
praiseworthiness. Praiseworthiness is the standard of judgment that motivates and guides our 
desire to perfect ourselves. Thus, to understand self-perfection—and the 6th edition of TMS—we 
must understand praiseworthiness and how it differs from mere propriety. 
 Focusing on praiseworthiness ought to help us understand why Smith made significant 
changes to the 6th edition of TMS and what effect these changes had on the meaning of the text. 
The significance of praiseworthiness has not been fully addressed in the secondary literature. 
Too often treatments of this concept have been perfunctory and have failed to address 
praiseworthiness’ importance to TMS and the changes made to the final edition. Within these 
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limited analyses there exists a tendency to link praiseworthiness with propriety and treat it as a 
mere appendage of the latter.362 This, I believe, has created significant gaps in our understanding 
of TMS’ 6th edition. Most significantly, without a firm and thorough understanding of 
praiseworthiness, and how it differs from propriety, there exists no reliable explanation for how 
to identify and pursue self-perfection nor would we have a means to properly evaluate existing 
moral conventions. Consequently, self-perfection would amount to conforming to the arbitrary 
(and possible vicious) whims of popular opinion (i.e. propriety). Although this makes social 
cohesion possible, it does not provide a means to become truly virtuous or truly happy. I have 
sought to fill in the gaps in our understanding of TMS by disentangling praiseworthiness from 
propriety and relating it directly to the major changes Smith made to the 6th edition. This, I 
believe, gives us a better understanding of what self-perfection is, how it is attained, and what 
problems it can resolve. Furthermore, this more complete understanding of praiseworthiness 
provides insights into why Smith altered the 6th edition of TMS and what he hoped to accomplish 
with these alterations. Ultimately, praiseworthiness transforms TMS in to a text that warns us 
about the limitations of conventional morality and provides a means to transcend this with 
distinct and superior moral standards.  
 To pursue the self-perfection Smith outlines in the 6th edition of TMS we need some 
means to discover what this entails. Smith provides such a means with the development of the 
authoritative conscience. To understand how our conscience can become authoritative it is 
necessary to have a complete picture of praiseworthiness and how it relates to the development 
of conscience. Without this there is no convincing explanation for how our conscience can make 
judgments about existing moral conventions or why such judgments would be considered 
superior to popular opinion. Praiseworthiness allows our conscience to become fully 
authoritative by liberating it from propriety and giving us distinct, superior, standards for moral 
judgment. Consequently, praiseworthiness ensures that the judgments from our own conscience 
will not be as arbitrary as popular opinion. Unlike propriety, which only describes morals, 
                                                 
362 Griswold (1999) and Otteson (2002) are guilty of conflating praiseworthiness and propriety. Additionally, 
because they reject the existence of superior, non-conventional, morals in TMS, empiricist readings also implicitly 
deny any distinction between propriety and praiseworthiness. See, Haakonssen (1981), Campbell (1971) and Winch 
(1978). Evensky (2005) and Hanley (2009) appreciate the importance of praiseworthiness but do not provide a 
reliable means for determining what it entails or requires. 
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praiseworthiness tells us what morality should be. This allows us to identify and pursue self-
perfection rather than merely conforming to arbitrary popular opinion. Simultaneously, this 
provides us with a means of evaluating a society’s morals by comparing them to what our 
conscience determines to be praiseworthy. Smith’s use of teleological arguments provides the 
means for judging what is praiseworthy. We become praiseworthy individuals when we adhere 
to the Author of Nature’s providential plan rather than conforming to the rules of propriety.  
 In addition to better explaining the development of conscience and its role in directing us 
towards self-perfection, my focus on praiseworthiness provides a more thorough understanding 
of Smith’s theory of moral corruption. Rather than focusing solely on corruption’s psychological 
symptoms or political consequences I have sought to understand the genesis of this corruption. 
For moral corruption to be significant there must be some way of living that we are corrupted 
from. Otherwise the pursuit of riches and greatness for their own sake would be a matter of 
personal choice worthy of the same approbation as any other component of propriety. However, 
praiseworthiness helps to explain how corruption occurs and why we should want to avoid it. 
Moral corruption diverts us away from the pursuit of self-perfection by distorting our natural 
desire to be praiseworthy in to a vain love of praise. This reshapes our conscience and makes us 
anxious, lonely, and miserable. It is ultimately our very desire to be praiseworthy that makes our 
corruption possible while also explaining exactly what it is we are corrupted from. Additionally, 
praiseworthiness provides a potential means of remedying corruption, if it can be redirected back 
towards the pursuit of self-perfection. 
 Finally, the focus on praiseworthiness contributes to our understanding of TMS by 
explaining why prudence, benevolence, and self-command are virtuous, how we develop them, 
and what they provide for us. These cardinal virtues provide the content to the self-perfection 
Smith advocates for in the 6th edition of TMS. When we develop and exercise prudence, 
benevolence, and self-command we will have perfected our character and become truly 
praiseworthy individuals. Thus, these virtues, recommended to us by Nature, are what our 
authoritative conscience aims for when it uses praiseworthiness to guide our behavior. These 
virtues also provide us with a means of evaluating propriety and possibly improving it. In 
addition to providing the content for praiseworthiness, the virtues also offer an alternative to 
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moral corruption and a potential means for redirecting our conscience away from the vain love of 
praise and back towards the desire to be praiseworthy.  
 A thorough understanding of praiseworthiness offers an interpretation of TMS that fully 
explains the additions Smith made to the 6th edition and how these fit together. Our authoritative 
conscience allows us to pursue self-perfection and live a life of virtue and tranquility. However, 
the temptations of wealth and greatness divert us from this pursuit. Smith attempts to reorient us 
back towards self-perfection by recommending the virtues of prudence, benevolence, and self-
command. All of this is tied together by praiseworthiness, which allows us to identify and pursue 
perfection, avoid the temptations of wealth and greatness, and develop the virtues that bring us 
the tranquility Nature designed us to attain. Furthermore, this interpretation provides a possible 
explanation for why Smith made significant changes to the final edition of what is arguably his 
most important work. It suggests dissatisfaction with conventional morality and a recognition 
that propriety cannot not, on its own, generate good morals and happy individuals. Thus, Smith 
may have altered TMS in order to intervene and persuade people to pursue what is praiseworthy 
rather than what is merely proper and conventional.  
 In addition to explaining the changes made to the 6th edition, and Smith’s potential 
motivations behind these changes, praiseworthiness is capable of reconciling a potential conflict 
within TMS. Smith presents this conflict in the very opening lines of TMS. Smith claims that 
human beings contain two potentially competing motivations; self-interest and benevolence 
(TMS, 13). These motivations can pull us in different directions but both are necessary to our 
well-being and possible pursuit of self-perfection. Self-interest is what makes the survival and 
propagation of the species possible. Additionally, the satisfaction of our self-interest is what 
makes society possible. The self-interested respect for justice is the pillar that maintains society 
by protecting individuals from harm. Furthermore, it is the continuous satisfaction of our self-
interest that generates the opulence that helps to define commercial society and makes the 
pursuit of virtue and tranquility more accessible and attainable than in any other society. 
However, commercial society’s reliance on self-interest is not benign. To truly satisfy the 
conditions required for the pursuit of virtue and tranquility commercial society relies on the 
delusional belief that wealth and greatness will make people happy. Vanity is the engine that 
creates the opulence and for commercial society to thrive it requires individuals who, like the 
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poor man’s son, anxiously toil away in the deluded hope that they will be rewarded with 
tranquility. Despite its reliance on a delusion, commercial society (and any of its potential 
variants) is still the best possible regime for the pursuit and attainment of self-perfection. 
Commercial society creates the conditions wherein people can develop the characteristics and 
behaviors that will lead to a life of tranquility. Though it relies on vain self-interest in order to 
thrive, commercial society gives us the option of developing our benevolence if we choose to. 
 Whereas self-interest makes survival and society possible, benevolence makes these 
desirable. Family, friendship, generosity, gratitude, etc. all add value to life that self-interest 
cannot and are all necessary to the pursuit of happiness (i.e. tranquility). We develop these 
benevolent qualities by pursuing praiseworthiness. Though we could survive in a society based 
entirely on self-interest, we would not choose this society unless it gave us the opportunities to 
express our benevolence in meaningful ways. Though it relies on deluded self-interest, by 
generating opulence commercial society provides us with these opportunities. We can take 
advantage of these by becoming virtuous via praiseworthiness. The virtues of prudence, 
benevolence, and self-command allow us to express both our self-interested and benevolent 
motivations in a way that is consistent and complementary. Thus, we can develop friendships 
and express our gratitude and generosity in commercial society without infringing upon our self-
interested desire to improve our condition. Rather, improving our condition through prudence 
makes it possible for us to continue to grow and express our benevolence. The more 
praiseworthy individuals there are in a society, the more benevolence there will be. This will 
improve commercial society, making it a more desirable regime and more likely to contribute to 
our happiness.  
 Praiseworthiness is both a defense of commercial society and an advocacy for 
benevolence. Smith recognizes that commercial society contains serious imperfections. 
However, in recognizing its imperfections, Smith is better able to defend commercial society and 
provide potential improvements. Commercial society should not be solely defended based upon 
the wealth it creates or the liberty and security it provides. What truly makes commercial society 
worth pursuing and maintaining is the opportunity it provides for everyone to pursue 
praiseworthiness. Unlike past societies characterized by poverty and direct dependence, 
commercial society allows everyone to choose the pursuit of praiseworthiness over adherence to 
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mere propriety. To take advantage of this opportunity Smith encourages us to develop and 
promote benevolence. Though it cannot be institutionalized or mandated, benevolence will 
improve people’s lives within commercial society. Though its imperfections cannot be 
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